Tatum v. Clackamas County

• Decision Date: 16 December 1974
• Citation: 19 Or.App. 770,529 P.2d 393
• Parties: Ralph C. TATUM et al., Respondents, v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY, Oregon, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 393

529 P.2d 393

19 Or.App. 770

Ralph C. TATUM et al., Respondents, v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY, Oregon, et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 21, 1974.

Decided Dec. 16, 1974.

Richard F. Crist, Deputy Dist. Atty., Oregon City, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Roger Rook, Dist. Atty., Oregon City.

Robert E. Glasgow, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Dusenbery, Martin, & Templeton, Portland.

Before SCHWAB, C.J., and LANGTRY and THORNTON, JJ.

THORNTON, Judge.

Defendants Clackamas County and its Board of County Commissioners appeal from a decree enjoining them from implementing or enforcing an initiative ordinance known as 'Ballot Measure No. 10, Natural Rivers Measure--Clackamas River Corridor,' ¹ adopted by the voters of Clackamas County at the general election of November 7, 1972. The trial court held that the people of Clackamas County have no authority to adopt zoning legislation by the initiative process; that even if such authority existed, the procedural requirements of ORS ch. 215 were not complied with in the adoption of the ballot measure; and that the initiative ordinance and the temporary rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the ballot measure were invalid.

The primary issue before us is whether the voters of Clackamas County, a nonhome rule county, have the authority to adopt the subject ordinance by the initiative process.

In support of their contention that the initiative measure is valid, defendants argue that the subject ordinance is 'local' legislation within the meaning of Art. IV, § 1(5) of the Oregon Constitution, and that the ordinance may properly be enacted by the people of Clackamas County by the initiative process.

From our review of the constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with this question, and prior decisions of our Supreme Court, we reach the conclusion that defendants' contentions cannot be sustained, and consequently that the lower court did not err in its decision.

The relevant portion of Art. IV, § 1(5), provides:

'The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by subsections (2) and (3) of this section are further reserved to the qualified voters of each municipality and district as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in or for their municipality or district. The manner of exercising those powers shall be provided by general laws * * *.'

It is of course true that the initiative and referendum powers are reserved to the voters of all counties by the above-quoted provision of the Oregon Constitution. It is also true that a county is a 'district' within the meaning of Art. IV, § 1(5). State v. Mack, 134 Or. 67, 292 P. 306 (1930); Briggs v. Stevens, 119 Or. 138, 248 P. 169 (1926); Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or. 503, 120 P. 375 (1912). However, this constitutional provision is not self-executing. In order to determine whether any 'district' may in fact exercise that power we must find additional legislative authority to do so. In other words, a proper determination of the issue before us requires that we analyze how, to what degree and on what subject matter voters of a nonhome rule county may exercise that power.

It is well settled in this state that no 'district' may enact a measure by the initiative process under Art. IV, § 1(5) (formerly Art. IV, § 1a), except pursuant to some additional grant of power, either by virtue of a charter or by a specific statute. State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or. 1, 154 P. 399 (1916); Rose v. Port of Portland, 82 Or. 541, 162 P. 498 (1917); Barber v. Johnson, 86 Or. 390, 167 P. 800, 1183 (1917); Carriker v. Lake County, 89 Or. 240, 171 P. 407, 173 P. 573 (1918); Hansell v. Douglass, 234 Or. 315, 380 P.2d 977 (1963). Applying the same principles followed in these cases, we must find a specific legislative grant to regulate land use by the initiative in order for the ballot measure in the instant case to be valid.

Defendants argue that the legislature has, indeed, made a specific authorization to the people of any county to use the initiative procedure to adopt land use and zoning ordinances; that not only is the county governing body authorized to adopt land use regulations, but also the legislature has specifically granted to the voters of each county the power to initiate ordinances on the same subject matter.

We first consider defendants' contention that the legislature has expressly authorized the voters of all counties to initiate ordinances regulating land use. Defendants cite ORS 215.130(1), which provides:

'Any ordinance adopted under ORS 215.010 to 215.190 and 215.402 to 215.422 shall be a Local law within the meaning of, and subject to, ORS 254.310.' (Emphasis supplied.),

and ORS 254.310, the pertinent portion of which provides:

'The people of every county are authorized to enact, amend or repeal all Local laws for their county by the initiative and referendum process. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.),

as supportive of their position. Defendants argue that because ORS 215.130(1) defines all zoning ordinances as local, and that because ORS 254.310 provides that the people of every county can utilize the initiative process for all local laws, Ballot Measure No. 10 was properly adopted by the citizens of Clackamas County, pursuant to an express legislative authorization.

In order to properly evaluate defendants' arguments it is necessary that we first analyze ORS ch. 215.

We begin with the well-established rule that a statute is to be construed as a whole, State v. Popiel, 216 Or. 140, 337 P.2d 303 (1959), and that effect must be given to the over-all policy which the entire statute was intended to accomplish. Wimer v. Miller, 235 Or. 25, 383 P.2d 1005 (1963).

ORS ch. 215 is an organic act authorizing any county in Oregon to undertake land use planning and zoning. The act spells out in great detail the steps a county must follow if it wishes to avail itself of this legislative grant of power:

ORS 215.020 through 215.100 provides for the governing body of the county to establish a planning commission, which must adopt a comprehensive plan for land use and zoning. Also included in these sections are statutory standards upon which the planning commission is to make its decisions, as well as certain procedural requirements such as public notice and hearings.

ORS 215.110(1) provides for the planning commission to recommend to the governing body ordinances to accomplish the comprehensive plan. ORS 215.110(3) sets forth the manner in which the county governing body may enact zoning ordinances. The governing body may enact ordinances recommended by the planning commission, or ordinances initiated by itself, provided it first requests a report and recommendation from the planning commission. ORS 215.110(2) also provides for a governing body to adopt ordinances renaming streets, numbering property and controlling subdivisions of land.

Other provisions include authorization for interim zoning ordinances, agricultural land use zoning, review procedures and a host of other matters.

From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that the grant of power to promulgate zoning and land use regulating ordinances is to the county governing body, and is closely limited in its terms. The procedure for adopting such ordinances is as specifically set forth in ORS ch. 215. See, Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). Thus the legislative grant is not general in its application but is restrictive and carefully conditioned.

Defendant's reliance upon ORS 215.130(1), quoted above, is misplaced. By its express terms, that section is limited in its application to: 'Any ordinance Adopted under ORS 215.010 to * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) By the use of such language the legislature has indicated that this provision is limited to ordinances already adopted by the county's governing body. This evidence of legislative intent is further strengthened by an express authorization to county governing bodies, at their option, to refer to the voters of the county any ordinance or amendment to an ordinance for their approval or rejection. ORS 215.110(4). By terming such an ordinance a 'local law,' the legislature has simply indicated that ordinances adopted pursuant to ORS ch. 215 shall be deemed 'local' and therefore subject to popular referendum as provided in ORS 254.310. This does not authorize the voters to adopt zoning ordinances by initiative. Nor does the language of ORS 254.310 authorize the voters to enact land use regulating ordinances by the initiative process as argued by defendants. As our Supreme Court held in Kosydar v. Collins, County Clerk, 201 Or. 271, 270 P.2d 132 (1954), in construing the ancestor statute ² of ORS 254.310, this statute only provides the mechanics for exercising initiative and referendum powers granted elsewhere. The court said:

'It is evident that no powers were granted to the people by this statute--the constitution had already reserved such powers to them--but the act did provide for the manner of exercising them. * * *' 201 Or. at 279, 270 P.2d at 136.

Lastly, we find nothing in ORS 215.110(3) ³, also relied upon by defendants, that supports their contention. This section deals entirely with the authority of the county governing body to enact, amend or repeal ordinances recommended by the planning commission. Nothing in this section can be construed as authorizing the voters to initiate an ordinance outside the procedure prescribed by ORS ch. 215. Likewise the initiative powers reserved to the people by Art. IV, § 1(5) of the Oregon Constitution cannot attach to such a limited grant of authority.

Summarizing then, nowhere in ORS ch. 215, or elsewhere, do we find any grant of authority to the voters of a county to adopt a zoning ordinance by the initiative process, shortcutting all of the requirements and safeguards provided by ORS 215.010 to...