Taylor Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n 

• Decision Date: 22 February 1922
• Docket Number: No. 14224.,14224.
• Parties: TAYLOR COAL CO. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

301 Ill. 381

134 N.E. 169

TAYLOR COAL CO.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 14224.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 22, 1922.

Error to Circuit Court, Williamson County; D. T. Hartwell, Judge.

Proceeding by Oscar Hall, as employee, to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, opposed by the Taylor Coal Company, employer. An award of compensation by the Industrial Commission was confirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error.

Affirmed.

Denison & Spiller, of Marion, for plaintiff in error.

A. W. Kerr, of Chicago, and George R. Stone, of Marion, for defendant in error.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The defendant in error, Oscar Hall, applied to the Industrial Commission for compensation for an alleged injury by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on October 24, 1919, in the mine of the plaintiff in error, the Taylor Coal Company. An arbitrator heard the evidence, and made an award of $14 per week for 16 weeks for temporary total incapacity, and $14 per week for 50 weeks for the reason that the injury caused 33 1/3 per cent. permanent loss of the use of the right hand. Upon a review by the Industrial Commission the award of the arbitrator was confirmed, and, upon a writ of certiorari from the circuit court of Williamson county, the writ was quashed and the award affirmed. This court allowed a writ of error to the circuit court to review the proceeding.

The argument for the plaintiff in error is devoted to the single proposition that the Workmen's Compensation Act in force before July 1, 1921 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1919, c. 48, §§ 126-152i), as construed by this court, prohibits a judicial review of both law and facts in accordance with the general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights, and is therefore in conflict with the requirement of due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, and is null and void. The sole reply of the defendant in error to that argument is that the record shows that no agreed statement of facts appearing upon the hearing before the arbitrator or a correct stenographic report of the proceedings was filed with the Industrial Commission within 50 days after the plaintiff in error received notice of the filing of the award, and this is the ground of a motion to dismiss the writ of error and affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission.

It will be observed that the motion calls upon the court to disclaim jurisdiction of the writ of error and dismiss the same because of an alleged want of jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission, and also to exercise such jurisdiction by affirming the decision of the Commission. That part of the motion calling upon the court to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction cannot be allowed. The court has jurisdiction, by virtue of the statute, to review judgments and orders of the circuit court under the Compensation Act upon writ of error, which the court in its discretion may order to issue if applied for as provided in the act, and upon such writ of error may determine whether the circuit court acquired jurisdiction under the provisions of the statute, and, if it had jurisdiction, whether error was committed. By the act in question the circuit court was given jurisdiction, by writ of certiorari to the Industrial Commission, to review all questions of law presented by the record except such as arose where a decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration had become the decision of the Industrial Commission. No question of jurisdiction of the circuit court to review the award in this case was presented to or passed upon by the circuit court. Oscar Hall filed his motion in writing to quash the writ of certiorari, and did not raise any question such as is sought to be raised here, but, among other things, averred as follows:

‘Said record shows that the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties and that said decision is in all respects regular and legal.’

Not only was no question raised or passed upon by the circuit court concerning the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, but no objection was made to a review of the award by the Commission. A stenographic report was not filed within 50 days after notice, but Hall appeared, made no objection to the review by the Commission, and did not present in any manner the proposition that the award had become or should become the decision of the Industrial Commission. If, therefore, the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission or the circuit court was one that could be waived, it was waived.

The general rule as applied to courts is that jurisdiction of the subject-matter-which means jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs and not jurisdiction of a case within such a class-cannot be waived. The method by which jurisdiction of a particular case within the general class of cases is obtained, and any defects or irregularities in respect thereto, may be waived, and are waived unless seasonable objection is made in accordance with the established practice. O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. 108,108 Am. St. Rep. 219,3 Ann. Cas. 966;Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176,4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1001, 110 Am. St. Rep. 248. Where a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and may take jurisdiction of a particular case if certain conditions exist, and no objection is raised to the exercise of jurisdiction, as in case of a limitation barring a writ of error, an adequate remedy at law, and the like, a party will be deemed to have waived the jurisdictional question. Burnap v. Wight, 14 Ill. 303;Stout v. Cook, 41 Ill. 447;Crawford v. Schmitz, 139 Ill. 564, 29 N. E. 40;Hauger v. Gage, 168 Ill. 365, 48 N. E. 142;Law v. Ware, 238 Ill. 360, 87 N. E. 308;Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ill. 329, 91 N. E. 466,18 Ann. Cas. 96;People v. Evans, 262 Ill. 235, 104 N. E. 646.

Counsel for plaintiff in error insist that no question concerning the jurisdiction of the circuit court either as to subject-matter or the particular case should be considered, because the court decided in Sulzberger & Sons Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill. 223, 120 N. E. 535, that the Industrial Board might grant extensions of time beyond 30 days to file an agreed statement or stenographic report. The opinion in that case has caused considerable misunderstanding on account of a reference to the wrong statute. The accident occurred on June 8, 1914, and petition for review was filed on December 4, 1914. Several extensions of time in which to file the record were granted by the Industrial Board, and it was filed on March 22, 1915. The proceeding, therefore, was under the act of 1913, which required an agreed statement of facts or stenographic report to be filed within 20 days after the decision, but gave the Industrial Board power to grant further time, without limitation, in which either to petition for a review or to file an agreed statement or stenographic report. The proceeding was completed under the act of 1913, and the decision of the court was right. The court could not, in the case presented, construe the provisions of the act of 1915, which was not in force, as shown by the dates given in the opinion, and the quotation from that act was an error.

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