Tasker v. Griffith

• Citation: 160 W.Va. 739,238 S.E.2d 229
• Decision Date: 01 November 1977
• Docket Number: No. 13943,13943
• Parties: Paul D. TASKER v. Harry GRIFFITH, acting warden, etc., et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

Page 229

238 S.E.2d 229

160 W.Va. 739

Paul D. TASKER v. Harry GRIFFITH, acting warden, etc., et al.

No. 13943.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Nov. 1, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The State may not deprive prisoners confined in administrative segregation of their right to habeas corpus review of the legality of their confinement by releasing the prisoners before their habeas corpus actions can mature for hearing.

2. Administrative segregation for the purpose of investigating a prisoner's misconduct may involve the placement of the prisoner in solitary or close confinement in an isolated cellblock, but it may not involve any punitive withdrawal of privileges accorded to the general inmate population, such as, by way of example and not limitation, access to legal and other reading materials, customary diet, mail privileges, and opportunities for exercise and personal hygiene.

3. No prisoner may be confined in administrative segregation for investigation into alleged misconduct, unless the safety of the institution or the integrity of the investigation would be jeopardized by having the prisoner remain at large in the inmate population.

4. No prisoner may be confined in administrative segregation for investigation into alleged misconduct unless the prisoner is notified by the time the investigation is concluded of the nature of the offense under investigation and is told the results of the investigation.

5. Ordinarily no prisoner may be confined in administrative segregation more than once or for more than three days for investigation into each charge of misconduct.

John R. Hoblitzell, Kay, Casto & Chaney, Charleston, for relator.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., Richard L. Gottlieb, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondents.

NEELY, Justice:

Paul D. Tasker is a prisoner at the Huttonsville Correctional Center, serving a one to ten year sentence for breaking and entering. In this habeas corpus action Mr. Tasker does not challenge the validity of his sentence or conviction, but rather the conditions of his confinement at Huttonsville. He contends that during his imprisonment at Huttonsville prison officials twice placed him in administrative segregation in violation of his due process and equal protection rights and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. We award the writ of habeas corpus as molded.

Evidence before the Court demonstrates that the Huttonsville Correctional Center maintains a special cellblock for use in cases of administrative segregation, protective custody, and disciplinary detention. During his administrative segregation Mr. Tasker was confined in this cellblock which is located in an interior room at the prison. The cellblock contains six cells, each of which is equipped with a bed, mattress, commode, wash basin, and drinking fountain. The food provided to prisoners confined in the cellblock for administrative purposes is the same as the general prison population receives, and those prisoners confined for extended periods are regularly taken out for showers and exercise. The rules at Huttonsville indicate that the mail privileges of an inmate in administrative segregation are not curtailed and that access to legal materials is provided. Nothing in the record suggests these rules are not observed.

The first administrative segregation of Mr. Tasker began at 3:15 p.m. on January 15, 1977. The prison authorities were investigating Mr. Tasker's alleged involvement in certain acts of violence which occurred at the prison, and the evidence indicates they thought they could better investigate the matter if Mr. Tasker were isolated from the other inmates. When he was placed in administrative segregation, Mr. Tasker was notified simply that he was under investigation. He was released from administrative segregation on January 19, 1977, at which time he was notified that the investigation had cleared him of all suspicion in the matter. Mr. Tasker was again isolated from the general inmate population at 11:30 a.m. on May 11, 1977. On this occasion he was notified that he was under investigation for receiving a contraband substance through the mail. The evidence here, however, does not indicate any logical reason why Mr. Tasker should have been isolated during that investigation. Mr. Tasker was released from this administrative segregation on May 14, 1977, after the investigation had exonerated him.

I

At the outset we must confront certain procedural difficulties which should be evident from the above recitation of facts. There is a serious question whether a habeas corpus action is the proper method for petitioner to test the constitutionality of his segregated confinement, when he does not challenge the validity of his conviction, when he prays for reformation of institutional rules, and when he does not seek release from custody. The leading federal case in this area, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), which petitioner cites frequently in his brief, was not a habeas corpus action, but rather a complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and injunctive relief.

Habeas corpus lies to test the legality of the restraint under which a person is detained. In this case it is necessary to distinguish between two types of restraint. The first, which petitioner does not challenge, is the restraint imposed on the petitioner because of his conviction in court of breaking and entering. The second is the restraint of the petitioner in administrative segregation because of his alleged infraction of prison rules and regulations. We hold that the scope of the writ of habeas corpus extends to cover the second instance of restraint, which has its basis conduct not related to the original conviction and which involves significant added restrictions upon a prisoner's very limited personal liberty. We find support for our position in the parallel interpretation of the scope of federal habeas corpus proceedings by a distinguished panel of fourth circuit judges, composed of Chief Judge Haynsworth and Circuit Judges Winter and Craven, in McNair v. McCune, 527 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1975) where they held that:

(T)here is federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over the complaint of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity of his original conviction but the imposition of segregated confinement without elementary procedural due process and without just cause. (527 F.2d at 875.)

A second procedural dilemma stems from the fact that the petitioner no longer is confined in administrative segregation. We cannot, therefore, dispose of this matter by ordering his release from administrative detention. Nor would our declaration that petitioner's confinement was invalid give the petitioner effective relief. The record before us indicates that no collateral consequences are attached to petitioner's administrative segregation so the petitioner suffers no present harm from his past confinement. We are thus in a position where we cannot lift the burden of present disabilities from the petitioner's shoulders in the event we find his substantive claims have merit. This circumstance, however, does not deprive us of jurisdiction to hear the case and resolve the important procedural due process questions involved. It is obvious that prison authorities could frustrate any meaningful habeas corpus challenge to their procedures by releasing prisoners from allegedly illegal restraints before the prisoners' cases mature for hearing on our docket or the circuit court dockets. To guard against such a possibility we must be prepared in appropriate habeas corpus cases to grant what amounts to prospective declaratory relief. The case of State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, W.Va., 202, S.E.2d 109 (1974) is ample authority for our position. The pertinent language from that habeas corpus case is:

Although the State has attempted to correct many of the obvious procedural errors in the May 1969 hearing, the Court is of the opinion that this case, taken in its entirety, presents a justiciable controversy of substantial public importance. The respondent (Director of Clinical Services, Huntington State Hospital) cannot deprive citizens of court review of a widespread violation of constitutional rights by curing procedural irregularities in individual cases after they have been brought to the court's attention. (202 S.E.2d at 115.)

If court review of constitutional violations cannot be frustrated by curing procedural irregularities post hoc, then, likewise, review cannot be frustrated by releasing an illegally confined person before his habeas corpus petition can be processed, particularly when the person continues to be in jeopardy of further illegal confinement of the same character. Not every case will fit this pattern, but in our view the peculiar facts of the case before us justify the exercise of our habeas corpus jurisdiction.

II

We turn now to a discussion of the merits of the case. Before examining in detail the due process requirements set down in the leading case, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), we need to examine generally how due process operates in a prison context. It is obvious that...