Taurus Ip, LLC v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.

Decision Date25 February 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-cv-158-bbc.,07-cv-158-bbc.
Citation534 F.Supp.2d 849
PartiesTAURUS IP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, DaimlerChrysler Company, LLC, Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., Chrysler, LLC, Chrysler Holding, LLC and, Chrysler Financial, LLC, Defendants. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc. and DaimlerChrysler Company, LLC, Third Party Plaintiffs, v. Taurus IP, LLC, Orion IP, LLC, Plutus IP Wisconsin, LLC, and Erich Spangenberg,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Third Party Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

Allen A. Arntsen, Foley & Lardner, Joseph P. Wright, Stafford Rosenbaum, LLP, Daniel P.' Bach, Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, WI, Robert S. Jones, Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Milwaukee, WI, Kajeer Attorney at Law, Tulsa, OK, Mitchell G. Stockwell, Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendantsfrhird Party Defendants.

OPINION and ORDER

BARBARA B. CRABB, District Judge.

In this civil action for monetary, injunctive and declaratory relief, plaintiff Taurus IP, LLC alleges infringement by defendants DaimlerChrysler Corporation, DairnlerChrysler Company, LLC, Mercedes — Benz USA, Inc., Chrysler, LLC, Chrysler Holding, LLC and Chrysler Financial, LLC of their United States Patent No. 6,141,658 (the, '658 patent). The '658 pat, ent is entitled "Computer System and Method for Managing Sales Information."

In response, defendants have asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims for breach of contract by plaintiff and third party defendants Orion IP, LLC, Plutus IP Wisconsin, LLC and Erich Spangenberg on the basis of a licensing agreement made between defendants and third party defendant Orion IP for the settlement of an earlier lawsuit between those parties.

This case involves only a few issues, and could be a simple case. Plaintiff Taurus IP, LLC has alleged infringement by defendants of a handful of claims in the '658 patent and defendants have asserted counterclaims for breach of contract on the basis of a licensing agreement. Not content with simplicity, the parties have engaged in continuous bickering, filing a small mountain of motions in which they argue the same substantive issues repeatedly, making up in volume for what they lack in clarity. Jurisdiction is present. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).

Now before the court are eleven motions of various types that can be sorted into roughly two groups: ten are related to defendants' breach of contract claims and affirmative defenses and one is related to the merits of plaintiffs patent infringement claims. Before describing the motions, a little background is required.

In October, this court addressed a host of separate (but again mostly repetitive) motions filed by plaintiff and third party defendants to dismiss third party defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dismiss defendants' counterclaims for failure to state a claim. Among other things, I concluded that (1) defendants had established a prima facie case that plaintiff and third party defendants were alter egos of one another and subject to this court's exercise of personal jurisdiction; (2) defendants had stated a claim for breach of contract on the basis of a warranty provision found in a licensing agreement made between defendants and third party plaintiff Orion IP; (3) certain license, release and third-party provisions found in the licensing agreement did not apply to defendants; and (4) defendants had failed to state a claim for fraudulent inducement or conspiracy. Dkt. # 212 at 20-23, 36-37, 40-41.

At the same time, in a separate order, I granted plaintiff leave to Me a third amended complaint for the narrow purpose of reflecting changes in defendants' corporate structure. No sooner had plaintiff filed its third amended complaint and defendants filed their amended answer and counterclaim than problems ensued. In their amended answers and counterclaims, defendants eliminated their claims of fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy in accordance with this court's' order but left in an affirmative defense that plaintiffs claims were licensed, in spite of this court's conclusion that the license, release and third party provisions of the licensing agreement did not apply to defendants.

In the wake of plaintiffs' third amended complaint, defendants filed a motion to supplement their amended counterclaims to include additional claims for breach of contract on the basis of separate lawsuits filed elsewhere related to separate patents. Dkt. # 201.

Next, defendants moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' infringement claims, relying on their affirmative defenses that plaintiffs infringement claims are licensed. Dkt. # 156. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to Me a surreply to this motion, repeating the same arguments it raised in its opposition brief. Dkt. # 203. (Although defendants' motion for summary judgment was Med before plaintiff amended its complaint on technical grounds, defendants have confirmed that they are still seeking summary judgment on the same grounds. Dkt. # 321 at 1. Plaintiff does not suggest that its amendment requires defendants to file a new motion.)

Plaintiff and third party defendants then filed their own motion for summary judgment on defendants' affirmative defenses and related claims of breach of contract (dkt.# 235). However, plaintiff and third party defendants did not stop at that. They filed a new round of motions to dismiss on exactly the same issues (dkt.## 270, 284). To top it off, third party defendant Erich Spangenberg has filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (dkt.# 280).

Finally, in relation to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, defendants have filed a motion to strike certain statements found in plaintiffs response to defendants' proposed findings of fact and reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment (dkt.# 359); many of the statements to strike are related to allegations that arise in defendants' proposed supplemental counterclaims. This motion has ignited another battle, with plaintiff attempting to move for sanctions within its response brief (dkt.# 370) and defendants moving for leave to file a reply brief (dkt.# 381).

The only other motion on the agenda is defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs infringement claim (dkt.# 286), in which they contend both that their products do not infrifige and that the patent claims asserted are Invalid as anticipated.

Although there are eleven motions before the court, they concern only three substantive issues: breach of contract, patent infringement and patent invalidity. Before getting to these issues, several of the parties' subsidiary motions may be resolved with little discussion.

A. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Defendants' Breach of Contract Claims and Affirmative Defenses (dkt.## 270, 284)

Most of the motions now before the court were brought by plaintiff and third party defendants. Upon reviewing these motions, I am persuaded that certain filings are a flat-out waste of judicial resources. Once plaintiff and third party defendants had filed a motion for summary judgment on defendants' affirmative defenses and counterclaims related to breach of contract, they had no reason to file almost identical motions to dismiss the same claims, rehashing the same arguments (often verbatim). Although plaintiff and third party defendants' new round of motions to dismiss came in response to newly filed counterclaims from defendants, these new counterclaims were merely responses to plaintiffs third amended complaint, for which leave was granted only to reflect defendants' changing corporate structure. Dkt. # 211. Plaintiffs third amended complaint did not open the door for plaintiff and third party defendants to file a new round of motions to dismiss. Therefore, the arguments raised in plaintiff and third party defendants' motions to dismiss will be disregarded and the motions denied. As I noted, many of the same arguments are raised in support of plaintiff and third party defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, to the extent plaintiff and third party defendants failed to consolidate their arguments within their briefing for summary judgment, they have forfeited those issues.

B. Third Party Defendant Erich Spangenberg's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (dkt. # 280)

Third party defendant Erich Spangenberg's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is yet another motion that comes too late. Third party defendant Spangenberg joined the last round of motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. These motions were briefed, evidence was submitted by both sides and the motions were ruled on in October. On the basis of defendants' allegations and supplemental evidence, I concluded that this court could exercise personal jurisdiction over third party, defendants, including Spangenberg. Dkt. # 212 at 20-23. Spangenberg provides no, persuasive reasons for reexamining, the issue of, personal jurisdiction. This motion `will be denied.

C. Defendants' Motion to Supplement Counterclaims, Motion to Strike and Related Motions (dkt. ## 201, 359, 370, 381)

Defendants have moved for leave to supplement their counterclaims to include allegations of additional breaches of contract by plaintiff and third party defendants based on their filing of additional lawsuits elsewhere. However, as defendants concede, these lawsuits allege infringement of patents distinct from the '658 patent and in one occasion involve a separate entity, ST Sales, which defendants assert is another Spangenberg alter, ego.

The court has broad discretion to grant or deny motions to supplement under Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(d). To allow defendants to supplement their counterclaims at this late date is likely to be prejudicial to plaintiff and third party defendants and cause undue delay. Moreover, defendants have given the court no' reason to think they could not or have not asserted breach of ...

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5 cases
  • Taurus Ip, LLC v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • August 9, 2013
    ...any of the asserted claims and finding claims 16 and 27 invalid as anticipated by a prior art patent. Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.Supp.2d 849, 873–82 (W.D.Wis.2008) (the “Summary Judgment Decision ”); see also Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 07–cv–158, 2007 W......
  • Shook v. Walden
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 9, 2012
    ...proof of actual fraud and direct personal benefit is required to pierce the veil of a Texas LLC. See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.Supp.2d 849 (W.D.Wis.2008) (Texas law). Relying on a statutory construction analysis similar to that advanced by the Waldens here, the court re......
  • Shook v. Walden
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 16, 2012
    ...proof of actual fraud and direct personal benefit is required to pierce the veil of a Texas LLC. See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 849 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (Texas law). Relying on a statutory construction analysis similar to that advanced by the Waldens here, the cour......
  • Legacy v. Gant
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 28, 2011
    ...(D.Conn.2006); SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., 375 F.Supp.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y.2005); Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.Supp.2d 849 (W.D.Wis.2008) (applying outdated Texas law; an expired statute and an overruled case); Westmeyer v. Flynn, 382 Ill.App.3d 952......
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