Tate v. HUD Wash. DC (Entity)

• Decision Date: 30 April 2020
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 18-318 Erie
• Parties: AMOS TATE, Plaintiff, v. HUD WASHINGTON DC (Entity), et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

AMOS TATE, Plaintiff, v. HUD WASHINGTON DC (Entity), et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 18-318 Erie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Amos Tate commenced this proceeding on October 17, 2018 with the filing of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1). Attached to his motion was a complaint directed against: (1) "HUD Washington DC (Entity)"; (2) "Housing Urban Development Jen Dreswicki (Associate)"; and (3) the unnamed Director" of "Stairways" (officially known as "Stairways Behavioral Health"), a provider of mental health services located in Erie, Pennsylvania (ECF No. 1-1). The Complaint alleges as follows.

In June 2016, Plaintiff was found to be disabled for social security insurance purposes after a cerebral hemorrhage left him with permanent brain damage. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. Since that time, Plaintiff has suffered several mini strokes and has been diagnosed with congestive heart failure. Id. at 7. After being awarded SSID benefits in June 2016, Plaintiff sought housing assistance from HUD and was placed on the "Erie, PA Disable[d] housing list." ECF No. 1-1 at 6. The following month, Plaintiff went to the local HUD office in Erie and inquired whether there was "any vacant disability housing." Id. Plaintiff was advised by someone that there was a new complex in Meadville, Pennsylvania. Id. Plaintiff applied for housing at that locationbecause he was informed that he was "first on the list." Id. When Plaintiff returned in August 2016 to inquire about available housing, however, he was informed that all the apartments were taken. Id. He then inquired about available housing for disabled individuals at various other complexes within the City of Erie. ECF No. 1-1 at p. 6.

Plaintiff alleges that, after "doing two years of disable [sic] SSID investigation," he discovered that "Stairways Mental Health & Behavior case manager is monoplizing [sic] all the HUD housing voucher program federal alloted [sic] monies for disable[d] individuals . . . ." ECF No. 1-1 at p. 6. He claims that "[t]hese ploys" are discriminatory in nature. Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff further states that "working people who acquire disablement while working, and people who never worked, have paramount suitability to our subsidize[d] housing," and that "Stairways Mental Health Behavior case managers have paramount control." Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks an award of $12,000 to reimburse him for the rent he has had to pay since 2016. ECF No. 1-1 at p. 8. In addition, Plaintiff requests entry of an order that would direct HUD to provide him a government subsidized "single house" or, alternatively, a voucher that would allow him to "get a house" through a "voucher program."

II. Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed the district courts to utilize a two-step analysis to determine whether to direct service of a complaint where the plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. See Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1990). First, the district court evaluates a litigant's financial status and determines whether he or she is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis under §1915(a); second, the court assesses thecomplaint under §1915(e)(2)¹ to determine whether it is frivolous or otherwise subject to sua sponte dismissal. Id. (citing Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.1976)); see Brown v. Sage, 903 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2018) (describing two-step process for evaluating a petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal); Schneller v. Abel Home Care, Inc., 389 F. App'x 90, 92 (3d Cir. 2010); Rogers v. United States, 248 F. App'x 402, 402-03 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2007). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee, he will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

III. Review of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as amended, "[t]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." A claim is frivolous if it: (1) is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory and/or, (2) contains factual contentions that are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under §1915(e) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). This standard requires the court to determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to §1915, a court must grant the plaintiffleave to amend his complaint unless the amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).²

B. Plaintiff's Prior Lawsuit in Case No. 1:18-cv-148

As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the present lawsuit is substantially similar to one previously filed by Plaintiff against an unidentified HUD "Supervisor" at Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-148. In that case, like here, Plaintiff asserted claims predicated upon his inability to obtain federally subsidized housing. The Honorable Cathy Bissoon ultimately dismissed Plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Tate v. Supervisor HUD, No. CV 18-148, 2018 WL 3068542 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2018). Because various aspects of Judge Bissoon's ruling are instructive in this case, the Court recites portions of that decision at length.

In her opinion, Judge Bissoon discussed the Housing Choice Voucher ("HCV") program established under Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 ("USHA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1437, et seq., which was the program under which Plaintiff sought to obtain benefits. Judge Bissoon observed that:

Congress authorized the HCV program "[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing." [42 U.S.C.] §1437f(a). The program is overseen by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and administered by local agencies in accordance with federal guidelines. See Henry v. City of Erie, 728 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2013). "In Erie, the local administering agency is theHousing Authority of the City of Erie ("HACE")." Id. As one federal court recently explained:

The Section 8 program is a tenant-based, housing-choice voucher program (HCV program) authorized under the USHA. With respect to the HCV program, the USHA authorizes the Secretary of HUD "to enter into annual contributions contracts with public housing agencies," who, in turn, "may enter into contracts to make assistance payments to owners of existing dwelling units in accordance with" the HCV Program. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1). "The HCV program is generally administered by ... PHAs [public housing authorities]. HUD provides housing assistance funds to the PHA. HUD also provides funds for PHA administration of the program." 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). Thus, the HCV program is funded by HUD but administered by local PHAs. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1). To participate in the program, families apply directly to the PHA. If the PHA approves the tenancy, PHA then enters into a contract "with the owner [of the rental unit] to make rent subsidy payments on behalf of the family." 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2). The family pays a portion of its income as rent, and HUD reimburses the PHA for the rental subsidies provided to housing-unit owners through annual contributions contracts. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(b)(1), 1437f(o)(2)(A), and 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.1(a)(3), 982.151. PHAs develop a "written administrative plan that establishes the local policies for administration of the [HCV] program." 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a). HUD regulations require the PHAs to "administer the program in conformity with the Fair Housing Act, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act." 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(b)(1). HUD is not required to approve the PHA's plan.

PHAs also develop their own policies for admission to the HCV program and administer their own waiting lists. 24 C.F.R. § 982.202. HUD regulations specifically provide "[a]n applicant does not have any right or entitlement to be listed on the PHA waiting list, to any particular position on the waiting list, or to admission to the programs." 24 C.F.R. § 982.202(c). In fact, PHAs are permitted to establish preferences designed to meet the needs of their local areas. 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(a). PHAs also determine when to open or to close their waiting lists. 24 C.F.R. § 982.206.

Emrit v. Marion Cty. Hous. Auth. (MCHA), No. 3:16-CV-01854-BR, 2017 WL 743882, at *2-3 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2017) (alterations in the original).

2018 WL 3068542, at *3-4 (initial alteration added).

Turning to Plaintiff's potential causes of action, Judge Bissoon noted that, "to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sue HUD or its local supervisor directly under Section 8, he cannot doso because 'Section 8 . . . does not provide for a private right of action except for recovery of rent and utility allowances[.]'" 2018 WL 3068542, at *4 (ellipsis added). Judge Bissoon then considered whether Plaintiff was attempting to assert a claim under Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq., which...