Tata v. State
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | EVELYN V. KEYESJustice. |
| Citation | Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2014) |
| Decision Date | 19 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 01–12–01119–CR.,01–12–01119–CR. |
| Parties | Jessica TATA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Allen C. Isbell, Houston, TX, for Appellant.
Devon Anderson, District Attorney, Jessica Akins, Assistant District Attorney, Harris County, Houston, TX, for State.
Panel consists of Justices KEYES, SHARP, and HUDDLE.
A jury convicted appellant, Jessica Tata, of felony murder and assessed her punishment at eighty years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. In five issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment after the close of evidence, in denying her motion to quash the indictment, and in denying her motion to suppress evidence.
We affirm.
Appellant was the owner and operator of Jackie's Day Care, which she operated out of the home she leased from Ronald Velasco. On the afternoon of February 24, 2011, appellant had seven children ranging in age from one to three years old under her care at her home. Four of the children died as a result of a fire that day, and others were severely injured but survived.
Using appellant's cell phone records, surveillance footage, and the testimony of witnesses, the State established that appellant entered a Target store near her home at approximately 1:09 p.m. and spoke to a Target employee, Ray Menzies. Menzies testified that while appellant was taking a survey seeking customer feedback she told him that she had left grease on the stove at home and that there were children at home with only her sister, who was sleeping. Menzies told appellant that he did not think that was okay, and appellant told him she would complete the survey at a later date. Surveillance footage shows that appellant bought a drink from the food court area of the store at 1:21 p.m. and walked out of the store at 1:22 p.m.
Appellant's neighbors, Geoffrey Deshano and John Chestnut, were outside their home that afternoon and saw appellant drive up to her house. They testified that appellant quickly ran back out of the house calling for help because there was oil burning in the house and there were small children inside. Deshano ran toward appellant and saw smoke coming out of her open front door. Chestnut called 9–1–1 to report the fire at approximately 1:30 p.m., and he and Deshano tried to help appellant remove some of the children from the house. Chestnut could see a bright fire on the stove.
Firefighters arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and entered the house and found the kitchen area on fire. While firefighters put out the fire in the kitchen, a search and rescue team located and removed the remaining children. Various witnesses testified about appellant's behavior during this time. She told some people that she was home when the fire broke out, but she had passed out from the smoke, and, when she woke up, she tried to get some of the children out and call for help. She told other people, including investigators, that she did not know what had happened. One of the firefighters noticed that appellant appeared clean and that the collar of her shirt was still white. Another firefighter observed that appellant did not demonstrate any symptoms of smoke inhalation or other characteristics of someone who had been inside a burning structure, such as watery eyes, coughing, or the presence of soot on her person and clothing.
Arson investigators arrived on the scene less than two hours after the fire was reported, while firefighters were still present. Arson investigator Anita Delgadillo arrived at approximately 3:30 p.m., took exterior photographs of the house, then went inside to continue her investigation. She immediately saw a Target bag that looked out of place because it was the only item that was not covered in soot. She moved the bag out of the interior walkway and noticed that the juice in the bag was still cool to the touch. The Target bag also contained a receipt with a time stamp of 1:18 p.m., and the items listed on the receipt matched the items found in the bag and outside the house on the lawn.
Four children died in the fire, including the complainant in this case, Elias Castillo, and the other children suffered injuries including severe burns. Castillo, who was sixteen months old, died as a result of complications following smoke inhalation. Appellant was indicted for the death of Elias Castillo under the theory of felony murder. The State alleged three felonies as alternative bases for appellant's felony murder liability: felony murder in the course of abandoning a child, felony murder in the course of endangering a child, and felony murder in the course of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child.
Before trial, appellant moved to suppress evidence, including the Target bag seized during the initial investigation into the cause of the fire. Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion. The trial court also denied appellant's motion to quash the third paragraph of her indictment, which alleged that she committed felony murder in the course of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child. After trial had started, and just before the charge on guilt or innocence was read to the jury, the State made an oral motion to abandon certain language in the paragraph of the indictment that alleged felony murder in the course of abandoning a child. The trial court granted the State's oral motion over appellant's objection, but no written memorialization of the amended indictment was included in the record on appeal. The jury found appellant guilty of felony murder, and it assessed her punishment at eighty years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. This appeal followed.
In her first four issues, appellant raises complaints regarding her indictment.
In her first three issues on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment after the close of evidence because: (1) the deleted language described an essential element of the alleged offense, (2) the amendment violated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 28.10, and (3) the amendment reduced the State's burden of proof.
The first paragraph of appellant's indictment states:
[O]n or about February 24, 2011, [appellant] did then and there unlawfully, commit and attempt to commit the felony offense of abandoning a child with the intent to return, by having care, custody and control of Elias Castillo, a child younger than fifteen years of age, by intentionally abandoning Elias Castillo under circumstances that exposed Elias Castillo to an unreasonable risk of harm, and under circumstances that a reasonable person would believe would place Elias Castillo in imminent danger of bodily injury ..., and while in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of said offense, [appellant] did commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely, by leaving Elias Castillo without adult supervision in a house with a pan containing oil on top of a heated burner that started a fire causing the death of Elias Castillo.
(Emphasis added.) After both appellant and the State had rested, prior to the trial court charging the jury, the State requested an abandonment of the phrase “and under circumstances that a reasonable person would believe would place Elias Castillo in imminent danger of bodily injury.” The trial court granted the State's oral motion over appellant's objections. However, the record does not contain a written, modified indictment.
The Code of Criminal Procedure allows for amendment of an indictment and supplies the procedure to be followed for successful amendment. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.10 (Vernon 2006) (); id. art. 28.11 (Vernon 2006) (). Neither the motion to amend nor the trial court's granting of that motion is an amendment; “rather, the two comprise the authorization for the eventual amendment of the charging instrument pursuant to [Code of Criminal Procedure article 28.10 ].” Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (quoting Ward v. State, 829 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) ); see also Johnson v. State, 214 S.W.3d 157, 158 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (“[W]e note that authority holds an oral motion to amend coupled with the trial court's decision to grant it falls short of a valid amendment under article 28.10.”); Valenti v. State, 49 S.W.3d 594, 597–98 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ( same).
A written amendment must be submitted to the trial court and included in the record to be valid. See Riney, 28 S.W.3d at 565–66 (); Head v. State, 299 S.W.3d 414, 437 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd) (); Aguilera v. State, 75 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd) (); see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 12 (b) (); Puente v. State, 320 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (...
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...1856 (need to prevent imminent destruction of evidence sufficient justification for warrantless search); Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (burning building created exigency justifying warrantless entry by fire officials and the search and seizure......
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...for felony murder is not required to allege the constituent elements of the underlying felony.” Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456, 463 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (citations omitted). “The proper test to determine if a charging instrument alleges ‘an offense’ is whether the ......
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...a reasonable time to investigate varies according to the circumstances of a particular fire. Tata v. State , 446 S.W.3d 456, 467 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (citing Tyler , 436 U.S. at 510 n.6, 98 S.Ct. at 1950 n.6 ). If evidence of criminal activity is discovered by fi......
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Search and Seizure: Property
...varies according the circumstances of a particular fire. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 1950 n. 6; Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456, 467 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.ref’d). Once in a building for this purpose, firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is ......
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Search and Seizure: Property
...varies according the circumstances of a particular fire. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 1950 n. 6; Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456, 467 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.ref’d). Once in a building for this purpose, firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is ......
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Search and Seizure: Property
...varies according the circumstances of a particular fire. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 1950 n. 6; Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456, 467 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.ref’d). Once in a building for this purpose, firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is ......
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