Taylor County Sand Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 August 1971
• Docket Number: No. 71-1638 Summary Calendar.,71-1638 Summary Calendar.
• Citation: 446 F.2d 853
• Parties: TAYLOR COUNTY SAND COMPANY, Incorporated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

446 F.2d 853 (1971)

TAYLOR COUNTY SAND COMPANY, Incorporated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 71-1638 Summary Calendar.^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

August 12, 1971.

Denmark Groover, Jr., W. Thomas Griffith, Byrd, Groover & Buford, Macon, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

W. H. Young, Jr., Young, Thompson, Redmond & Young, Columbus, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

On this appeal we need only decide whether the District Court properly invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in refusing to consider a discrimination complaint prior to its submission to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Taylor County Sand Company (Shipper) sued Seaboard (Carrier) in a Georgia court for damages and injunctive relief, alleging that railroad cars previously promised to Shipper had been discriminatorily diverted by Carrier to other higher paying customers. Shipper relied, alternatively, on a common law cause of action for discriminatory car service and on a claim for breach of an alleged contract to provide an adequate number of cars. Following removal the District Court concluded that the complaint raised issues of discrimination and of the reasonableness and adequacy of Carrier's car service, thereby dictating initial review by the ICC under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Court permitted Shipper 60 days within which to file a complaint with the Commission and, when none was filed, dismissed the action. We affirm.

There can be no doubt whatever that the national transportation policy embodied in the Interstate Commerce Act "leaves to the ICC initial responsibility for making fact findings and perhaps the even more decisive task of fashioning a policy which it articulates in terms of a legal standard." Agricultural Transportation Assn. of Texas v. King, 5 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d 873, 883. Controversies touching interstate commerce or its instrumentalities cannot be resolved satisfactorily unless the independent regulatory agency charged by Congress with primary adjudicative responsibility is first provided with an opportunity to consider the case. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 84; J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 104; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Knox Homes Corp., 5 Cir., 1965, 343 F.2d 887, 893-895; Flight Engineers' International Assn., A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. American Airlines, Inc., 5 Cir., 1962, 303 F.2d 5. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is thus no more than recognition of the fact that the compelling necessity for regulatory uniformity and consistency, coupled with the almost infinite variety of administrative rules and regulations which affect or may affect a particular dispute, initially require administrative rather than judicial fact-finding and rule-applying expertise. See Far East Conference v. United States, 1952, 342 U.S. 570, 574-575, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576, 582; Tampa Phosphate Railroad Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 5 Cir., 1969, 418 F.2d 387, 402 (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 90, cited with approval in Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget, 1970, 400 U.S. 62, 91 S.Ct. 203, 27 L.Ed.2d 203.

Allegations of discriminatory car service fall squarely within this policy. Congress has delegated to the ICC¹ broad authority to "establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service by common carriers."² As a result questions of discrimination, of the reasonableness of service, or of the legality of particular practices are all matters to be first considered by the Commission. Thompson v. Texas Mexican Railway Co., 1946, 328 U.S. 134, 147, 66 S.Ct. 937, 945, 90 L.Ed. 1132, 1141; ...