Tate v. State Highway Commission, 17324.
Citation | 49 S.W.2d 282 |
Decision Date | 02 May 1932 |
Docket Number | No. 17324.,17324. |
Parties | TATE v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cole County; Henry J. Westhues, Judge.
Action by Joseph T. Tate against the State Highway Commission of Missouri. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
J. W. Mather, of Jefferson City, for appellant.
James Booth, of Pacific, for respondent.
This is an action for damages brought on account of the appropriation of certain land, in respect to which plaintiff was a tenant at will, by the state highway commission, for a public highway. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 and defendant has appealed.
The sole point raised by the defendant is that the petition fails to state a cause of action. There was no demurrer to the petition in the trial court, but of course, the point that the petition does not state a cause of action may be raised at any time. Strauss v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 644, 648, 77 S. W. 156.
The petition alleges that the plaintiff was in the peaceful possession of certain lands in Gasconade county as a tenant at will:
It is insisted that plaintiff, being a tenant merely at will, did not possess any interest in the land entitling him to sue under the provisions of section 21, article 2, of the Constitution of this State, providing that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. It is claimed that the interest of a tenant at will is not property, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
In order to intelligently pass upon this question it is necessary to inquire into the nature of a tenancy at will. Tiffany on Real Property, vol. 1, § 55, p. 140, says:
A tenancy at will is terminated by a conveyance or by written lease by the lessor to a third person and is likewise determined by an alienation of the lessee to a third person. See 1 Tiffany on Real Property, § 56, p. 141; 1 Washburn on Real Property, § 765, p. 478, § 767, p. 479 (6th Ed.); Reckhow v. Schanck, 43 N. Y. 448; Clarke v. Thatcher, 9 Mo. App. 436; Corby v. McSpadden, 63 Mo. App. 648, 652, 653.
As this action is not predicated upon the wrong or trespass upon the land, but upon a constitutional right to compensation for the interference to the use thereof, it is governed by the law relative to condemnations under the provisions of the Constitution aforesaid. Webster v. Kansas City & So. Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 114, 118, 22 S. W. 474; Hickman v. City of Kansas, 120 Mo. 110, 124, 25 S. W. 225, 23 L. R. A. 658, 41 Am. St. Rep. 684; State ex rel. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474.
It is stated that in order for one to be entitled to damages under the condemnation law: "The injury complained of must also be actual, susceptible of proof, and capable of being approximately measured, and must not be speculative, remote, prospective, or contingent." City of Winchester v. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 552, 144 N. E. 333, 336, 36 A. L. R. 520; see, also, Goldfield Consolidated Water Co. v. Public Service Comm. (D. C.) 236 F. 979; Groenendyke v. Fowler, 204 Iowa, 598, 215 N. W. 718; Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah, 546, 200 P. 510. When the condemnor appropriates the fee he is substituted, in a sense, for the landlord and, therefore, it is held that it will be considered that the property has been conveyed by the landlord. As before stated, a conveyance by the landlord terminates a tenancy at will. "The termination of the landlord's estate, even though by involuntary alienation under eminent domain proceedings, terminates a tenancy at will." 35 C. J. p. 1128; Lyons v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 209 Pa. 550, 552, 58 A. 924. Though not disclosed in the petition, the evidence shows that the commission secured the right of way in question from the owners. However, we are not basing our decision on this circumstance. In the following cases it has been held that a tenant at will had no such interest in the land as is subject to condemnation: Lyons v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., supra; Can. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Milling & Elev. Co., 15 Ann. Cas. 709 (Ont.).
Some light can be thrown upon the question of whether a tenant at will is the owner of property, within the meaning of our constitutional provision requiring that it be condemned if taken for public use, by inquiring, as to what part of the "just compensation" awarded should be allotted to a tenant at will. It is quite apparent from its nature that a tenancy at will is incapable of being the subject-matter of a sale. Therefore, it is questionable whether it has a market value. In the case of St. Louis, K. & Northwestern R. Co. v. Knapp, Stout & Co., 160 Mo. 396, 412, 61 S. W. 300, 303 ( ), the Supreme Court said:
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