Taylor Federation of Teachers v. Board of Ed. for Taylor School Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 23486 |
| Citation | 249 N.W.2d 399,72 Mich.App. 304 |
| Parties | , 14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 928 TAYLOR FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR the TAYLOR SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GREAT WEST LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, Third-Party Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
DeBiasi & Carrier by William J. DeBiasi, Taylor, for appellant.
Fieger, Golden & Cousens by Bernard J. Fieger, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellee.
Scholl, Jenkins, Robinson & Stieg by Robert A. Jenkins, Detroit, for Great West Life Ins.
Before J. H. GILLIS, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and VanVALKENBURG, * JJ.
We are asked to decide two issues relative to an insurance contract issued by Great-West Life, insuring against disability loss for school teachers employed by defendant Taylor School District. First, is a teacher an employee for purposes of disability benefits during the summer when not receiving wages but still under contract? Second, whether a clause in a bargained-for disability insurance contract barring recovery for pregnancy related disability is void on public policy grounds.
Plaintiff is the bargaining agent for the teaching employees of the defendant school district. Its complaint sought to enforce certain claims for disability benefits which accrued to its members under the terms of the current collective bargaining agreement and disability insurance contract then in effect.
The collective bargaining agreement obligated defendant to insure against wage loss due to disability. The policy provides a weekly indemnity payment of $50 for the first three months of disability, $90 per week for the next nine months and $25 per week for the second year of disability.
The union sought disability benefits for teachers who continued to be disabled during summer vacation; the defendant school board balked, contending that since the teachers were paid on a ten month salary plan they suffered no wage loss.
Count II of the complaint also alleged that Bonnie Mathewson did not receive disability benefits on two occasions; first, due to a tubular pregnancy, second due to a burst uterus. Both, it is conceded, are pregnancy related.
After motion and argument, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on grounds that there was no issue of fact. GCR 1973, 117.2(3).
There is no ambiguity to the insurance contract. It provides, in pertinent part
'If accidental bodily injury or sickness wholly and continuously disables an employee while he is insured for this Benefit Provision PAI and prevents him from performing his regular work, he shall be entitled to the Amount of Weekly Indemnity shown in the Table of Benefits for the Insurance Clause in which he is insured, provided the disability is not due in whole or in part to pregnancy.'
Teachers were employees of the school district during the term of the collective bargaining agreement. That agreement ran from September 1, 1970, through August 31, 1972. The insurance contract defines 'employee', 'regular work' and other terms necessary to construe the contract. However, nowhere does the contract say that once benefits have begun, as they had in all the claims before us, that the benefits cease when summer vacation begins. Indeed the policy is clear and unequivocal in that regard:
'Weekly Indemnity Benefits shall continue during the period of disability but only so long as (a) the employee is continuously under treatment by a physician or surgeon, and (b) he does not engage in any work for remuneration or profit and not longer in any event than the Maximum Period shown in the Table of Benefits.'
We hold that under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the insurance policy then in force the teachers entitled to disability protection remain employees entitled to continued benefits during the summer so long as they are not 'engaging in any work for remuneration or profit'.
The argument is that the teachers must be 'actively employed'. We disagree. It is simply not applicable in this situation. As long as the employee (a) is continuously under treatment by a physician or surgeon and (b) does not engage in work for remuneration or profit, then the insurer is obligated by the unequivocal terms of the contract to pay benefits due.
Is the policy provision which excludes pregnancy related disability void for public policy reasons? We conclude, as did the trial court, that it is.
At issue here is the intended scope of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition against discrimination based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Et seq. Parenthetically, we note that the issue is now, as we write, before the United States Supreme Court. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (CA 3, 1975), Appeal dismissed on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976), Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (CA 3, 1975), Cert. granted, 423 U.S. 822, 96 S.Ct. 36, 46 L.Ed.2d 39 (1975) (argued January 19--20, 1976, reargued in October 1976).
That these issues involve pressing social policy precedent is obvious to all. In spite of the variety of dispositions pro and con, we find the better reasoned law on the plaintiff's side. 1
The defendant urges that a reading of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974), mandates reversal. There, the State of California's employee-funded disability insurance program which paid benefits to persons in private employment who were temporarily unable to work because of disability not covered by workmen's compensation was challenged as being violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. A majority of the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of coverage for disability that accompanies normal pregnancy and childbirth does not amount to an invidious discrimination under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the challenge here is not the same as the Aiello case. Aiello involved a constitutional attack, based on equal protection grounds, against a legislatively created social welfare program for private employees which differentiated between pregnancy and other disabilities. In essence, the Court held simply that legislation incorporating a pregnancy-childbirth disability classification apart from other disabilities was 'rationally supportable'. This, the Court concluded, was all that California need do to sustain its legislation against an Equal Protection assault. Finally, Aiello emphatically didn't say that the distinction in disability benefit rights based on pregnancy was not discriminatory. The clear implication is that the Court found discrimination, but that the discrimination was not 'invidio...
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Laidler v. National Bank of Detroit
...of the state law in Taylor Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education for the Taylor School District which has been reported in 72 Mich App 304 (1976)." Although both sides refer in their briefs to the fact that the above action held the suit in abeyance, this view is contradicted by thei......
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Taylor Federation of Teachers v. Board of Ed. for Taylor School Dist., GREAT-WEST
...JJ. * PER CURIAM. Pursuant to an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the original decision in this case, reported at 72 Mich.App. 304, 249 N.W.2d 399 (1976), lv. granted, 400 Mich, --- (1977), has been vacated and the case has been remanded to us for reconsideration in light of Gilbert v. ......
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Taylor Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education for Taylor School District, GREAT-WEST
...leave to appeal is considered and, in lieu of leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), the Court of Appeals' decision 72 Mich.App. 304, 249 N.W.2d 399, is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Gilbert v. General Electric, 429 U.S. 1......