Tardieu v. Connecticut Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1931
• Citation: 113 Conn. 94,154 A. 173
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TARDIEU v. CONNECTICUT CO.

154 A. 173

113 Conn. 94

TARDIEU v. CONNECTICUT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 6, 1931

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Carl Foster, Judge.

Action by Octave Tardieu against the Connecticut Company to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, brought to the superior court in New Haven county and tried to the jury; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

No error.

Although specific reference to supervening negligence doctrine is unnecessary, complaint must fairly include negligence relied on.

John M. Chapnick and M. Edward Klebanoff, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Charles A. Watrous and R. Blake Russell, both of New Haven for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

MALTBIE, C.J.

The plaintiff claimed to have proved that he attempted to board a trolley car of the defendant company, and, as he placed his foot on the step of the car and reached for the handhold to assist him in stepping up, the door was suddenly closed in his face and the car started; that holding on by the handles, he was carried along for some distance on the step, as the speed of the car increased; that he then lost his balance, his legs and feet were thrown to the pavement and he was dragged a considerable distance in this way; that the upper portion of the door was glass, the lower wooden; and that, while the plaintiff stood upon the steps, the motorman could have seen him there. The appellant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to charge the jury as to supervening negligence, claiming that the motorman ought to have seen the plaintiff in a position of danger upon the step of the car, and, by stopping it or otherwise, have enabled him to escape injury. There are two reasons why the trial court was justified in omitting from its charge any reference to this doctrine. While it is true that a plaintiff need not refer to it as such in his complaint, its allegations must fairly include the negligent acts or omissions with which the defendant is to be charged, whether they are made the basis of recovery by reason of his negligence in the first instance or of his supervening negligence; and in the instant case the sole negligence charged in the complaint is the sudden starting of the car whereby the plaintiff was violently thrown to the ground and dragged...