Tarnowsky v. Socci, 16992
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Writing for the Court | SULLIVAN, C.J. |
Citation | 856 A.2d 408,271 Conn. 284 |
Parties | Joseph TARNOWSKY v. Peter SOCCI. |
Docket Number | No. 16992,16992 |
Decision Date | 28 September 2004 |
856 A.2d 408
271 Conn. 284
v.
Peter SOCCI
No. 16992
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued April 13, 2004.
Decided September 28, 2004.
Brenden P. Leydon, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.
SULLIVAN, C.J.
The defendant, Peter Socci, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court that the negligence action brought by the plaintiff, Joseph Tarnowsky, was barred by General Statutes § 52-584.1 The Appellate Court held that the two year statute of limitations for bringing a negligence action does not begin to run until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known, the tortfeasor's identity. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On March 14, 1997, the plaintiff sustained injuries when he slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk on property in Darien. In December,
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 809, 850 A.2d 114 (2004).3 We begin
The defendant argues that knowledge of the identity of the tortfeasor is not an essential element of a cause of action and, therefore, under Catz, such knowledge is not required in order for the plaintiff to have suffered actionable harm. We disagree.
Whether a plaintiff has suffered actionable harm before discovering the tortfeasor's identity is an issue of first impression for this court. In Catz, we concluded that the discovery of the causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury was an essential element of a cause of action, but had no occasion to address the specific question before us here. See Catz v. Rubenstein, supra, 201 Conn. at 44, 513 A.2d 98. Prior to its decision in the present case, the Appellate Court had addressed this question, but only indirectly. In Peerless Ins. Co. v. Tucciarone, 48 Conn.App. 160, 162, 708 A.2d 611 (1998), the tenants of a commercial property and their insurance carriers brought an action against the defendant commercial property owners, who impleaded and brought a product liability claim against the manufacturer of a defective lighting product that had caused a fire on the property. The manufacturer claimed that the action was barred by General Statutes § 52-577a(a).4 The trial court agreed and rendered
The decisions of our sibling states on the question before us are divided. The majority of those jurisdictions have held, however, that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered or should have discovered the identity of the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393-94, 971 P.2d 801 (1998) ("trier of fact must determine whether [plaintiff's] discovery of [defendant's] involvement was delayed due to her alleged attempts to conceal her role and whether [plaintiff] could have, nonetheless, discovered her identity earlier through diligent inquiry"); Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or. 233, 239, 611 P.2d 1153 (1980) (statute of limitations "does not commence to run until plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury" [emphasis added]); Wyatt v. A-Best, Co., 910 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn.1995) ("breach of a legally cognizable duty occurs when plaintiff discovers or `reasonably should have discovered, (1) the occasion, the manner and means by which a breach of duty occurred that produced ... injury; and (2) the identity of the defendant who breached the duty'" [emphasis added]); Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis.2d 630, 636, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989) (plaintiff's "cause of action did not accrue until [he] knew the identity of the defendant, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the identity of the defendant" [emphasis added]).5
We agree with the Appellate Court and the majority of our sibling jurisdictions that there is no principled reason to distinguish between, on the one hand, the discovery of a breach of duty or the discovery of a causal connection between the
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Harrington v. Costello, SJC–11383.
...that for a cause of action to accrue, the identity of the defendant must be known or reasonably knowable. See, e.g., Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 288–291, 297, 856 A.2d 408 (2004); Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or. 233, 239, 611 P.2d 1153 (1980); Robinson v. Morrow, 99 P.3d 341, 3......
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Viera v. Cohen, 17478.
...when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 287 n. 3, 856 A.2d 408 (2004). We begin our analysis with a brief review of the evolution of tort law in this state regarding the apportio......
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State v. Orr, 18172.
...is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal 291 Conn. 652 quotation marks omitted.) Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 287 n. 3, 856 A.2d 408 In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with the text of the statute. Section 52-146q (b) provides in relevant par......
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Bender v. Bender, 18306.
...709 read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 287 n. 3, 856 A.2d 408 (2004). The construction of a statute presents a question of law, over which we exercise plenary review. State v. Ta......