Tart v. Illinois Power Co.

Decision Date26 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-2236.,03-2236.
Citation366 F.3d 461
PartiesLamarce TART and David Curtis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY and Rauly Law, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Stanley E. Goldstein, Eli Karsh (argued), Liberman, Goldstein & Associates, Clayton, MO, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Beth Clemens Boggs (argued), Landau, Omahana & Kopka, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Lamarce Tart and David Curtis prevailed before a jury on their claims of race-based employment discrimination and retaliation. The district court subsequently granted the defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, vacating the jury's verdict. Once a jury has spoken, we are obliged to construe the facts in favor of the parties who prevailed under the verdict. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Because the district court1 construed several key facts in favor of the losing parties, and because a reasonable jury could (and indeed did) find that the defendants took adverse employment actions against the plaintiffs because of their race and retaliated against them for engaging in protected activity, we reverse and remand with directions to reinstate the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.

I.

We begin with a view of the facts that favors the winning plaintiffs as we are required to do under existing law. David Curtis, who is African-American, began working at the East St. Louis plant of Illinois Power in 1979. Tr. Vol. II, at 10. He received positive performance reviews throughout his career there and was selected to train other employees because of his skills. Tr. Vol. II, at 18-20; Tr. Vol. III, at 190-91; Pl.Ex. 18. For many years, he worked in a one-man truck responding to customer service calls. Tr. Vol. II, at 11-12. In 1988 or 1989, he also began working in the meter shop, an indoor position that involved maintaining and testing gas meters and other equipment used to measure gas and detect and repair gas leaks. Tr. Vol. II, at 13-15. He continued to respond to customer calls in a one-man truck and he performed maintenance services around the building itself, completing wiring, plumbing, air-conditioning and heating repairs. Tr. Vol. II, at 15-16. His position changed titles over the years but he remained essentially what is now known as a gas journeyman. After the events that took place in this case, he obtained the additional status of "lead man," which makes him eligible to be in charge on a two-man truck. Tr. Vol. II, at 10-11.

Lamarce Tart is also African-American. He too is a gas journeyman. He began working for Illinois Power in East St. Louis in 1981. Tr. Vol. II, at 196. He, like Curtis, received positive performance reviews over the years. Pl.Ex. 17. Prior to these events, he worked in a one-man truck responding to customer service calls and greatly enjoyed his work. Tr. Vol. II, at 197-98. In the one-man truck he had contact with customers, was his own boss, made his own decisions and was not subordinate to a lead man (as was the case with two-man trucks). Tr. Vol. II., at 198. Like Curtis, he engaged in skilled work locating and repairing gas leaks both inside and outside of customers' homes.

Both men worked at Illinois Power without incident until 1996 when Rauly Law, one of the defendants in this case, became the new plant manager. Law is Caucasian. At that time, although the plant workforce was half African-American and half Caucasian, all of the supervisors and managers were Caucasian. Tr. Vol. II, at 24. In 1996, after Law came on board, a Caucasian employee named Reginald Briggs began harassing Curtis, threatening him, swearing at him and roughhousing. Briggs called Curtis a thief, accused him of stealing time from the company, and accused him of harming the employees' position with the union. Tr. Vol. II, at 24-28. Curtis approached Law and asked him to intervene but Law did not respond to this request. Tr. Vol. II, at 28. Instead, Law told Curtis he was going to keep a close eye on him, that he would be watching Curtis and his work performance, and he began to call into question the validity of Curtis's time sheets. Tr. Vol. II, at 29-30.

Law also turned away from a verbal altercation in which Briggs yelled at Curtis for taking a company truck home, an action Briggs claimed was unethical. Tr. Vol. II, at 32-33. Briggs, of course, was Curtis's co-worker, not his supervisor, and Curtis explained that the company allowed employees to take trucks home when they were serving as "first responders." Tr. Vol. II, at 33-34. Law came out of his office to observe the commotion, saw it escalating and returned to his office. Id. In the course of this diatribe, Briggs accused Curtis of having previously taken a truck home in an incident that occurred some twelve years earlier. Curtis remarked that he was vindicated in the earlier incident, which occurred in conjunction with a plant where African-American employees were not allowed to have a key to the facility and were not allowed to respond to customer calls in that particular geographic area, a situation which existed until Curtis complained. Briggs accused Curtis of trying to turn the conversation into a racial issue. Curtis replied that it was a racial issue. Tr. Vol. II, at 33-34.

Briggs also harassed Lamarce Tart. As described by Curtis, one incident included Briggs "yelling and screaming at Mr. Tart and giving him his middle finger and giving him a general cuffing" all in the presence of Law. Tr. Vol. II, at 36-37, 199-200. When Tart asked Law to intervene and force Briggs to apologize, Law declined. Tr. Vol. II, at 200-01. After witnessing this exchange and having suffered at Briggs's hands himself, Curtis decided to call the company's human resources division in Decatur, Illinois. He spoke to Ken Justice, an Illinois Power human resources consultant, and told him that he and Tart were being treated "with a biasness [sic] by Mr. Law, and we had been attacked and harassed by a white individual and his actions were being substantiated by Mr. Law." Tr. Vol II, at 36-37; Tr. Vol. II. at 156 ("I told him that it was biased, and that's the term I used. He understood what I was saying. He knew I was talking about race."). He explained that by "substantiated" he meant that Law had "done absolutely nothing to curtail" Briggs's actions. Tr. Vol. II, at 37. Justice promised to look into the situation.

Shortly thereafter, Law called the plant together to "flush the birdie" because "somebody done called EEOC." Tr. Vol. II, at 40. Law was irate that "somebody called the EEOC or the employee services," that someone "blew the whistle" and he did not want employee services coming to investigate. Tr. Vol. II, at 40. Curtis admitted it was he who had made the call to Human Resources. He was confused by Law's reference to the EEOC and told him he did not know he had called the EEOC but thought he was talking to the company's employee services. Law responded, "That's them, then you did do it." Tr. Vol II, at 41.

Law next called a weekend meeting of Curtis, Tart, Briggs and a union representative, David DeGonia. At this meeting, Law told Curtis that to prevent employee services from coming down, Curtis would have to say he made a mistake in calling them or that he did not need their services. Tr. Vol. II, at 42. Law told Curtis that Justice was coming down to East St Louis on Monday unless they could get the issue resolved without him. Tr. Vol. II, at 43. He told Curtis that "if they do come down, someone is going to be without a job." Tr. Vol. II, at 42, 202-03. Because he was looking directly at Curtis when he threatened the job loss, Curtis assumed Law meant that Curtis would be fired. From this point on, Curtis feared for his job. Tart too understood his job to be on the line. Tr. Vol. II, at 203. That weekend, Curtis called Law to apologize for calling Human Resources, explaining he did not know it was going to be "such a big deal." Tr. Vol. II, at 43. Law told him that "somebody was going to have to be fired if that guy has to come down.... And, David, you're the only guy that we're having a problem with." Tr. Vol. II, at 43.

On Monday morning, Law called another meeting of Curtis, Tart, Briggs and the union steward. At the meeting, Law asked Curtis if the issue was resolved. Curtis replied it was not. Law then asked if Curtis had a problem working with Briggs; Curtis said he did not. Law asked Briggs if he had a problem working with Curtis and he replied he did not. Law declared the matter resolved. Tr. Vol. II, at 44. Human Resources did not come down to East St. Louis to investigate at that time. Thereafter, Briggs continued to harass Curtis, and Law continued to scrutinize Curtis's work. Curtis tolerated the situation until the Loisel Drive incident.

On appeal, the defendants characterize the Loisel Drive job as "mishandled" but a reading of the record that favors the prevailing plaintiffs reveals that many factors beyond the plaintiffs' control contributed to the length of time they were at the site. Although the plaintiffs were working on one-man trucks and, in Curtis's case, in the meter shop at that time, the union had negotiated a requirement that after regular working hours in certain geographical areas, a minimum of two workers were required to respond to customer calls for safety reasons. This is how Curtis and Tart came to respond together to the report of a gas leak at Loisel Drive in October 1997.

The call came in on a weekend afternoon, and Curtis and Tart reported to the plant within an hour as required. There they picked up a truck and proceeded to the site, where another Illinois Power employee waited for them. He told them the leak was "first class," the...

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