Taunton v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: ALMON; MADDOX; MADDOX
• Citation: 562 So.2d 615
• Decision Date: 06 April 1990
• Parties: Ex parte State of Alabama. (Re Ronald TAUNTON v. STATE). 88-1422.

Page 615

562 So.2d 615 Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re Ronald TAUNTON
v.
STATE). 88-1422. Supreme Court of Alabama. April 6, 1990.

Petition for writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals (5 Div. 564). Appeal from the Circuit Court, Elmore County, No. CC-88-595.70, John B. Bush, J.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Dennis N. Balske of Balske and Van Almen, Montgomery, for respondent.

Prior report: Ala.Cr.App., 562 So.2d 614.

ALMON, Justice.

WRIT QUASHED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

JONES, SHORES, ^* ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.

MADDOX, J., dissents.

MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).

The question presented in this case seems simple enough--when a prisoner is seeking to receive credit on his sentence for the time he spent in jail awaiting trial, what kind of petition should he file and where should he file it? The Court of Criminal Appeals held that he could file a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 15-21-6, "addressed to the nearest circuit judge."

Page 616

The State contends that the petition should have been filed "in the court of original jurisdiction" because the petitioner is claiming that the court of original jurisdiction imposed on him a sentence that exceeds the maximum authorized by law, a ground for post-conviction relief included in Temporary Rule 20, A.R.Crim.P. ¹

Temporary Rule 20.1, in pertinent part, states that "any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense may, without prepayment of any fee, institute a proceeding in the court of original conviction to secure appropriate relief on the ground that: ... (c) The sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise not authorized by law" (emphasis added).

I dissent in this case because I believe that this Court, under its rule-making power, has set out the place where petitions like this one should be filed, and the procedure for handling such petitions. Any thought that Rule 20 would not afford a petitioner as much relief as a habeas corpus petition filed under Title 15 I believe to be mistaken. In other words, the same relief prayed for by petition under Title 15 is available for him under Rule 20, and this Court is the proper body to determine what procedure should be used in according a citizen his or her right to post-conviction relief, so long as that procedure accords with the constitutional right to relief from an illegal sentence.

In this dissent, I will spell out why I think that this Court, by rule, has prescribed the procedure to be used in this case, and why the Court of Criminal Appeals is in error in concluding that Temporary Rule 20 has the effect of a "chipping away" of the constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus.

The Court of Criminal Appeals, in support of its conclusion that petitioner could file a habeas corpus petition addressed to the nearest circuit judge, states that "a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedure to determine whether the appellant has been credited with the correct amount of actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for the offense for which he was eventually sentenced" (em

Page 617

phasis added), citing Hardy v. State, 534 So.2d 328 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Smith v. State, 504 So.2d 1224 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); and Boutwell v. State, 488 So.2d 33 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). I respectfully disagree with that conclusion.

At the time those cited cases were decided, the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, Title 15, Chapter 21, were applicable, and admittedly Title 15 then established the procedure for filing such petitions, but this petition was filed after the effective date of Temporary Rule 20, and, in my opinion, the provisions of Rule 20 should govern. The cases cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals are not authority to support the Court's conclusion that habeas corpus is the "proper procedure."

The Court of Criminal Appeals disagrees with the trial judge, who was of the opinion that Rule 20 did control, but in that disagreement, I feel, it has made a policy choice, reserved to this Court, as to what procedure can be used in cases such as this. The Court of Criminal Appeals is clearly aware that there is a statutory procedure set out for obtaining habeas corpus relief and a procedure established under Rule 20, because the Court presents the arguments concerning whether the statutory procedure should apply or whether Rule 20 should apply, but concludes:

"It is well established that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedure to determine whether the appellant has been credited with the correct amount of actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for the offense for which he was eventually sentenced. See, e.g., Hardy v. State, 534 So.2d 328 (Ala.Cr.App.1988); Smith v. State, 504 So.2d 1224 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Boutwell v. State, 488 So.2d 33 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). However, the attorney general adopts the trial court's position in arguing that, since the effective date of Rule 20, April 1, 1987, habeas corpus is no longer the proper remedy in the instant situation. He considers the improper denial or erroneous calculation of pretrial jail credit to be improper sentencing which can be corrected by a new sentence proceeding, a remedy encompassed within Rule 20. See Rule 20.1(a). He further argues that judicial economy is well served by requiring the instant issue to be raised in a Rule 20 petition, for the judge and the records of the convicting court would be required to appear in the court of habeas corpus jurisdiction, should we consider habeas corpus to be the proper remedy.

"We find both arguments to be unpersuasive, especially when considering the risk of 'chipping away' at the constitutionally mandated remedy of habeas corpus by the preclusions and rules set out in Rule 20 and the 'muddying of the waters' on the issue of under what situation is which remedy appropriate. For example, if the asserted ground were cognizable under Rule 20.1(a), as the attorney general argues, it would be subject to a two-year statute of limitations, rule 20.2(c); yet, the statutory scheme for the remedy of habeas corpus provides no statute of limitations, see § 15-21-1 et seq. Moreover, we consider the calculation of actual time spent incarcerated pending trial not to be a part of the actual sentencing proceeding. All § 15-18-5 mandates is that the sentencing court order that the convicted person be credited with his pretrial incarceration; by the statute, the circuit clerk or district clerk certifies the actual time to be credited.

"While we certainly encourage judicial economy, we must be mindful of the following:

" 'The Alabama constitution provides that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended by the authorities of this state." [Ala. Const. Art. I, §...