Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, TAPIA-ORTI
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 171 F.3d 150 |
| Parties | Juan Antoniolaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, DEA Agents, Michael Kevin McGurk, DEA Agent, Miles Sonn, U.S. Customs Agent, Alan Bradford Payne, U.S. Customs Agent, Dominick Gerand, U.S. Customs Agent, Defendants-Appellees, United States of America, Defendant. |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 98-6103,TAPIA-ORTI,P |
| Decision Date | 26 March 1999 |
Page 150
v.
John DOE, DEA Agents, Michael Kevin McGurk, DEA Agent, Miles
Sonn, U.S. Customs Agent, Alan Bradford Payne,
U.S. Customs Agent, Dominick Gerand,
U.S. Customs Agent, Defendants-Appellees,
United States of America, Defendant.
Second Circuit.
Decided March 26, 1999.
Page 151
Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz, pro se, White Deer, PA.
Charles P. Kelly, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney (Deborah B. Zwany, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: McLAUGHLIN, CALABRESI, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges. *
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-appellant Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz, pro se, appeals from an order dated April 16, 1998, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Thomas C. Platt, J.). The court granted summary judgment for the defendants-appellees--named and unnamed officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")--and dismissed as time-barred Tapia-Ortiz's Bivens action alleging that the officers had used excessive force while arresting him in 1991. We affirm this part of the district court's judgment. With respect to Tapia-Ortiz's claim that the district court misconstrued his motion to withdraw the United States as a party to the Bivens action as a motion to withdraw his suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, we conclude that the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA claim is not time-barred. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA action.
Tapia-Ortiz was arrested on September 7, 1991, and charged with various drug offenses of which he was eventually convicted. On September 4, 1993, less than two years after his arrest, Tapia-Ortiz mailed an administrative complaint from prison to the DEA alleging that the arresting officers had used excessive force against him. This administrative claim was received by the DEA on September 8, 1993, more than two years after the alleged incident, and was denied on the merits.
Tapia-Ortiz then timely filed a Bivens action in district court against "John Doe (DEA Agents)." On June 20, 1996, almost two years after the statute of limitations for Bivens actions had run, he filed an amended complaint that specifically identified some of the "John Doe" officers by name. Also in 1996, Tapia-Ortiz added the United States to the suit as a defendant in a federal "Tort Claim action." But in 1997, he changed his mind and moved the district court "to withdraw the United States as a defendant in this Bivens action," and the motion was granted. (emphasis added) Since the district court made...
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Tigano v. United States, 19-CV-3337 (PKC) (PK)
...alleged against them. "The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years." Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe , 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999). Even where a plaintiff has filed a complaint naming John Doe Defendants "within the three-year statute of limitatio......
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Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles, No. S143929.
...for summary judg.); Caldwell v. Amend (9th Cir. 1994) 30 F.3d 1199, 1201 (motion for new trial). 16. See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe (2d Cir.1999) 171 F.3d 150, 152 (Federal Tort Claims Act admin. filing); Faile v. Upjohn Co. (9th Cir.1993) 988 F.2d 985, 988 (service under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rul......
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Tenas-Reynard v. Palermo Taxi Inc., 14 Civ. 6974 (PGG)
...seek to 'correct a lack of knowledge, rather than a mistake of fact.'" Sloane, 2005 WL 1837441, at * 4 (quoting Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999); Sidney v. Wilson, No. 03 Civ. 830 (VM), 2005 WL 1500869, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2005)). Noting that she pleaded a vicario......
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Reed v. Sheppard, No. 6:12-CV-6655-MAT-JWF
...because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued[.]" Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam ) (quotation omitted; brackets in original). Courts typically refrain from dismissing suits against unknown or so-call......
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Tigano v. United States, 19-CV-3337 (PKC) (PK)
...claims alleged against them. "The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years." Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe , 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999). Even where a plaintiff has filed a complaint naming John Doe Defendants "within the three-year statute of limitations perio......
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Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles, No. S143929.
...for summary judg.); Caldwell v. Amend (9th Cir. 1994) 30 F.3d 1199, 1201 (motion for new trial). 16. See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe (2d Cir.1999) 171 F.3d 150, 152 (Federal Tort Claims Act admin. filing); Faile v. Upjohn Co. (9th Cir.1993) 988 F.2d 985, 988 (service under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rul......
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Reed v. Sheppard, No. 6:12-CV-6655-MAT-JWF
...of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued[.]" Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam ) (quotation omitted; brackets in original). Courts typically refrain from dismissing suits against unknown ......
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Brandon v. The City Of N.Y., No. 07 Civ. 8789(LAP).
...circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.' ” 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted)). Even if Plainti......