Tatman v. Provincial Homes

• Decision Date: 29 May 1963
• Docket Number: No. 7756,7756
• Citation: 94 Ariz. 165,382 P.2d 573
• Parties: Donald TATMAN, Petitioner, v. PROVINCIAL HOMES, Defendant Employer, and The Industrial Commission of the State of Arizona, Defendant Insurance Carrier.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 573

382 P.2d 573

94 Ariz. 165

Donald TATMAN, Petitioner, v. PROVINCIAL HOMES, Defendant Employer and The Industrial Commission of the State of Arizona, Defendant Insurance Carrier.

No. 7756.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division.

May 29, 1963.

Bret Harte & Murphy, Tucson, for petitioner.

Lorin G. Shelley, Phoenix, for defendant insurance carrier, Industrial Commission.

Donald J. Morgan, C. E. Singer, Jr., Ben P. Marshall, and Robert D. Steckner, Phoenix, of counsel, for Industrial Commission.

BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

This is a certiorari proceeding to review an award of the Industrial Commission denying compensation. Petitioner was 50 years old at the time of the accident. He had been a carpenter for 20 years. On the day of the accident he was working on a scaffold about 15 feet off the ground from which he fell, sustaining injuries. He made a claim for benefits and on examination the doctors were of the opinion that petitioner had no orthopedic disability, but recommended psychiatric consultation. Petitioner was examined by a board of psychiatrists who found his condition to be that of passive-aggressive personality disorder with some paranoid overtones and further found:

'We recognize that he is, because of his own attitude toward himself, essentially totally disabled psychologically at the present time. However, we feel that this disability is almost entirely a matter of fundamental character difficulty and his own motivations. We would feel, at most, the amount of his total disability due to the accident of April 29, 1960, would be 10 per cent. We would advise that final disposition of the case be made on that basis.' (Emphasis added)

Based on this report and a further confirming report from a psychiatrist the commission awarded the petitioner a 10% loss of earning capacity. Petitioner protested the award and on rehearing the commission found that the petitioner had suffered a 10% 'physical functional' disability, but was physically able to work. He therefore could show no loss of earning capacity due to the injury and was not entitled to an award, thus taking from him the 10% they had previously awarded him.

The testimony on rehearing of one of the commission's psychiatrists was as follows:

'Q. I believe you stated, Dr. Beaton, that in your opinion Mr. Tatman with his present mental illness would not be able to obtain employment. What would be your reasons for reaching that conclusion?

'A. Mostly that his own attitude toward the problem of employment or toward himself, is one of almost total defeat, and total resignation to invalidism. There is also, of course, also the additional fact that as long as a man is receiving some kind of compensation for illness, he has very little conscious motivation to go out and gain employment.'

* * *

* * *

'Q. In your report of September 25, 1961, the report of the group board of consultation, you ascribed ten per cent of the total disability as being a result of the accident, I believe?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. But a ninety per cent then due to the fundamental character disorder?

'A. Yes.

'Q. But do you still believe that this hundred per cent disability would not have occurred had the accident not occurred?

'A. I can only state that if this specific present situation would not be present, if the accident had not occurred. But I still would have to add that from the physician standpoint, disability is what keeps a man from going back to work, and what keeps this man from going back to work is fundamental character disorder, not the symptoms that arose out of his injury.' (Emphasis added)

There is no claim and no evidence that the petitioner is a malingerer and it is fair to say that the accident triggered the psychological mechanism which resulted in total disability.

The industrial commission first claims that as there is no residual physical disablement petitioner may not be compensated for loss of earning capacity due to psychological disablement. A disabling mental disorder is compensable if caused by a physical accident arising out of the employment, Murray v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ariz. 190, 201, 349 P.2d 627, 634.

'A workman covered by the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Law who is physically injured by accident arising out of and in the scope of his employment is entitled to accident benefits in the form of medical treatment and compensation for his disability until he is cured or until his condition is stationary and the permanent effects of the accident are evaluated. If such injury causes a disabling mental disease, he is entitled to the same benefits.' (Emphasis added)

See also McAllister v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 83 Ariz. 213, 319 P.2d 129; Sproul v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 128, 370 P.2d 279. There is no requirement that the disabling mental disease be accompanied by any physical disablement.

The Industrial Commission also takes the position that admitting 10% of the mental disorder was caused by the accident the present inability of petitioner to obtain employment is the result of the preexisting mental condition which was not a result of the accident. Therefore petitioner has suffered no loss of earning capacity resulting from his injury.

This brings up again the difference between the medical cause of a condition and the legal cause. If legal cause exists damages may be assessed in tort or compensation demanded in the field of workmen's compensation.

We made this difference clear in Murray, supra, when we said:

'The difference in the medical and legal concept of cause results from the obvious differences in the basic problems and exigencies of the two professions in relation to causation. By reason of his training, the doctor is thinking in terms of a single, precise cause for a particular condition. The law, however, endeavors to reach an inference of reasonable medical certainty, from a given event or sequence of events, and recognizes more than one cause for a particular injurious result. In the law of torts, it is said that the tortfeasor is not entitled to a perfect specimen upon which to inflict injury. Likewise, in the field of Workmen's Compensation, the employer takes his employee as he is. In legal contemplation, if an injury, operating on an existing bodily condition or predisposition, produces a further injurious result, that result is caused by the injury.' 87 Ariz. at 199, 349 P.2d at 633.

And

'The injury need not be the sole cause of disability, if it is a...