Tasaka v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17-CV-07235 (LDH)(ST) |
| Parties | TOMOE TASAKA, Plaintiff, v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC; JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; RICHARD O'BRIEN; MICHAEL S. WALDRON; and JAMES DIMON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Tomoe Tasaka (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings the instant action against Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview”), Richard O'Brien, Michael S Waldron (together with Bayview and O'Brien, the “Bayview Defendants”), JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association (“JPMC”), and James Dimon (together with JPMC, the “JPMC Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting various claims under state and federal law, including claims for (i) fraud, (ii) violation of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), (iii) violation of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and violation of various federal criminal statutes. Defendants move, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety.
BACKGROUND[1]
On May 7, 2007, Plaintiff entered into a promissory note with Alliance Mortgage Banking Corporation (“Alliance”) and its successors and assigns for $114, 187 (the “Note”). (See Am. Compl., Ex. A (Note), ECF No. 35-2.) The Note was secured by a mortgage on real property located at 7176 State Highway 29, Dolgeville, New York 13329 (the “Real Property”) in Fulton County, New York (the “Mortgage”), which was “given to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (‘MERS') (solely as nominee for [Alliance]).” (See Am. Compl., Ex. B (Mortgage) at 3, ECF No. 35-3.) The Mortgage was recorded by the Fulton County clerk on June 11, 2007. (Id. at 2.) Thereafter, on October 9, 2007, the Mortgage was assigned from MERS, as nominee for Alliance, to MERS, its successors and assigns, as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”), its successors and assigns. (Am. Compl., Ex. C (assignment to WaMu), ECF No. 35-4.) This assignment was recorded by the Fulton County clerk on January 2, 2008. (Id.) On September 13, 2013, the Mortgage was assigned from MERS, as nominee for WaMu, to JPMC. (Am. Compl., Ex. D (assignment to JPMC), ECF No. 35-5.) The assignment was recorded by the Fulton County Clerk on September 27, 2013. (Id.) On October 3, 2013, JPMC initiated foreclosure proceedings in New York State Court (the “Foreclosure Action”). (See Am. Compl., Ex. E-4 (Foreclosure Action complaint), ECF No. 35-10.) In November 2014, the state court granted JPMC's motion for default judgment in the Foreclosure Action and appointed a referee to compute the amount due to JPMC. (Am. Compl. Ex. F-1, ECF No. 35-14.) On March 10, 2016, a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale was entered in the Foreclosure Action. (Declaration of Brian P. Scibetta (“Scibetta Decl.”), Ex. 2 (Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale), ECF No. 40-3.) On March 15, 2016, the Mortgage was assigned by JPMC to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and on April 6, 2016, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development assigned the Mortgage to Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC. (Am. Compl., Ex. E (assignment to Bayview and chain of title), ECF No. 35-6.) The latter assignment was recorded by the Fulton County Clerk on May 26, 2016. (Id.) On October 2, 2017, JPMC assigned the bid of foreclosure sale to Bayview. (Scibetta Decl., Ex. 7 (assignment of bid of foreclosure sale), ECF No. 40-8.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants claimed an interest in the Note underlying the Mortgage, despite that fact that Plaintiff did not enter into an agreement with JPMC or Bayview. (Am. Compl. at 5-6, ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff further alleges that a transfer of the Mortgage to any Defendant was not recorded in the official records of the Queens County Recorder's Office within 30 days of the transfer or assignment. (Id. at 7-8.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that, at some point, the loan was “transferred to multiple classes of the Guaranteed REMIC Pass-Through Certificates Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1990-6.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff concludes that the rights to the “Mortgage must have also been transferred to multiple classes of [all Defendants].” (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, “Defendant(s) certifies that an assignment of the [Mortgage] has been accomplished by selling certificates as shares of the Guaranteed REMIC Pass-through Certificates Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1990-6, to investors” though no such assignments have been recorded in the Queens County Recorder's Office. (Am. Compl. at 7-8.) Plaintiff also alleges that JPMC and Bayview never owned the Note underlying the Mortgage. (Id. at 8.) Next, Plaintiff alleges that she hired an investigator to conduct a “securitization audit” to prove that Defendants are not the “holders in due course” of the Note and Mortgage and that they therefore committed fraud. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff attached to her second amended complaint 533 pages of exhibits, including an Affidavit by Joseph R. Esquivel, Jr., a licensed investigator in the state of Texas, who conducted a chain of title analysis and mortgage fraud investigation for Plaintiff “regarding the [s]ecurity [i]nstrument and the real property located at 7176 State Highway 29, Dolgeville, NY 13329, as referenced in the Fulton County Record.” (See Am. Compl., Aff. of Joseph R. Esquivel, Jr. (“Esquivel Aff.”), ECF No. 35-1.)[2]
Against that backdrop, the crux of Plaintiff's complaint appears to be that Defendants improperly and fraudulently claimed an interest in the rights to the Mortgage and underlying Note and sought to exercise those rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the Note and Mortgage were improperly assigned, because: (i) Plaintiff did not enter into any contract with any Defendant and (ii) Defendants did not timely record or notify Plaintiffs of the assignments.
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility” of a defendant's liability, id., “[i]t is not the Court's function to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss, Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F.Supp.2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the Court must merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient, and, in doing so, it is well settled that the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (citations omitted).
Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, her pleadings “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
Defendants argue that pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims.[3] (See JMPC Defs.' Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“JPMC Mem.”) at 11-15, ECF No. 40-9; Bayview Defs.' Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Bayview Mem.”) at 9-12, ECF No. 41-1.) In aid of their Rooker-Feldman argument, Defendants submitted to the Court the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale of the Real Property entered in the Foreclosure Action. (See Scibetta Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 40-3; Declaration of Robert H. King (“King Decl.”), Ex. A, ECF No. 41-3.) As Defendants' request, the Court takes judicial notice of the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale.[4] (See JMPC Mem. at 3, n.2; Bayview Mem. at 8, n.1.)
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.” Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021). Rooker-Feldman bars federal review of claims when four requirements are met: “(1) ‘the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court[;]' (2) ‘the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment[;]' (3) ‘the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment[;]' and (4) ‘the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.'” Id. (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)). “[I]n determining whether the doctrine applies, the key inquiry is whether the complaint alleges an injury caused by a state court judgment.” Brodsky v. Carter, 673 Fed.Appx. 42, 43 (2d Cir. 2016).
Here there is no question that Plaintiff meets the first and fourth requirements-also known as the procedural requirements for invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff lost in the Foreclosure Action and therefore meets the first requirement. See Dorce, 2 F.4th at 102 (“Someone who loses an ownership interest in property through a state in rem foreclosure proceeding against the property has lost in state court.”). The fourth requirement is also met because judgment in the Foreclosure Action was rendered on or about March 10, 2016 (see Scibetta Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2), well before the commencement of the instant action. Whether Plaintiff meets...
To continue reading
Request your trial