Tate v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 10 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-0895-B-BH |
| Parties | LATINA MONIQUE TATE, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge[1]
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Before the Court is Defendants Rafael Fontalvo, Maria Sandra Rodriguez, and Carma Hoskins's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Latina M. Tate's Original Complaint and Brief in Support, filed May 18, 2021 (doc. 9), and Defendants Dallas Independent School District's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Latina M. Tate's Original Complaint and Brief in Support, filed May 18, 2021 (doc. 10). Based on relevant filings and applicable law, both motions should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The plaintiff's responses to the motions are liberally construed as a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a new claim and GRANTED.
Latina Monique Tate (Plaintiff) sues Dallas Independent School District (DISD) and three of its employees, Maria Sandra Rodriguez, DISD Background Specialist (Background Specialist), Rafael Fontalvo, a Department Manager in DISD's Human Capital Management Department (Department Manager), and Carma Hoskins, Equal Employment Opportunity Manager (EEO Manager) (collectively Employees), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (FCRA), for compensatory, punitive, and injunctive relief. (See docs. 3 at 1-3, 6.)[2]
Plaintiff obtained a Texas teacher certification in special education EC-12 through the iTeach Texas Program. (See Id. at 4.) On April 8, 2019, she attended a DISD job fair for alternative certification candidates. (See Id. at 33.) The next day, DISD offered her an “early contract via email that guaranteed [her] a teaching position for the 2019-2020 academic year, ” “pending the completion of all the requirements as stated in the document, ” including new hire forms, an approved background, and valid certification. (See Id. at 4, 10.) After an interview, on May 6, 2019, she was offered a teaching position at a local high school. (See Id. at 4, 10.)
On May 23, 2019, Background Specialist emailed Plaintiff and requested information about three arrests that appeared on a background report, including a description of the arrests, an explanation of why they were omitted from the application, and submission of related court documents, within 48 hours. (See doc. 3 at 17-18.) That day and the next, Plaintiff responded to Background Specialist by telephone and email, explaining that the arrests were traffic-related and had not resulted in convictions, which is why she had omitted them from her application. (See Id. at 18-19.) She also explained that she would be traveling to Illinois, where the arrests took place, to obtain the court documents, but it would take her “a week to 10 days, ” given the time that had passed since the arrests. (See Id. at 19.) Background Specialist replied that she had “[n]otated the time frame for the court documents.” (See id.)
On June 5, 2019, Background Specialist sent Plaintiff an email stating, “The review of your background has been completed and you are ineligible for employment with [DISD] at this time in accordance with [DISD] District Policy DBAA (Local).” (See Id. at 20.) The next day, Plaintiff submitted her court documents “in the timeframe originally stated, ” which she later explained was “10 business days.” (See Id. at 22, 32.) On June 7, 2019, she asked Department Manager for information about the “consumer reporting agency” that provided her background information; he said he would get back with her by telephone the next day but never did. (See Id. at 5.)
On September 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging she had been “discriminated against because of [her] Race-Black/African American, in violation of Title VII, ” and “profiled due to an arrest record that had nothing to do with [her] teaching ability or credentials.” (See Id. at 5-6, 24-25). DISD's response, which was signed by EEO Manager, denied Plaintiff's allegations and stated that her offer had been rescinded because she had not taken and passed the Core Subjects certification exam, which was a requirement for the position, had failed to provide requested documents, and had failed to communicate timely with the Background Department. (See Id. at 28-31.) The EEOC sent Plaintiff a dismissal and right to sue letter on January 21, 2021, which she received “on or about” February 1st or 2nd, 2021. (See Id. at 5-6, 35.)
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the three DISD employees (Employees) and DISD (collectively Defendants) on April 19, 2021, alleging that they had discriminated against her based on race in violation of Title VII, and that they obtained and used her background information in violation of the FCRA. (See Id. at 1, 3, 5-6, 35.) She filed proof of service showing that an individual at the same address as her mailed each defendant a copy of the summons by certified mail, return receipt requested, at “9400 North Central Expwy, Dallas, Texas 75231.”
On May 18, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff responded to both motions and asserted for the first time a new discrimination claim based on a disparate impact theory. (See docs. 13 at 1; 14 at 1.)
Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(5) for lack of proper service. (See docs. 9 at 14; 10 at 15.)
Rule 12(b)(5) permits a party to challenge the method of service attempted by the plaintiff, or the lack of delivery of the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5); Gartin v. Par Pharm. Companies, Inc., 289 Fed.Appx. 688, 692 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).[3] Rule 4(c) places the burden on the plaintiff to ensure that defendants are properly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1); Carimi v. Royal Carribean Cruise Line, Inc., 959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992).[4] For service to be effective, a plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Rule 4. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4; Bowling v. Childress-Herres, No. 4:18-CV-610-ALM-CAN, 2019 WL 4463450, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4451122 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2019). This includes the requirement in Rule 4(m) for service within 90 days of the filing of the lawsuit, although the time for service may be extended upon a showing of good cause. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); Bowling, 2019 WL 4463450, at *6. “A litigant's pro se status neither excuses his failure to effect service nor excuses him for lack of knowledge of the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); see also Kersh v. Derozier, 851 F.2d 1509, 1512 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to dismiss an action for ineffective service of process.” Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 645 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing George v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), a court may properly look beyond the pleadings to determine whether service was sufficient. See, e.g., Williams v. Kroger Texas, L.P., No. 3:16-CV-1631-L, 2016 WL 5870976, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2016) (); see also Trombetta v. Novocin, No. 18-CV-993 (RA), 2020 WL 7053301, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (citation omitted) ( a court may look at “affidavits and supporting materials” in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5)); Cutler Assocs., Inc. v. Palace Constr., LLC, 132 F.Supp.3d 191, 194 (D. Mass. 2015) (citation omitted) (“[T]he Court is permitted to look beyond the pleadings and may consider affidavits and other documents to determine whether process was properly served.”). Here, Plaintiff filed proof of service showing that an individual at her same address mailed each defendant a copy of the summons by certified mail, return receipt requested. Employees also attached copies of two of the certified mail envelopes bearing Plaintiff's name and return address to their motion to dismiss. (See doc. 9 at 30-31.) These documents may be properly considered.
Rule 4(e) provides that an individual may be served by:
Fed. R Civ. P. 4(e). Under Texas law, any person authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 103[5] may serve process by “(1) delivering to the defendant, in person, a copy of the citation, showing the delivery date, and of the petition; or (2) mailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 106(a)(2). The return receipt must be signed by the addressee to be...
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