Tarnowsky v. Socci

• Decision Date: 28 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 16992,16992
• Citation: 856 A.2d 408,271 Conn. 284
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph TARNOWSKY v. Peter SOCCI.

856 A.2d 408

271 Conn. 284

Joseph TARNOWSKY v. Peter SOCCI.

No. 16992

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 13, 2004.

Decided September 28, 2004.

James V. Somers, with whom, on the brief, were N. Kane Bennett, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Brenden P. Leydon, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

SULLIVAN, C.J.

The defendant, Peter Socci, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court that the negligence action brought by the plaintiff, Joseph Tarnowsky, was barred by General Statutes § 52-584.¹ The Appellate Court held that the two year statute of limitations for bringing a negligence action does not begin to run until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known, the tortfeasor's identity. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On March 14, 1997, the plaintiff sustained injuries when he slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk on property in Darien. In December, 1998, the plaintiff timely commenced separate negligence actions against People's Bank (bank), the owner of the property, and Jana, LLC (Jana), the tenant of the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff learned through the formal discovery process that the defendant had been responsible for removing ice and snow from the bank's property and, on March 10, 2000, commenced this negligence action against him. On August 9, 2000, the defendant filed an apportionment complaint against the bank, Jana and Leggat McCall Properties Management of Connecticut, Inc. (Leggat). The plaintiff later amended his complaint, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102b,² to assert a direct claim against Leggat. The defendant and Leggat then filed separate motions for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff's claim was barred by § 52-584. The trial court, D'Andrea, J., denied Leggat's motion for summary judgment after concluding that there existed "a genuine issue of [material] fact as to when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of the defendant Peter Socci as a viable defendant ...." Subsequently, the trial court, Hon. William B. Lewis, judge trial referee, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment without referring to Judge D'Andrea's decision on Leggat's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed from Judge Lewis' decision, and the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that "actual or constructive knowledge of the identity of a tortfeasor is an essential element of a claimant's action for damages for negligently inflicted injuries." Tarnowsky v. Socci, 75 Conn.App. 560, 569, 816 A.2d 728 (2003). This court granted certification, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff's action against the named defendant was not barred by General Statutes § 52-584?" Tarnowsky v. Socci, 263 Conn. 921, 922, 822 A.2d 245 (2003).

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 809, 850 A.2d 114 (2004).³ We begin our analysis with the language of the statute. Section 52-584 provides in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person ... caused by negligence... shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of ...." We previously have held that, as used in § 52-584, "the term `injury' is synonymous with `legal injury' or `actionable harm.' `Actionable harm' occurs when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the essential elements of a cause of action. Catz v. Rubenstein, [201 Conn. 39, 44, 513 A.2d 98 (1986)]. A breach of duty by the defendant and a causal connection between the defendant's breach of duty and the resulting harm to the plaintiff are essential elements of a cause of action in negligence; they are therefore necessary ingredients for `"actionable harm."' Id. Furthermore, `actionable harm' may occur when the plaintiff has knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the nature and extent of an injury, and that the injury was caused by the negligent conduct of another. Id., at 47, 513 A.2d 98. In this regard, the harm complained of need not have reached its fullest manifestation in order for the limitation period to begin to run; a party need only have suffered some form of "`actionable harm.'" Id., at 43, 45, 513 A.2d 98. "Finally, the determination of when a plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered `actionable harm' is ordinarily a question reserved for the trier of fact." Lagassey v. State, 268 Conn. 723, 748-49, 846 A.2d 831 (2004).

The defendant argues that knowledge of the identity of the tortfeasor is not an essential element of a cause of action and, therefore, under Catz, such knowledge is not required in order for the plaintiff to have suffered actionable harm. We disagree.

Whether a plaintiff has suffered actionable harm before discovering the tortfeasor's identity is an issue of first impression for this court. In Catz, we concluded that the discovery of the causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury was an essential element of a cause of action, but had no occasion to address the specific question before us here. See Catz v. Rubenstein, supra, 201 Conn. at 44, 513 A.2d 98. Prior to its decision in the present case, the Appellate Court had addressed this question, but only indirectly. In Peerless Ins. Co. v. Tucciarone, 48 Conn.App. 160, 162, 708 A.2d 611 (1998), the tenants of a commercial property and their insurance carriers brought an action against the defendant commercial property owners, who impleaded and brought a product liability claim against the manufacturer of a defective lighting product that had caused a fire on the property. The manufacturer claimed that the action was barred by General Statutes § 52-577a(a).⁴ The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. Id., at 163, 708 A.2d 611. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, reasoning that the owners, exercising due diligence, could have discovered the cause of the fire and the identity of the manufacturer before the expiration of the statute of limitations because the fire marshal's report, issued soon after the fire, contained that information. Id., at 167, 708 A.2d 611. Thus, as the Appellate Court stated in the present case, it had "implicitly decided [in Peerless Ins. Co.] ... that actual or constructive knowledge of the identity of a tortfeasor is an essential element of a claimant's action for damages for negligently inflicted injuries." Tarnowsky v. Socci, supra, 75 Conn.App. at 569, 816 A.2d 728.

The decisions of our sibling states on the question before us are divided. The majority of those jurisdictions have held, however, that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered or should have discovered the identity of the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393-94, 971 P.2d 801 (1998) ("trier of fact must determine whether [plaintiff's] discovery of [defendant's] involvement was delayed due to her alleged attempts to conceal her role and whether [plaintiff] could have, nonetheless, discovered her identity earlier through diligent inquiry"); Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or. 233, 239, 611 P.2d 1153 (1980) (statute of limitations "does not commence to run until plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury" [emphasis added]); Wyatt v. A-Best, Co., 910 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn.1995) ("breach of a legally cognizable duty occurs when plaintiff discovers or `reasonably should have discovered, (1) the occasion, the manner and means by which a breach of duty occurred that produced ... injury; and (2) the identity of the defendant who breached the duty'" [emphasis added]); Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis.2d 630, 636, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989) (plaintiff's "cause of action did not accrue until [he] knew the identity of the defendant, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the identity of the defendant" [emphasis added]).⁵

We agree with the Appellate Court and the majority of our sibling jurisdictions that there is no principled reason to distinguish between, on the one hand, the discovery of a breach of duty or the discovery of a causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury and, on the other hand, the discovery of the identity of the tortfeasor, for purposes of the actionable harm doctrine. First, the very phrase "actionable harm" suggests that knowledge of the identity of the tortfeasor is one of its elements. The defendant makes no claim that an injury is "actionable," i.e., that an action may be brought, when a specific defendant has not been identified.⁶ See Lagassey v. State, supra, 268 Conn. at 743, 846 A.2d 831 ("the limitation period in § 52-584 does not begin to run until a plaintiff has knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge of sufficient facts to bring a cause of action against a defendant").

We note that General Statutes § 52-45a provides that "[c]ivil actions shall be commenced by legal process consisting of a writ of summons or attachment, describing the parties ...." (Emphasis added.) Unlike some jurisdictions, Connecticut has no statutory provision for suing an unidentified "John Doe" defendant.⁷ In any event, a plaintiff who has incurred...