Tassin v. Cain
| Decision Date | 14 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-70013.,07-70013. |
| Citation | 517 F.3d 770 |
| Parties | Robert TASSIN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellee, v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Denise LeBoeuf (argued), Carol A. Kolinchak, Capital Post-Conviction Project of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, for Tassin.
Terry Michael Boudreaux (argued), Gretna, LA, for Cain.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
A jury convicted Robert Tassin of capital murder in a Louisiana state court. His wife Georgina, believing that she might receive a ten-year sentence in exchange for her testimony, testified that Robert had planned to commit armed robbery. Robert denied that there was any plan. The State suppressed evidence of Georgina's sentencing agreement, arguing in close that there was "no deal" and that Georgina had no reason to lie. Robert challenged his conviction on numerous grounds, including an argument that the State misled the jury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state court found that there had been no promise of a lenient sentence and no Fourteenth Amendment violation. Robert filed a habeas claim in federal district court; that court held that the state court's decision was contrary to federal law and vacated his conviction, ordering that the writ issue unless Louisiana retried Tassin within 180 days.1 Louisiana appeals.
Wayne Stagner and Eddie Martin worked on a Mississippi tugboat. When they completed a shift one night, they met a young woman named Shirley, Sheila, or Shelia Mills at the Shady Lady Lounge in Louisiana. Martin, Stagner, and Sheila had several rounds of drinks and then drove away from the bar in an attempt to find cocaine to buy. Martin drove, Stagner rode in the passenger's seat, and Sheila sat between them. After stopping at another bar, where they found no cocaine, Mills suggested that they stop at the home of Georgina and Robert Tassin. The men agreed, and Sheila went inside. Georgina later testified that while Martin and Stagner were waiting in the car, the Tassins and Mills hatched a plan to rob Martin and Stagner. The Tassins also informed Sheila that they did not have cocaine but they had Dilaudid, and that they would provide Sheila with the drug if she could get enough money from Mills and Stagner to pay for Dilaudid for the group. Mills emerged to ask Martin for money in exchange for sex. She re-entered the Tassins' home, where she paid the Tassins and they all injected Dilaudid. Mills reemerged from the home, this time with the Tassins.
The five individuals drove elsewhere, allegedly to look for more drugs. They stopped at another home, where the State argued that the Tassins borrowed a gun and Robert said that he obtained needles. While driving back to the Tassins' home, Sheila asked Martin to stop the car under a bridge because she was going to be sick. She exited the car. Robert claims that at this point, Stagner pointed a gun at him, demanded drugs and money, and wrestled with him. During the tussle, Robert got possession of Stagner's gun and shot the gun in self defense, wounding Stagner and killing Martin. Stagner, on the other hand, claimed at trial that Robert shot from the back seat in a surprise attack on Stagner and Martin.
The state court severed Georgina's, Robert's, and Mills's cases. Georgina was indicted for first degree murder but pled guilty to armed robbery and received a ten-year sentence. Stagner and Robert also testified at Robert's trial, but Mills did not.
Before trial, Robert asked the State to disclose any information it had on potential deals for a lenient sentence in exchange for Georgina's testimony against her husband.2 The State responded that it had no information on any deal. Georgina testified that she faced the possibility of a five- to ninety-nine-year sentence for armed robbery. When asked before the jury if her testimony would affect her sentence, she responded that she did not know if it would, and that no promises relating to her testimony had been made.3 The prosecution then suggested to the jury that Georgina had no reason to lie, since she faced up to a ninety-nine year sentence.4 According to an affidavit of Georgina's attorney, however, the judge presiding over her case had indicated that he would sentence her to twenty to thirty years, or as low as fifteen years, if she waived the marital privilege and possibly ten years if her testimony was consistent with her police statement.5 Georgina also testified in post-conviction proceedings that when she had testified at trial, she believed that she would receive a ten-year sentence.6 At trial, Robert and his attorney were unaware that Georgina had a favorable sentencing bargain, more favorable than a plea of armed robbery with the potential for ninety-nine years in prison. They learned of the deal only when an inmate forwarded Robert a letter following Robert's conviction and sentencing. Georgina had been writing letters to a male "pen pal" inmate named C.J. Jenkins or "Shorty," who sent Robert one of Georgina's letters7 to reassure him that Georgina's letters to Jenkins were friendly and not amorous. The letter referenced the possibility of a sentencing deal.8
A jury found Robert guilty of first degree murder in May 1987, and the court sentenced him to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Robert's conviction on direct appeal9 and rejected Robert's later application for a re-hearing. Robert filed his first application for post conviction relief in August 1990. The state court rejected that petition in August 1994, rejecting Tassin's claim that the State's suppression of the agreement between Georgina and the trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his other claims.
Following rejection of his application for writ of certiorari and review to the Louisiana Supreme Court,10 Robert brought his first federal habeas petition arguing, inter alia, that the lower court's determination that no covered-up deal existed was an unreasonable application of federal law. While these claims were pending, Robert discovered new evidence,11 and the State permitted Robert to bring a second State Application for Post Conviction Relief (the "successor petition") based on this evidence, which he filed in January 1997. The federal court dismissed his habeas claim without prejudice, and the state court considered the successor petition. The state court rejected the second petition for relief in November 1997. In January 2001, the state court rejected Robert's motion to reconsider its denial of the successor petition. That court did, however, permit additional scientific testing to determine whether Stagner initiated the violence on the night of the murder. In December 2003, the state court considered the results of the scientific testing and denied Robert's claims in his amended successor petition. Then the federal district court again addressed Robert's habeas claims.
Robert had presented evidence to the state court that Georgina expected to receive only ten years, not ninety-nine, in prison — including the letter that she wrote to a friend before the original trial, as well as post-conviction testimony of Georgina and her lawyer indicating that Georgina's attorney had discussed a deal with the court and had communicated this to Georgina.12 The state court concluded that Robert had failed to prove that such an arrangement existed and therefore denied Robert's habeas claim, stating,
Tassin alleges that his wife, Georgina Tassin (Georgina) was promised a lenient sentence by the trial judge in return for her testimony against petitioner. Tassin further alleges that this arrangement was unknown to him. At the evidentiary hearing on this claim, the trial judge, Georgina, and Georgina's attorney all denied that such an arrangement was made. Robert Tassin presented no convincing evidence to contradict the testimony of these individuals. Accordingly, relief based on this claim is denied.
The district court granted relief on this issue, finding that the state habeas court had erroneously required Robert to show that the court had "promised" Georgina a lenient sentence and that this promise was unknown to Robert.13 The district court held that the state court's ruling was "contrary to federal law because it applied a more stringent standard than the one established by Supreme Court precedent." Specifically, the district court found that the state court's determination was contrary to Giglio v. United States,14 Napue v. Illinois,15 and Brady v. Maryland16 because the suppressed bargain need not have been a firm "promise" in order to mislead the jury with respect to Georgina's credibility, and because the State failed to disclose the bargain. The court found that the State was "Constitutionally required" to "reveal its deal with the witness to the jury"17 and had failed to do so. The State appealed, arguing that the district court's holding was erroneous, urging that there was no "promise" and that Georgina's testimony was not misleading. Alternatively, the State argues, even if Georgina's testimony was misleading, her testimony was not material. We address each argument in turn.
Robert Tassin filed his federal habeas petition on January 18, 2005, so AEDPA applies.18 Under AEDPA, "The state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct, and the habeas petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence."19 In reviewing a state trial court decision, a district court may grant a habeas writ only if the court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."20
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