Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 03 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:2005-350 |
| Citation | 737 F.Supp.2d 474 |
| Parties | Sonya TAYLOR, Administratrix of the Estate of Devin J. Taylor, and in her Own Right, Plaintiff, v. ALTOONA AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, and Carol Myers, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Alan R. Krier, Anthony J. Zanoni, Jubelirer, Carothers, Krier & Halpern, Altoona, PA, for Plaintiff.
David P. Andrews, Aimee L. Willett, Roberta Binder-Heath, Andrews & Beard, Altoona, PA, Randall C. Rodkey, Leventry,Haschak & Rodkey, Johnstown, PA, for Defendants.
This matter arises from the most tragic of circumstances. Having previously adjudicated two motions to dismiss in this matter, the Court now examines the claims of Sonya Taylor ("Taylor") in the summary judgment context with a thoroughly developed evidentiary record that provides the Court details into Devin's educational experience and the asthma attack that ultimately took Devin's life. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ( ) (Doc. No. 78) with regard to Plaintiff's remaining claims along with a brief ( ). Plaintiff has filed a responsive brief ("PL's Br.") (Doc., No. 80). Both sides have filed respective Concise Statements of Material Facts ("CSMF") and responded to one another's Concise Statements of Material Facts ("RCSMF"). Defendants have also filed a Reply Brief ("Reply") (Doc. No. 88).
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Plaintiff's claims arise under 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Venue is proper because Plaintiff and the Defendant School District are located in Blair County, in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
This Court previously dismissed Defendants Suzanne Ritchey ("Ritchey") and Michelle Adams, R.N., ("Adams") from this matter.1 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 20) ("Compl.") implicitly concedes the Altoona Area School Board's dismissal from this litigation. In the Amended Complaint, even though the Board does appear in the caption, Plaintiff omits the Board when she states that "[t]hese claims are made against the Altoona Area School District, the Principal of Wright Elementary School, the school nurse and the child's third grade teacher."
The following facts drawn from Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts ("DCSMF") are undisputed unless otherwise noted. On September 24, 2003, Devin "D.J." Taylor ("Devin") was one of 17 students in Carol Myers' third grade class at Wright Elementary School. (DCSMF ¶¶ 4-5, 95.) He suffered a massive asthma attack that afternoon. Devin had a diagnosis of asthma, and in the three years preceding his death he was treated either in the emergency room or hospital a total of twelve times. (DCSMF ¶¶ 11, 14.) During the last year of his life, not including September 24, 2003, he went to either the emergency room or hospital seven times. (DCSMF ¶ 15.) These hospital visits were almost all related to Devin's asthma. (DCSMF ¶ 16.) On January 18, 2003, Devin was actually life-flighted to Pittsburgh and hospitalized for one week following an asthma attack he suffered at a friend's house. (DCSMF ¶¶ 17-19.) Adams, Wright Elementary's school nurse,learned of the January 18, 2003, asthma attack and discussed it with Carol Myers ("Myers").
Devin had a Service Plan and an Asthmatic Reaction Procedure in place. (DCSMF ¶ 67.) The Service Plan executed on August 27, 2003, provided as follows:
The Asthmatic Reaction Procedure provided instructions on what to do in the event of an asthma attack, including to call 911 and begin CPR if the child stops breathing or loses consciousness. (Defs.' Ex. Y.) Ritchey, the building principal, kept copies of all the Service Plans for students in her building. (DCSMF ¶ 60.) Adams kept in her file a questionnaire filled out by Taylor regarding Devin's asthmatic condition. (DCSMF ¶ 70.) In addition, Myers had both a copy of Devin's Service Plan and an inhaler for him. (DCSMF ¶¶ 73-74, 102-103.) Adams, Ritchey, and Myers met before the start of the 2003-2004 school year to discuss Devin's asthma. (DCSMF ¶ 97.) Adams told Myers what symptoms to watch for and explained to her that Devin was to use his inhaler before Physical Education class and in any situation where he was exercising strenuously. (DCSMF ¶ 98 2.) Devin knew when he was experiencing asthmatic symptoms and would use his inhaler. (DCSMF ¶ 82.) Devin sat right in front of Myers so that she could monitor him. (DCSMF ¶ 104.)
While Devin did have a Service Plan, he did not have an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). (DCSMF ¶ 83.)
As school nurse, Adams would split her time between Wright Elementary and Washington and Jefferson Elementary. (DCSMF ¶ 91.) At the time of Devin's asthma attack on September 24, 2003, Adams was at Washington and Jefferson Elementary. (DCSMF ¶ 108.) She received a call at 2:30 p.m. about Devin's asthma attack and promptly returned to Wright Elementary. (DCSMF ¶ 108.)
On the morning of September 24, 2003, Devin looked congested to Myers. (DCSMF ¶ 105.) That afternoon, after recess, the students returned to the classroom between 1:20 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. (DCSMF ¶ 113.) From this point on very few facts are undisputed. According to Defendants, Myers asked Devin if he wanted to go to the nurse, and Devin said he did. (DCSMF ¶ 115.) According to Plaintiff, Devin asked Myers if he could go to the nurse, and Myers said "No, Devin, not now." (RDCSMF ¶ 115.) Defendants claim Devin was sitting upright at a desk and struggling to breathe. (DCSMF ¶ 119.) Plaintiff claims Devin had his head on his desk. (RDCSMF ¶ 119.) Ritchey was notified and came to the classroom, though it is disputed how she was contacted. (DCSMF ¶ 117; RDCSMF ¶ 117.) Defendants say Myers called her secretary who called Ritchey, while Taylor says Myers sent Devin's classmate, a student identified in the record as "T.T.," to Ritchey's office to notify her about the emergency. (DCSMF ¶ 117; RDCSMF ¶ 117.)
Ritchey instructed Monica DiStefano, the nurse's assistant, to call both Taylor and Adams. (DCSMF ¶ 120.) Ritchey also tried to call 911 from the classroom, but the call did not go through, so Ritchey directed Myers to run to the office and call 911. (DCSMF ¶ 120.)
A fireman arrived within minutes, placed Devin on the floor, and began resuscitative efforts. (DCSMF ¶ 124.) The first AMED was dispatched at 2:35 p.m., arrived on site at 2:37 p.m., and was at "bed-side" at 2:39 p.m. (DCSMF ¶ 127.) John Seymour, with the first AMED crew, attempted unsuccessfully to intubate Devin. (DCSMF ¶ 128.) The second AMED crew arrived at 2:40 p.m. and ultimately succeeded at intubation. (DCSMF ¶ 129-130.) Devin was taken to Altoona Hospital and then life-flighted to Pittsburgh. (DCSMF ¶ 132.) Devin died on September 27, 2003, just short of his ninth birthday. (DCSMF ¶¶ 2, 3.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where "it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Troy Chem. Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 125-126 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Materiality is defined by the substantive law, and a dispute over a material fact is a dispute "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "An issue of material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Troy Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d at 126 (quoting ( Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505)). The Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, in this case, Sonya Taylor. Troy Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d at 126.
Sonya Taylor ("Taylor") has brought a claim against the District under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), one of the main purposes of which is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). An Individualized Educational Program (IEP) is "the primary vehicle for providing students with the required free and appropriate education." S.H. v. State-Operated School Dist. Of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir.2003).
The Court first addresses a threshold jurisdictional issue that it raised sua sponte in adjudicating the last motion to dismiss and on which it requested further briefing from the parties. The question of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction arose because the "unclear state of the record" suggested that Taylor had not resorted to the IDEA'S administrative process. See Taylor II, 513 F.Supp.2d at 552 n. 3 (). In their Answer, Defendants did raise as an affirmative defense Taylor's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies but did so in very...
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