Taxes in Hennepin Cnty. v. Baldwin

Decision Date22 November 1895
Citation65 N.W. 80,62 Minn. 518
PartiesIN RE TAXES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY v. BALDWIN (THREE CASES).
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Proceedings were commenced in January, 1887, to enforce delinquent taxes on certain real estate for the year 1885, together with those for certain prior years added thereto, in one given sum, without specifying the amount for each year. The landowner seasonably interposed an answer, denying that any taxes had been assessed for any year except for 1885. The register of actions kept by the clerk of the court contained an entry in the proceeding: “Case tried July 23rd, 1888.” In July, 1893, pursuant to Laws 1893, c. 150 (Gen. St. 1894, § 1579), there was filed a list of taxes delinquent for 1889 and prior years, which included the same tract, against which were charged taxes for the same years, sought to be enforced in the former proceeding. This proceeding is still pending. The proceedings commenced in January, 1887, were brought on for trial in May, 1895, and judgment ordered against the land for the whole amount of taxes, penalties, and costs claimed against it, with interest on the same at one per cent. per month from March 21, 1887, the date on which judgment for delinquent taxes is required to be entered in case no answer is filed. Held:

(1) That the entry in the register of actions was of itself no evidence that the proceeding had been tried.

(2) That the time that had elapsed between the commencement of the proceedings and the time they were brought on for trial did not operate as a discontinuance, or entitle the landowner to a dismissal at the trial.

(3) The provisions of Gen. St. 1894, § 1586, as to the time when answers filed in tax proceedings shall be tried, are directory, and not mandatory.

(4) The commencement of proceedings in 1893 to enforce the collection of taxes for the same and other years against the same tract did not of itself operate as an abandonment or dismissal of the prior proceedings.

(5) Laws 1885, c. 2, § 23 (Gen. St. 1894, § 1631), being purely remedial, and merely giving a remedy to enforce existing rights and obligations, is to be construed as applying to taxes levied (but prevented from being collected) prior to its passage, as well as to those levied thereafter.

(6) If the failure to state the amount of taxes for each year separately was an omission or irregularity, it was not one which went to the jurisdiction of the court, and it was waived by the failure of the landowner to set it up in his answer as a defense or objection to the taxes.

(7) A tax never bears interest, either as interest or as damages, except by force of statute. The statutes of this state do not provide for charging interest on taxes until after sale on the judgment, but, on the contrary, clearly contemplate that all that shall be added to the original tax prior to sale are the prescribed penalties and costs. The fact that the landowner interposes an answer which is overruled on the trial, or that the public officers neglect to bring the issues raised by answer on for trial and determination within the time contemplated by statute, does not authorize charging interest on the delinquent taxes, and including it in the judgment.

Case certified from district court, Hennepin county; Robert Jamison, Judge.

Three separate actions in the name of the state to enforce taxes in Hennepin county against R. J. Baldwin. There were findings for plaintiff in each case, and the proceedings were certified to the supreme court for an opinion. Modified.

Frank M. Nye, A. H. Nunn, and Smith & Reed, for plaintiff.

Edward C. Gale, for defendant.

MITCHELL, J.

This proceeding was commenced January 20, 1887, by filing in the office of the clerk of the district court a list of taxes on real estate for the year 1885, in which list a tract owned by R. J. Baldwin was charged with taxes for the year 1885, together with those for 1877. '78, '79, '80, '81, and '83, added thereto in one gross sum of over $2,500, without specifying the amount for any particular year. Baldwin answered March 15, 1887, denying the assessment or levy of any taxes on the land except for 1885. The register of actions kept by the clerk of the court contains this entry in the proceeding: “Case tried July 23rd, 1888;” but there is no other evidence, record or otherwise, that the proceeding was ever tried. On July 15, 1893, pursuant to the provisions of Laws 1893, c. 150 (Gen. St. 1894, § 1579), a list was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of all taxes which became delinquent in 1889 or prior years, and not satisfied by payment, redemption, or sale of the land to actual purchasers. This list also contained the same tract above described, and against it appeared the taxes for the same years sought to be enforced in this proceeding. Baldwin also answered in that proceeding, setting up as one of his defenses the pendency of the present or prior proceeding. That proceeding is still pending and undetermined. The present proceeding (commenced in January, 1887) was brought on for trial May 28, 1895, and, after motions on part of Baldwin to strike from the calendar and to dismiss were overruled, was tried on the merits, and judgment ordered against the property for the whole amount of taxes claimed, together with penalties, costs, and interest, amounting to over $5,000.

The trial court certifies to this court for its determination the following questions, which had all been decided adversely to Baldwin: “First. Is the entry in the clerk's register of ‘Cause tried’ sufficient to establish the fact of a former trial, and if so, and for that reason, without further evidence, was the trial had in these proceedings May 28, 1895, unauthorized and void? Second. Did the lapse of time between the commencement of these proceedings and this trial render such trial unauthorized, and entitle defendant to a dismissal of the action? Third. Did the inclusion of the taxes for the year 1885 and the prior years named, in the special tax proceedings of 1893, work an abandonment or dismissal of these proceedings, commenced in 1887, and then pending to enforce the same taxes? Fourth. Was the inclusion in these proceedings of the taxes for the years 1877, '78, '79, '80, '81, and '83, or any of them, and the attempt to enforce the collection of the taxes for these years, or any of them, in this action, authorized by law? Fifth. Does the fact that the amount sought to be enforced as the taxes for these several years was named in the delinquent and published list as one gross sum, and the amounts claimed to be due for the various years, respectively, were not separately stated, render these proceedings unauthorized and void as to the taxes for all or any one of such years? Sixth. Does the amount charged against the land in this action, and set forth in said delinquent list as $2,541.57, bear interest from the time of filing such list to the time of entry of judgment thereunder at the rate of 1 per cent. per month, as computed by this court in its findings and decision hereinabove set forth, or, if not, what rate of interest does it so bear, if any?”

1. The first question must be answered in the negative. This memorandum of the clerk in his register of actions was by itself no evidence that the proceeding had ever been tried.

2. The second question must also be answered in the negative. Assuming, without deciding, that the delay of a plaintiff to prosecute an action may be so long as per se to amount to a legal discontinuance, yet we do not think that, as against the public, the delay of the public officers to bring this proceeding on for trial for something over six years should be held to operate as a discontinuance, or to entitle the appellant to a dismissal on the trial. So far as appears, he never objected to this delay, and, under the circumstances, we may assume that he was entirely willing that the proceeding should never be brought to trial. The provisions of Gen. St. 1894, § 1586, that in such proceedings the answers shall stand for trial at the same or next general or special term of court, etc., are directory, and not mandatory.

3. The inclusion of the same taxes in the special tax proceedings of 1893 was equivalent to the commencement of another suit for the same cause of action, but did not operate as a dismissal or abandonment of the first proceeding. The cases cited by counsel in which we held that Gen. Laws 1881, c. 135 (Gen. St. 1894, § 1579, note), providing for a sort of general clearing-up tax sale, proceeded upon the theory that the state waived all rights under any prior sales or forfeitures, and recognized the owners as still having rights in the lands, are not in point. See Knudson v. Curley, 30 Minn. 433, 15 N. W. 873;Farnham v. Jones, 32 Minn. 7, 19 N. W. 83;Mulvey v. Tozer, 40 Minn. 384, 42 N. W. 387;Croswell v. Benton, 54 Minn. 264, 55 N. W. 1125. The language used in these cases must be construed with reference to the questions before the court. They simply decide that by the statute of 1881 the state waived any rights under prior sales or forfeitures, and recognized existing equities in the owners of the lands.

4. The argument of counsel for the landowner upon the fourth question is wholly based upon the proposition that Laws 1885, c. 2, § 23 (Gen. St. 1894, § 1631), is prospective in the sense that it only authorizes the auditor to add to the tax for the current year taxes for other years, which shall, after the passage of the act, be prevented from being collected. In support of this contention he relies on the phrase “if any tax is prevented from being collected.” The statute in question does not impair any vested right, or create any new right, or impose any new obligation. It is purely remedial, and merely gives a remedy for enforcing existing rights and obligations. Such statutes...

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  • Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., Case No. 20-CV-0889 (PJS/BRT)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • December 4, 2020
    ...for a sort of general clearing-up tax sale" by requiring the sale of certain tax-delinquent properties. Taxes in Hennepin Cnty. v. Baldwin , 62 Minn. 518, 65 N.W. 80, 82 (1895). Specifically, the 1881 Act required the state to sell properties that were tax delinquent as of 1879 or earlier. ......
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • October 12, 1901
    ...... be due as taxes on personal property omitted from assessment. for the years 1895, 1896, ...917); State v. Myers , 52 Wis. 628 (9 N.W. 777); State v. Baldwin , 62 Minn. 518, 522. (65 N.W. 80); Gager v. Prout , 48 Ohio St. 89 (26. ......
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    ...Iowa 597, 87 N.W. 512; State v. Pors, 107 Wis. 420, 83 N.W. 706, 51 L.R.A. 917; State v. Myers, 52 Wis. 628, 9 N.W. 777; State v. Baldwin, 62 Minn. 518, 65 N.W. 80; Gager v. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89, 26 N.E. Sellars v. Barrett, 185 Ill. 466, 57 N.E. 422; Biggins v. People of Illinois, 106 Ill.......
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