Tate v. State
Decision Date | 25 October 2019 |
Docket Number | CR-18-0378 |
Parties | Marcus Terrell TATE v. STATE of Alabama |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Susan G. James of The James Firm, Montgomery, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Marcus Terrell Tate appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary, a violation of § 13A-7-5, Ala. Code 1975, and fourth-degree theft of property, a violation of § 13A-8-5, Ala. Code 1975, and his resulting concurrent sentences of 14 years and 1 year, respectively.
The evidence at trial showed that Tate broke into an apartment occupied by Theresa Monk and her family and stole a television. (R. 125-26.) Before Monk began living in the apartment, Monk's friend, Kevia Staples, had lived in that apartment. (R. 128.) Tate had previously been Staples's boyfriend, and he had often stayed at the apartment overnight, but apparently had never lived there. (R. 191.) When Staples moved out of the apartment, she subleased the apartment to Monk's boyfriend. (R. 154.) Staples also told Monk that she could have the furniture and other items remaining in the apartment after Staples moved out. (R. 130.)
On December 3, 2016, Monk, her teenaged daughter, and others were entering the apartment when Tate entered the apartment without an invitation and went into the bedroom. (R. 127.) Tate removed a television from the bedroom dresser and left the apartment with the television. (R. 131-33.) After Tate left, Monk locked the front door. Immediately thereafter, Tate kicked the door open, came inside, and removed another television from the living room, together with a game system and cords. (R. 133-36.)
One of the persons with Monk told Tate that the television was not his. Tate lifted his shirt to show them his pistol, and said "it's mine now." (R. 135-36.) Tate left the apartment with both televisions, and Monk telephoned the police. Monk and her daughter identified Tate from a lineup and identified Tate again at trial. (R. 128, 143, 175, 181, 231-32.)1
Staples testified that she used to date Tate and that Tate had no belongings at the apartment. (R. 191-92.) Staples also testified that she never told Tate that he could take the television in the bedroom. (R. 194.)
Tate did not testify at trial, but the State presented evidence of Tate's interview with police investigators several months after the burglary. Tate's written statement read as follows:
(R. 239-40.)
White v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
The standard of review for pure questions of law in criminal cases is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003).
On appeal, Tate claims (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence, and (3) that it violated principles of double jeopardy to convict him of both burglary and theft based on the same incident.
Tate argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because, he says, the State did not prove that Monk owned or rented the apartment or that she owned the television that was stolen and (2) that, as to both charges, there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof regarding ownership.
Section 13A-7-5, Ala. Code 1975, defines first-degree burglary as:
(Emphasis added.)
(C. 12 (emphasis added).)
The circuit court instructed the jury that, to convict Tate of burglary, it must find that Tate "knowingly and unlawfully entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Theresa Monk with intent to commit a crime therein, to-wit, theft of property in the fourth degree." (R. 281.)2
Fourth-degree theft of property is a violation of § 13A-8-5(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides:
"The theft of property which does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) in value and which is not taken from the person of another constitutes theft of property in the fourth degree."
Section 13A-8-2(a), Ala. Code 1975, defines "theft of property" as: "(a) A person commits the crime of theft of property if he or she: (1) Knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his or her property."
(C. 13 (emphasis added).)
With respect to the theft charge, the circuit court instructed the jury that it must find that Tate "knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over the property of Theresa Monk, more specifically, a television," and that Tate "acted with intent to deprive Ms. Monk of her property." (R. 289-90.)
Tate argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction because, he says, the evidence showed that Monk was not the "owner" of the apartment or the television and (2) that there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof regarding Monk's ownership of the apartment and the television. Specifically, Tate argues that the indictment alleged that the dwelling was Monk's, but the evidence at trial refuted that allegation by showing that the apartment was actually being subleased by Monk's boyfriend and that Monk was just visiting. Likewise, Tate argues that the television did not belong to Monk, as alleged in the indictment.
With respect to the burglary charge, Tate argues:
This argument fails because "[b]urglary, like trespass, is an offense against the possession, and hence the test for the purpose of determining in whom the ownership of the premises should be laid in an indictment is not the title, but the occupancy or possession at the time the offense was committed." Folsom v. State, 668 So. 2d 114, 116 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (citations omitted). See also Gaines v. State, 460 So. 2d 240, 241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (where the building burglarized was occupied by the establishment named in the indictment "it [is] immaterial who owned the building"); Hamilton v. State, 283 Ala. 540, 545, 219 So. 2d 369, 374 (1969) ( ); Fuller v. State, 28 Ala. App. 28, 29, 177 So. 353, 354 (1937) ( ).
To prove burglary, the State does not need to prove who has legal title to the burglarized building or dwelling, or the exact nature of the victim's ownership interest. Instead, it is enough that the State prove that the victim had a right to possess or occupy the building and that the defendant did not have ownership or a right of possession or occupancy.
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