Tarray v. State

Citation410 Md. 594,979 A.2d 729
Decision Date14 September 2009
Docket NumberNo. 149, September Term, 2008.,149, September Term, 2008.
PartiesAdelaida Maria TARRAY v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Maryland, Baltimore), on brief, for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.

GREENE, J.

The appellant, Adelaida Maria Tarray ("Tarray"), appeals from her convictions, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, for the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, under Md.Code (1957, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 8-801 of the Criminal Law Article,1 and conspiracy to commit that offense. Considering this statute for the first time, we must determine the extent of the misconduct embraced by the Legislature in describing what constitutes the exploitation of a vulnerable adult and whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Tarray's convictions. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

I.

In late spring of 2005, John D. Wright ("Wright") separated from his wife. Consequently Wright, who for the prior 25 years had suffered from a physically debilitating medical condition leaving him paralyzed from the waist down, needed someone to care for him. Indeed, Wright was neither able to dress himself, clean himself, nor get in and out of bed without assistance. As a result, he began inquiring into the services of professional caregivers.

Wright met Tarray for the first time in May 2005, when she interviewed for the position of live-in caregiver. Although Wright was relatively independent, in the sense that he worked full time from home for a defense contractor, Wright indicated that he needed someone around the house to help him perform his daily activities. Also, he indicated that he needed someone with medical expertise and knowledge about how to care for someone in his physical condition. In particular, Wright stated that he needed someone who knew how to operate and maintain his catheter device. Tarray informed Wright that she was a licensed practical nurse.2 Wright then offered Tarray the position at a salary of $350 per week, which she later accepted.

Within weeks after starting work,3 Tarray approached Wright and demanded a pay raise from $350 to $500 per week. According to Tarray, the work was simply too difficult to perform at her current wage. Wright later testified that he granted her request, in part, because he was "no small drink of water."

Tarray communicated additional requests to Wright between June and July of 2005. First, she requested to be paid $750 per week for the same reason mentioned previously for justifying a raise, i.e., the work was too difficult. Second, she requested that Wright fire another caregiver working in the house at the time to make room for another caregiver, David Baker. By late fall, Tarray secured a third and final pay raise from Wright, increasing her earnings to $1,000 per week. At trial, when asked why he had agreed to raising Tarray's pay by so much over a relatively short period of time, Wright said, "Because ... I was between a rock and a hard place. You know, where else am I going to go[?] I had no choice."

Except for the initial payment, Wright paid Tarray by personal check with funds from his account with Bank of America. At first, he wrote each check. Subsequently, however, Wright's physical disability prevented him from performing activities any more arduous than signing his name on checks that Tarray would prepare. Thus, he signed more than 30 checks, most of which were prepared by Tarray. Over the course of her six months of employment, Tarray earned in excess of $24,000, without any tax withholdings.

In the fall of 2005, Tarray presented Wright with a business proposition. Tarray suggested that she and Wright should enter into a joint venture. Although the proposition never amounted to anything more than a series of discussions, Wright remembers talking about naming the business "Jade."

Shortly after discussing the business proposition, at Tarray's request, Wright purchased a late model Honda Ridgeline truck. Because of his physical disability, Wright could neither drive nor ride as a passenger in the truck. Notwithstanding that, Wright agreed to buy it for Tarray in the hope that she would continue working for him.

In addition to acquiring a new means of transportation, Tarray opened a Bank of America business account in the name of John D. Wright and "Jade." Wright, however, testified that he never authorized Tarray to act on his behalf, let alone open a second account with Bank of America. Even though Wright acknowledged signing a prepared check dated December 22, 2005, Tarray never alerted Wright to the fact that this particular check was being drawn from the second Bank of America account, nor was Wright aware of this account. This fact was emphasized during the prosecutor's closing argument:

And, as time went on, you heard more is going on. You've heard about at least three accounts that are open that Mr. Wright did not know anything about. One of those on a check that he ends up signing off on. State's 35. And, you can tell by comparing the checks that most of the checks were [sic], different account. Same bank, different account. And again, Mr. Wright says ["]I don't know anything about that account. Yeah, I did sign this check for a thousand dollars on the 22nd[.] [T]his is an account I don't know anything about.["]

Wright, likewise, was unaware that Tarray had opened two other accounts with Maryland Bank National Association (MBNA) and Citigroup, again in the name of John D. Wright and "Jade." Furthermore, the Citigroup account named Tarray as an authorized credit cardholder, and she used the account to make several cash advances.

As Tarray's "gifts" and wages increased, the quality of care that she provided Wright deteriorated. Indeed, Tarray had taken a second job, outside Wright's home, and as a result, she was gone most of the day. Wright testified that often he was left alone, to the extent that he saw Tarray only first thing in the morning and late at night before going to bed. In addition to her frequent absences, Tarray had repeated difficulty with cleaning Wright's catheter device properly. Consequently, Wright was hospitalized for urinary tract infections on three separate occasions over the six months of Tarray's employment.

By the end of 2005, Wright decided to terminate the employment of Baker and Tarray. Accordingly, Wright asked the couple to move out.4 Two days later, he was hospitalized for the third and final time.

On January 3, 2006, Baker and Tarray visited Wright at the hospital. While there, they asked him to sign two separate documents relating to his truck and house, respectively. In the first document, Wright agreed to let Baker and Tarray continue to reside in his home so long as he was in the hospital. In the other document, Wright agreed to transfer ownership in his truck to Tarray after he paid off the vehicle loan.

Although he had already asked the couple to leave his home after firing them, Wright explained that he felt obliged to take care of Baker and Tarray until they were able to get back on their feet. When asked why he signed the documents, Wright said, "Because I felt obligated due to them working for me ... I didn't want to throw them out ... on their ears." Similarly, he stated, "Well, I am a very feeling person. That is, I care for everybody. And I always try to take care of everybody that I can."

On December 21, 2006, the State filed a criminal information against Tarray, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, alleging multiple counts of theft, forgery, uttering, conspiracy, and exploitation of a vulnerable adult.5 At trial, Tarray's counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on the charge of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and conspiracy to commit the offense based, solely, upon the argument that the evidence did not support a finding of undue influence. In particular, counsel for Tarray stated:

Additionally ... the third element of the charge ... is that [Tarray] obtained property of the victim by using deception, intimidation or undue influence[.] I would argue ... that there was money ... exchanged between [Wright] and [Tarray]. However, [Wright] did not testify that there were any threats or coercions during these [exchanges]. He did testify that the money was given because ... the work was very hard. [Also Wright] ... testified that he was caught between a rock and a hard place. I don't think that that would constitute undue influence. The definition of due [sic] influence is domination and influence amounting to force and coercion exercised by another person to such an extent that a vulnerable adult was prevented from exercising free judgment and choice.

In this case, [Wright's] free judgment and choice was not over ... he was not prevented from exercising this free judgment and choice. ... He never mentioned that there were any threats in exchange for ... being fed or a catheter being changed, for example.

There was no testimony whatsoever on behalf of [Wright] to indicate that ... any of [Tarray's] behaviors prevented him from exercising free judgment or choice.

Should I just go through all of the counts, Your Honor?

In denying Tarray's motion, the trial judge concluded that a fact finder would be justified in finding undue influence under the totality of the circumstances. Also, the judge noted that Tarray charged excessive wages, opened bank accounts in Wright's name without authorization, caused Wright to purchase a truck for Tarray's personal use, and secured rights to Wright's house and truck. In the trial judge's assessment of the facts, the jury could infer that Wright's decisions...

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