Tate v. Dragovich
| Decision Date | 14 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-4495.,96-4495. |
| Parties | DAVID TATE, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN L. DRAGOVICH, <I>Deputy Superintendent of the State</I>: <I>Correctional Institution at Mahanoy,</I>: ROBERT M. NOVOTNEY, <I>Deputy</I>: <I>Superintendent of the State Correctional</I>: <I>Institution at Mahanoy,</I>: PHILIP DUCK, <I>State Correctional</I>: <I>Institution at Mahanoy,</I>: Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the Court is Defendant Philip Duck's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. For the reasons set forth below, I deny Defendant's motion.
On June 26, 1996, Plaintiff David Tate, then an inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy ("Mahanoy"), commenced this civil rights action against then Governor Tom Ridge Commissioner of the State Department of Corrections Martin F. Horn, Superintendent of Mahanoy Martin Dragovich, Deputy Superintendent Robert Novotney, and Unit Manager Philip Duck as a class action on behalf of African-American inmates aged 14-29 in the Pennsylvania correctional system. On January 17, 1977, then District Court Judge Rendell dismissed Plaintiff's claims regarding lack of rehabilitative services and lack of African-American prison staff, denied class certification and narrowed the case to Plaintiff's individual claims of harassment. On May 29, 1997, Judge Rendell issued an order denying class certification, denying Plaintiff's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction, and directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint focusing on individualized discrimination and retaliation claims.
Mr. Tate filed his amended complaint on July 28, 1997. Therein, he alleged, in relevant part, that Mr. Duck had targeted and harassed him by, for example, refusing his request for a roll of toilet paper, expressing a personal dislike toward him, repeatedly calling him a "gang banger," telling other officers to monitor him, and repeatedly searching his cell. Mr. Tate further alleged that Messrs. Dragovich and Novotney failed to remedy Mr. Duck's treatment of him, despite his bringing it to their attention. Finally, Mr. Tate alleged that all three Defendants retaliated against him for "challenging discriminatory treatment." They did this, he alleged, by issuing false misconduct reports, placing him on cell restriction, referring to him in a racially derogatory manner, moving him into a cell with a smoker, removing his name from the list for vocational training, denying him haircuts, laundering his clothes in a way that caused a skin rash, denying his toilet paper request, and searching his cell.
On December 17, 1997, Judge Dalzell, to whom the case was reassigned on October 23, 1997, dismissed Plaintiff's complaint against Governor Ridge and Commissioner Horn with prejudice. On January 14, 1998, Judge Dalzell granted summary judgment for Messrs. Dragovich, Novotney, and Duck. On January 28, 1998, Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Third Circuit. On August 9, 1999, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Gov. Ridge and Commissioner Horn. It affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Dragovich, Novotney and Duck as to claims that they discriminated against African-Americans in general, but vacated the grant of summary judgment for Dragovich, Novotney and Duck as to Plaintiff's claims of retaliation and remanded for further proceedings. On July 11, 2000, the case was reassigned to me, and I granted Mr. Tate the right to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se.
On June 17, 2003 a jury trial took place for two full days on Mr. Tate's claim of retaliation against Messrs. Dragovich, Novotney and Duck. At the close of evidence, the Defendants made a proper motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the Court denied. Therein, among other things, Mr. Duck objected to the submission to the jury of the issue of punitive damages. On June 19, 2003, the jury returned a verdict for Mr. Dragovich and Mr. Novotney, but against Mr. Duck. The jury awarded Mr. Tate one dollar in nominal damages and ten thousand dollars in punitive damages. Ssequently, Mr. Duck timely filed the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial that is the subject of this Memorandum and Order.
In July, 1994, Mr. Duck became a housing unit manager at SCI-Mahonoy. (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 163.) From that point until Mr. Duck left Mahanoy in September, 1999, Mr. Tate was "on and off" Mr. Duck's housing unit. (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 188.) Sometime during 1994, after Mr. Duck had assumed that post, Mr. Tate sent Mr. Duck a series of "interrogatories." (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 163.) In response to one such interrogatory relating to Mr. Duck's alleged refusal to provide Mr. Tate with toilet paper, Mr. Duck indicated that he had informed Mr. Tate about "legislation pending regarding frivolous lawsuits." (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 177.) On March 21, 1995, Mr. Tate filed a grievance regarding a conversation between himself and Mr. Duck about Mr. Tate obtaining early release from the prison. (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 168.)
On March 22, 1995, Mr. Tate filed a grievance regarding Mr. Duck's alleged disrespectful tone toward Mr. Tate and his alleged discrimination against Mr. Tate and other inmates. (Ex. D-51; June 17, 2003 Tr. at 170.) The same day, Mr. Tate filed another grievance regarding Mr. Novotney's allegedly racist responses to his verbal complaints about Mr. Duck's treatment of Mr. Tate. (Ex. D-6.) On July 1, 1996, Mr. Tate filed a complaint with Superintendent Dragovich against Mr. Duck and several prison guards, who he claimed were writing false misconducts against him and harassing him. (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 22-23, 127-129; June 18, 2003 Tr. at 28, 87, 128.) Mr Tate's grievances in both instances were denied initially, on appeal by Mr. Dragovich, and on final review by a Central Office Review Committee of the state Department of Corrections. (Ex. D-5; Ex. D-6.) On February 14, 1997, Mr. Tate filed a grievance by letter to Mr. Novotney alleging that Mr. Duck had been "deliberately harassing" Mr. Tate in retaliation for Mr. Tate's filing of a federal law suit against Mr. Duck. (Ex. D-6.)
The jury heard evidence at trial that, after Mr. Tate complained to Mr. Duck about his laundry not being cleaned properly, Mr. Duck instructed an inmate working in the laundry room to put toilet cleanser in Mr. Tate's clothing sometime between 1995 and 1996. (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 70-73; June 18, 2003 Tr. at 78.) When Mr. Tate's clothes were returned to him, they were blue and thinned and the following day, he developed a rash in the areas where the clothes had touched his body. (Tr. at 81.) Mr. Tate testified that when he confronted Mr. Duck about his clothes, Mr. Duck responded that Mr. Tate was "always complaining" and that he had "just told them to add a little something to it to make your clothes a little cleaner." (June 18, 2003 Tr. at 82.) The jury heard evidence that Mr. Duck frequently searched Mr. Tate's cell and, on at least one occasion, knocked a few of Mr. Tate's items off a shelf. (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 71; June 18, 2003 Tr. at 84.) The jury also heard evidence that in1997, Mr. Duck refused Mr. Tate's request for a roll of toilet paper and instead "rolled some toilet paper off [his hand] and gave it to [Mr. Tate]" (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 177-178, 194), while telling Mr. Tate to "go file another lawsuit" (June 18, 2003 Tr. at 91). Mr. Tate mentioned this incident as an example of Mr. Duck's alleged harassment in his February 14, 1997 grievance. (Ex. D-7.) The jury also heard evidence that Mr. Duck, who was in charge of cell assignments in his housing unit, knew that Mr. Tate was a nonsmoker and yet Mr. Tate frequently had cell mates who smoked (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 185-186), although the majority of inmates in the prison were smokers (June 17, 2003 Tr. at 190).
In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that: 1) Mr. Tate made good faith use of the prison grievance system or made a good faith communication to Mr. Duck about his use or intent to use the prison grievance system; 2) Mr. Duck took adverse action against Mr. Tate; and 3) Mr. Tate's use of the prison grievance system or communication about his use of the prison grievance system was a substantial or motivating factor in Mr. Duck taking adverse action against Mr. Tate. (June 18, 2003 Tr. at 23.)
Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for" the prevailing party. Olefins Trading v. Han Yang Chem. Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(b)). The "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" has also been characterized as a "minimum quantum of evidence," Keith v. Truck Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 1990), or even as "any rational basis for the verdict." Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 259 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Stelwagon Manu. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1361 1364 (E.D. Pa.1994) () (internal quotations omitted). A court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and "`every fair and reasonable inference'" must be drawn in that party's favor. McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993)).
A court may grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at...
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