Tarau v. Coltea

Decision Date16 August 2017
Docket NumberCase No. 15-CV-03545
PartiesADRIAN TARAU, Plaintiff, v. LUCIAN COLTEA and AURICA COLTEA, Defendants. LUCIAN COLTEA, Counter-Plaintiff, v. ADRIAN TARAU, Counter-Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Adrian Tarau ("Tarau") and Lucian Coltea ("Coltea") met in 1999 and soon began a business relationship investing in real estate in Romania and Chicago, Illinois. (See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' L.R. 56.1(a)(3) Statement Material Facts ("Pl.'s SOF Resp."), ECF No. 98; Tarau Dep. 8:19-9:12, ECF No. 71-1.) Coltea bought a Romanian castle for $400,000 in 2003 and sold it for a handsome profit: €10.6 million or approximately $13.65 million at the exchange rate for August 2008.1 (See ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 5, 12.) In this diversity suit,2 Tarau alleges that Coltea breached a written agreement the two signed in 2007 entitling him to 25% of profits from the sale ("the 2007 agreement"). Coltea and his wife, former codefendant Aurica Coltea ("A.Coltea"), move for summary judgment. They primarily argue that the 2007 agreement is not a valid contract because Tarau gave no consideration for it.

I. BACKGROUND

Except where otherwise noted, the court draws the following undisputed facts from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements. See, e.g., Boyd v. City of Chicago, 225 F. Supp. 3d 708, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ("The facts underlying summary judgment proceedings are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 submissions."); Kirsch v. Brightstar Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 676, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (same).

In his reply, Coltea argues that paragraphs 6, 8, 10, and 13 of Tarau's Local Rule 56.1 response do not properly dispute the facts asserted, and so those facts should be deemed admitted. (See ECF No. 102 at 1-4.) To the extent Tarau's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) response asserts new facts, the court disregards them. See Kirsch, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 681 (citing Greene v. CCDN, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (N.D. Ill. 2011)) (disregarding new factual assertions in L.R. 56.1(b)(3) response). The court notes, however, that most, if not all, of the new facts appear in Tarau's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts. (Compare, e.g., ECF No. 98 ¶ 6, with ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 3-4.) Moreover, the court cannot see, and Coltea does not explain, how those facts make any difference to the disposition of his motion. The dispute in paragraph 8, for instance, over whether "Tarau testified that his business dealings with Coltea involved only one Romanian castle, which is the castle at issue here" (ECF No. 71 ¶ 8 (citation omitted)) does not matter. No party argues at summary judgment that there is any confusion about which castle is at issue. And in any event, it is undisputed that the parties had other business relationships. (See ECF No. 71 ¶ 3.) Because neither party contends these facts are material, the court need not resolve this dispute. See, e.g., Matter of the Compl. of Ingram Barge Co., 2016 A.M.C. 2582,2593 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (declining to resolve fact dispute at summary judgment because it was not material). Ironically, highlighting Local Rule 56.1 violations on immaterial issues without clearly labeling them as immaterial invites the sort of sifting the rule is supposed to help avoid. See Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 528-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that Local Rule 56.1's purpose is to save the court from having to "wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact").

In 2003, Tarau paid Coltea $200,000 in cash. (ECF No. 98 ¶¶ 6-7.) Tarau claims that he reached a verbal agreement with Coltea and two other business partners ("the 2003 agreement") to buy the Romanian castle. (Pl.'s Statement Additional Facts ¶¶ 3, 4, 13, ECF No. 100.) The verbal agreement, as Tarau describes it, also reallocated Tarau and Coltea's interests in other investments. See id.

Tarau described the terms of the 2003 agreement, the existence and terms of which Coltea disputes (see the next paragraph), at his deposition.3 (See ECF No. 71-1 at 19:4-12.) According to Tarau, he and Coltea each contributed 50% ($200,000) of the castle's purchase price. (ECF No. 104 ¶ 13.) He, Coltea, and two additional partners agreed that he and Coltea were guaranteed the return of their $200,000 investment; after the first $400,000 was distributed to Coltea and Tarau, the remainder would be split among the four partners in equal shares. (See Tarau Dep. 19: 4-12; ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 13-14.)

Coltea disputes most of Tarau's testimony in his affidavit. He avers that Tarau "declined to participate in the purchase of the Castle" in 2003. (Coltea Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 104, Ex. A.) Litigation over the 2003 purchase and other matters ensued in Romania and the United States. In 2004, the Romanian Ministry of Culture filed a lawsuit seeking cancellation of the castle's sale. (ECF No. 104 ¶ 6.) The parties disagree about when that lawsuit ended (Tarau says 2007 or 2008; Coltea says 2004), but it obviously ended favorably to Coltea. (See ECF No. 104 ¶ 7 and sources cited therein.)

Tarau also sued Coltea in Cook County, Illinois in 2005 ("the 2005 lawsuit"). (ECF No. 104 ¶ 8; ECF No. 98 ¶ 9; Compl., ECF No. 71 Ex. 3.) Tarau's complaint included an allegation that he "has knowledge that COLTEA financed the down payments of and/or remodeled a castle, and other real estate properties, in Romania with monies acquired during the course of TARAU's and COLTEA's business relationships." (ECF No. 71 Ex. 3 ¶ 158.) Tarau stated that he was entitled to profits from the sale of those Romanian properties because Coltea used "joint monies" to buy them even though Tarau never authorized him to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 159, 160.)

Tarau and Coltea settled the 2005 lawsuit in May 2005. (ECF No. 98 ¶ 12.) The written settlement agreement (the "2005 settlement agreement") provided, among other things, that Coltea would pay Tarau $50,000 (see Settlement Agreement ¶ 5, ECF No. 71-4) and that the two would deed certain Romanian and Chicago properties to one another (id. ¶¶ 4-6; ECF No. 98 ¶ 14). Tarau released Coltea:

from any and all claims, demands, liens, releases, contracts, covenants, actions, suits, causes of action, including but not limited to actions for slander of title, contributions and an investment made by Tarau to C&T and Ashland European, obligations, controversies, debts, costs, expenses, damages, judgments, orders and liabilities of whatever kind of nature in law, equity or otherwise, including but not limited to any action based on the allegations out of which this settlement arose. Without, in any way, limiting the generality of the foregoing language, this Release shall include any and all claims, demands, or causes of action, arising out of, or in any way connected with any occurrence, acts, omissions, transactions, practices or policies, which were or couldhave been asserted relating to any claim whatsoever arising out of, or related to the Lawsuit, the entities, and the Parties involved.

(Settlement Agreement ¶ 19, ECF No. 71 Ex. 4.) The 2005 settlement agreement also provides for the recovery of attorney's fees. (See id. ¶ 21.) Coltea bases his counterclaim on that provision. He asserts that Tarau breached the 2005 settlement agreement by filing this lawsuit. (See ECF No. 42 ¶¶ 9-11.) Coltea does not seek summary judgment on his counterclaim now, however.

The 2007 Agreement reads:

I, undersigned Lucian Coltea, domiciled at: 428 E 1st Street, Hinsdale, Illinois 60521, in my own name and on behalf of my wife, Aurica Coltea, in person do confirm that we agreed with Mr. Adrian Tarau, domiciled at 36 S. Ashland Avenue 402, Chicago, Illinois 60607, to buy the real estate property registered in CF 138N Busteni, Prahova, Romania, cadastral 200, purchased in accordance with the purchase contract certified by Gheorghita Albu under no. 2312/04.09.2003 with the intention to sell at a higher price, whereby, Mr. Tarau Adrian paid 50% of the purchase price with the condition that upon the sale, I will pay him an amount of 25% of the sale price.
Also, individually, I obligate myself to sell the property at the highest possible price but not less than 2,000,000 Euros, and unequivocally to pay Adrian Tarau, within 10 days of the receipt of funds upon the sale, 25% of the selling price.
This agreement is my will and cancels any prior written or oral agreement and it was finalized on August 27, 2007 in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

(Agreement, ECF No. 106 Ex. A.) Coltea signed the agreement, which was written in the Romanian language. (See id. at 1, 3 (translator's certification).)

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonablejury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In resolving summary judgment motions, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to, and all reasonable inferences from that evidence must be drawn in favor of, the nonmoving party-but only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016)).

The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Rule 56 "imposes an initial burden of production on the party moving for summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not necessary") (citation omitted). After "a properly supported motion for summary judgment...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT