Tartaglia v. Hodges
| Decision Date | 10 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 19,749.,19,749. |
| Citation | 10 P.3d 176,129 N.M. 497,2000 NMCA 80 |
| Parties | Pedro TARTAGLIA, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Joseph T. Tartaglia, a/k/a Joe Tartaglia, deceased, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. Karen Lynne HODGES, Individually and as Successor Trustee of the Romi Tartaglia Revocable Living Trust; and Albert John Meteney, Jr., Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellants, v. Leo Tartaglia, III, Connie Tartaglia, and All Unknown Heirs of Leo Tartaglia, Jr., Counterdefendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
William J. Darling, Margaret P. Armijo, William J. Darling & Associates, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.
Avelino V. Gutierrez, Gutierrez Law Offices, Albuquerque, NM, Robert T. DeVoe, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
Certiorari Denied, No. 26,481, September 11, 2000.
{1} This is a dispute over ownership of a family home. Based primarily on statements attributed to deceased declarants, the trial court imposed trusts on the property in favor of all family members thereby defeating deeds by which one family member held legal title. The holder of that legal title appeals. We affirm.
{2} Romelia Tartaglia, who died in September 1966, had five children: Romi (Tartaglia) Meteney, the oldest, who died in March 1995; Carlos Tartaglia who died in May 1998; Joe Tartaglia who died in February 1994; Leo Tartaglia who died in 1985; and Pedro Tartaglia, who is living and is a plaintiff in this action.
{3} In 1957, the Tartaglia family moved into a home on Indian School Road in Albuquerque, New Mexico ("the Indian School property"). Title was placed in Joe's name. In 1966, this home was purchased by the Highway Department for the 1-40 right of way. Romelia then purchased the property that is the subject of this action: a home on Eton Street, in Albuquerque, New Mexico ("the property" or "the Eton property"), title to which was placed in Joe's name. In May 1968, Joe executed a quitclaim deed to the property to Romi as grantee. The quitclaim deed was recorded in July 1969.
{4} In July 1981, Joe borrowed $10,000 from Albuquerque National Bank and signed a mortgage on the property. Although record title was in Romi's name, the mortgage contained Joe's representations that included the statements that "Borrower (Joe) is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to mortgage the property, the property is unencumbered." Joe was given a release of this mortgage in November 1986. In May 1993, Romi executed a special warranty deed to herself as trustee of a revocable living trust called the Romi Tartaglia Revocable Living Trust ("the trust").
{5} After 1966, subject to their ability to pay, Joe made monthly mortgage payments and paid the taxes and insurance on the property, and the remaining family members, while they lived on the property, paid for the property upkeep, repair, and the family living expenses.
{6} Pedro individually, and as personal representative of Joe's estate, filed a complaint in August 1996 to set aside Joe's 1968 quitclaim deed to Romi and Romi's 1993 special warranty deed, alleging as grounds Joe's incapacity and lack of intent to convey to Romi. Pedro is the "Appellee" here. The lawsuit named as Defendants the children of Romi, who are Karen Lynne Hodges and Albert John Meteney, Jr., and also named Hodges as successor trustee of the trust. These defendants are the "Appellants" in this opinion. Pedro also sought an express or resulting trust declaring Joe to have been the trustee of the property, and, in addition, to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of Joe's heirs, namely, himself, Carlos, Romi's children (Defendant Karen Lynne Hodges and Defendant Albert John Meteney, Jr.), and Leo, Jr.'s nephew (Leo III). Appellants counterclaimed to quiet title and added as parties to the counterclaim Leo III, and Connie Tartaglia, who was married to Leo, Jr.
{7} During the pendency of the present lawsuit, the property was sold and the sale proceeds were ordered placed in the registry of the court. The district court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law after a one-day bench trial. The court concluded that Romelia established an express trust in 1966 for the benefit of the family; that a resulting trust for the benefit of all members of the family arose from the 1966 deed in Joe's name; that Joe lacked intent to convey full title to Romi; and that the 1968 deed to Romi and Romi's 1993 deed to herself as trustee were wrongful, giving rise to constructive trusts and requiring the deeds to be set aside. The court then entered judgment: setting aside Joe's 1968 quitclaim deed to Romi and Romi's 1993 special warranty deed to herself as trustee; releasing the sale proceeds in the court registry to Pedro as the personal representative of Joe's estate to be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession; and dismissing the counterclaim with prejudice.
{8} The trial court primarily relied on the testimony of living witnesses reiterating statements of deceased persons to support its findings and conclusions regarding Joe's lack of intent and the existence of express, resulting, and constructive trusts. At the heart of the trial court's findings and judgment are statements attributed to Romelia, Joe, and Romi. It is the admission of those hearsay statements that constitutes the primary basis for Appellants' claim of error requiring reversal.
{9} The court admitted the hearsay statements under Rule 11-803(X) NMRA 2000 at trial. As Appellants correctly point out, the declarants were unavailable, so the appropriate catch-all rule is Rule 11-804(B)(5) NMRA 2000, and not Rule 11-803(X). This point is inconsequential, however, because the two residual exceptions are identical. A point that is of significant importance to the resolution of this case on appeal is that although the court relied on one of the residual exceptions for admitting the statements at trial, it relied on another rule, Rule 11-804(B)(3), in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, to support the admission of some of the hearsay statements. We explain the significance of this point below.
{10} The court also ruled that Romi wrongfully paid herself $15,600 from Joe's bank account, and that Carlos's heirs were entitled to share in Joe's estate under the laws of intestate succession.
{11} Appellants seek reversal on several grounds. They attack the court's findings of fact regarding Joe's lack of intent to convey and regarding the trusts, on the ground that the findings are based on erroneously admitted hearsay evidence. They attack as unsupported by substantial evidence the court's findings of lack of intent and the existence of trusts. They assert error by the court in failing to apply the statute of limitations to bar the claim that Joe lacked intent to convey. They also attack as contrary to the law and evidence the determination that Romi wrongfully paid herself $15,600 from Joe's bank account, and the determination that Carlos's heirs could share in Joe's estate under the laws of intestate succession.
{12} The court found that Romelia intended in 1957 that the Indian School "home be used by all of the children who, in turn, would share the mortgage payments and upkeep expense as best they could." The court further found that Romelia placed title to the Indian School property in Joe's name because "he was the child who was most often living in the home." This trust, the court found, was intended to continue with the purchase of the Eton property in 1966 with the use of the Indian School property sale proceeds. Again, the court found, title to the Eton property was placed in Joe's name with the intent that he "hold and maintain the Eton home for the living use and benefit of the Tartaglia family." Implicit in this finding is that Romelia manifested her intent that Joe hold title for the benefit of the family. In addition, the court concluded that "[t]he Tartaglia family did not intend that Joe take the sole beneficial interest in the [Eton] property when the title ... was placed in his name."
{13} The court concluded that an express trust was established in 1966 by Romelia and her five children. The terms of that trust were that "Joe was to hold title to the property for the benefit of the Tartaglia family, which was a continuation of the express trust which had been established in 1957 with regard to the Indian School property." The court also concluded that because the family did not intend that Joe take the sole beneficial interest in the Eton property, "a resulting trust was created for the benefit of all members of the Tartaglia family" when Joe took title to the property. Thus, the court determined that, with respect to the 1966 Eton property deed, Romelia's manifest intent in placing title in Joe's name was solely for Joe to hold title for the use and benefit of the family and, further, that a resulting trust was created based on the family's intent that Joe not take the sole beneficial interest in the property.
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