Tatman v. Philadelphia, Baltimore And Washington Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 23 January 1913
• Citation: 85 A. 716,10 Del.Ch. 105
• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware
• Parties: BLEMA B. TATMAN, v. PHILADELPHIA, BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY

85 A. 716

10 Del.Ch. 105

BLEMA B. TATMAN, v. PHILADELPHIA, BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY

Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle

January 23, 1913

INJUNCTION BILL. The bill in this cause was filed by Blema B Jones, a minor, by her next friend, Alexander Jones, to restrain the pleading of a release by the Philadelphia Baltimore and Washington Railroad Company in a suit at law for damages as a result of injuries sustained by the complainant by the explosion of powder in transportation over the company's railroad. Upon the complainant's arrival at twenty-one years of age, upon petition, she was permitted to prosecute this cause in her own name and right she having married one Tatman since the filing of the bill. The matter was heard on bill, answer, testimony and exhibits.

Hugh M. Morris, for the complainant.

Ward, Gray & Neary, for the defendant.

OPINION

THE CHANCELLOR

This was a bill to enjoin a defendant in a suit at law from pleading a release. On December 2, 1903, Blema B. Jones and her mother, Addie M. Jones, were injured at Greenwood by an explosion of powder being transported in a car by the Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington Railroad Company. At the February term, A. D. 1904, of the Superior Court of New Castle County, suit was brought by the complainant, then a minor, by her next friend, against the company for damages for her injuries so received. After the declaration had been filed in that suit, the plaintiff therein, by her next friend, filed a bill in this court asking that the defendant be enjoined from using as a defense the release made by Blema B. Jones and others, dated February 4, 1904 given under the following circumstances: Beyond slight bruises, the injury received by Blema B. Jones was to one of her eyes. She was attended by the physician usually employed by the family, and by another physician, an eye specialist of repute, both of whom were employed for the purpose by the railroad company and by it paid for their services. These physicians told the injured girl, her parents and one Dorrance, an agent of the company engaged in settling claims of those injured by the explosion, that the injury to the girl's eye was only a scratch on the surface of the eye, and one of them said that glasses would bring the eye right. Relying on these representations the parents of Blema B. Jones, who was then a minor over fourteen years of age, agreed with Dorrance upon a settlement for the injuries sustained by Blema B. Jones and her mother, who also received personal injuries by the same explosion. On February 4, 1904, a joint release was executed by Blema B. Jones, her father and mother, and John C. Barwick, who had been appointed guardian for the child. The sum of $ 3,400 was paid for the release for the injuries to Blema B. Jones and her mother without either stating in the release the character of the injuries, or distributing or separating among those entitled thereto the sum paid for the injuries to the two persons. It was agreed, however, between all parties thereto, including Dorrance for the railroad company, that the sum of $ 500 was for the injuries to Blema B. Jones, and this sum, being part of the $ 3,400 mentioned in the release, was received by her guardian.

Afterwards the injuries to the eye of Blema B. Jones were found to be different from that which all concerned considered to exist at the time of the release. She lost the sight of the injured eye, and another specialist found that the eye instead of being superficially scratched, had been penetrated deeply through four coats, including the retina, and the injured eye was removed. There was no dispute as to the testimony and the defendant offered no evidence. The complainant tendered herself ready to repay to the company the sum of $ 500, which she received through her guardian, and this offer, though made on her behalf when she was an infant, is now enforceable as a condition for a decree in her favor, since she has now attained her legal majority.

By the bill the complainant seeks to prevent the use of the release as a defense to her suit for damages. To the bill the defendant demurred generally. This demurrer was overruled by Chancellor Nicholson, who in a brief opinion found that the facts constituted a mistake with regard to an actually existing fact and an erroneous description of the wound actually inflicted, and, therefore, that it was such a mistake as falls within the well established principle that a court of equity will give relief by way of canceling a contract based on a mistake of actually existing facts.

The release was that of Blema B. Jones, her father, mother and guardian (her mother having been injured by the same explosion) of "all claims and demands which we or any of us have or can have, against the said the Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington Railroad Company, or their successors, for or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, and more especially by reason of losses and damages sustained by us in consequence of personal injuries received by the said Addie M. Jones, wife of the said Alexander Jones, and injuries received by the said Blema B. Jones, minor daughter of the said Alexander Jones and Addie M. Jones, which were caused by the explosion of glycerine powder in a car of a train at Greenwood, in the state of Delaware, on December 2, 1903. And the said the Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington Railroad Company, in paying the said sum of money, do so in compromise of the said claim and demand above released, not admitting any liability on account of the same."

By the pleadings and proofs, then, it appears that a release was given for personal injuries, all the parties to the release, both releasers and releasee, believing that the injuries were of a certain kind, while in fact they were not only more serious in extent, but different in kind, for it is fair to say that a superficial scratch of the cornea of the eye is quite a different kind of an injury from a deep penetration through four coats of the eye, including the retina. Again it appears clearly proven that all parties relied on the physicians of the company and their representations without independent advice, and that the statements were made and treated as the basis of the settlement which was induced thereby. It is also true that there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the medical attendants, but of a mistake in diagnosis. Under such circumstances no fault is attributable to the complainant, or those acting for her, in accepting the settlement and giving the release, under the circumstances here alluded to, or under any shown in the evidence.

In this State the particular questions here raised have not been passed on, though there are some decisions here on the general subject of equitable relief against mistakes. None of them, however, seem to be pertinent. The law respecting unsettling settlements is well stated by Judge Sanborn thus, in the case of Chicago, etc., Railway Company v. Wilcox, 116 F. 913, 914:

"The policy of the law has always been to promote and sustain the compromise and settlement of disputed claims. It loves peace, hates broils and dissensions, and discourages the prolongation of litigation and the revival of controversies which have once been closed. The judgment of a court settles the claims submitted to it, and estops the parties from again litigating them after they have been adjudicated. In the absence of fraud or mistake, an executed agreement of settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim constitutes as conclusive and as effectual an estoppel against the parties to the compromise from again litigating the claim thus settled as the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, to the effect that the rights of the parties are as they are set forth in the agreement; and such a contract is always upheld by the courts. Kercheval v. Doty, 31 Wis. 476, 484; Bank v. McGeoch, 92 Wis. 286, 313, 66 N.W. 606, 614; Hennessy v. Bacon, 137 U.S. 78, 11 S.Ct. 17, 34 L.Ed. 605; Van Trott v. Wiese, 36 Wis. 439; Zimmer v. Becker, 66 Wis. 527, 29 N.W. 228; Woodford v. Marshall, 72 Wis. 129, 39 N.W. 376. Nor will such agreements be lightly disturbed upon confused, conflicting, or uncertain evidence of fraud or mistake. The burden is always upon the assailant of the contract to establish the vice which he alleges induced it, and a bare preponderance of evidence will not sustain the burden. A written agreement of settlement and release may not be rescinded for fraud or mistake, unless the evidence of the fraud or mistake is clear, unequivocal, and convincing."

In order to invalidate a release on account of mutual mistake, the mistake must relate to a past or present fact material to the contract and not to an opinion respecting future conditions as results of present facts. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 116 F. 913; Nelson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 111 Minn. 193, 126 N.W. 902, Houston, etc., Co. v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App.) 69 S.W. 651 (1902); Homuth v. Metropolitan, etc., Co., 129 Mo. 629, 31 S.W. 903.

The case of Chicago, etc., Co. v. Wilcox, 116 F. 913 well illustrates the difference between a prognosis and diagnosis. There the plaintiff's hip had been broken and she compromised and released her claim, knowing when she settled that her hip had been broken and that it was a bad break. Her physician, who was also the physician of the company, stated his belief that she would be well within a year and believing this she settled. She was mistaken as to the duration of the injury and the disability turned out to be permanent. The bill to rescind the release was dismissed because her mistake was not a mistake of fact, but an opinion or belief as to the future event. Judge Sanborn well...