Taylor v. American Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1931
• Docket Number: 13,727
• Citation: 17 La.App. 458,135 So. 47
• Parties: TAYLOR ET AL. v. AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. ET AL
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

135 So. 47

17 La.App. 458

TAYLOR ET AL. v. AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. ET AL

No. 13,727

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Orleans

May 25, 1931

Rehearing Refused July 20, 1931.

Writs of Certiorari and Review Refused by Supreme Court October 6 1931.

Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Division "E." Hon. William H. Byrnes, Jr., Judge.

Action by John E. Taylor et al. against American Bank & Trust Company et al.

There was judgment for plaintiffs and defendants appealed.

On motion to dismiss appeal motion denied.

Judgment reversed on merits and suit dismissed.

Judgment reversed on merits and suit dismissed.

Edward Rightor and W. H. Sellers, of New Orleans, attorneys for plaintiffs, appellees.

Merrick Schwarz, Guste, Barnette & Redmann, of New Orleans, attorneys for defendants, appellants.

JANVIER J. HIGGINS, J.

OPINION

JANVIER, J.

Plaintiffs, all members of the police force of the city of New Orleans, seek to collect from the various defendant banks rewards alleged to be due them in accordance with the notice quoted below, as the result of their having furnished information leading to the arrest of certain bandits who participated in the robbery of the Algiers branch of the Canal Bank & Trust Company on November 27, 1929.

At some time prior to November 27, 1929, defendant banks, members and associate members of the New Orleans Clearing House Association, had posted in their various places of business and had otherwise circulated printed notices or handbills reading as follows:

"$ 5,000 REWARD

"For information leading to the arrest and conviction of

BANK ROBBERS

"A reward of $ 5,000.00 will be paid by the NEW ORLEANS CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION to the person or persons who furnish information leading to the arrest and conviction of the participants in any robbery of or attempt to rob or hold up any Member or any Associate-Member of the Association or a branch bank of any Member or Associate-Member Bank, or any messenger or agent of such banks or branches. The killing of any person or persons in the act of committing such robbery, or in the act of attempting such robbery or hold up, shall, for the purpose of this reward, be considered as an arrest and conviction of such person or persons. All claims for such reward must be made to the Association within thirty (30) days after conviction.

"The Association is the sole judge of any dispute arising over the reward and the person or persons, if any, entitled to share therein, and its decision on any point connected with the reward will be final and conclusive.

"THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW ORLEANS CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION ARE:

"American Bank & Trust Company

"Canal Bank & Trust Company

"Hibernia Bank & Trust Company

"Interstate Trust & Banking Company

"New Orleans Bank & Trust Company

"Whitney-Central National Bank

"Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank

"ASSOCIATE-MEMBERS:

"Algiers Trust & Savings Bank

"Gretna Trust & Savings Bank

"Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, Gretna, La.

"Metairie Bank

"St. Bernard Bank & Trust Company."

Plaintiffs allege that they were aware of the said notice; that their action, in courageously and intelligently following the various clues left by the bandits and in obtaining and in transmitting the information obtained constituted acceptance by them of the offer made by the banks and that this acceptance converted the said offer into a contract between them and the banks, under which contract they now bring this action.

Various defenses are presented, all but one of which we have found it unnecessary to consider, since that one appears to us to be well-founded and to offer an insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs' recovery. That defense is that all of the plaintiffs are public officers employed by the city of New Orleans for the purpose of tracking down and apprehending criminals guilty of violations of law committed within the territorial limits of the city of New Orleans, and that, thus, not only is it against public policy that such public officers should be permitted to claim rewards for services performed in line of duty, but, even if no question of public policy were involved, no consideration for the contract has been given by plaintiffs, since all that they did they were bound by their official duties to do.

It is conceded that in most jurisdictions it is violative of the public policy for peace officers to demand special rewards for services performed in line of duty, however courageous or meritorious the services may have been, but it is argued that in this state not only has no such public policy been established by statute, ordinance or jurisprudence, but that, on the contrary, many legislative and municipal enactments indicate a public policy favorable to the acceptance of such rewards or gratuities. Our attention is directed to the following:

Section 35 of Act No. 74 of 1868; Jewell's Digest of Municipal Ordinances (1882) p. 304, sec. 28; section 22 of Act No. 63 of 1888; section 23 of Act No. 95 of 1896; section 10 of Act No. 32 of 1904; Act No. 10 of 1910; section 54 of Act No. 159 of 1912; section 7 of Act No. 27 of 1914; Act No. 29 of 1926.

We have most carefully considered the above referred to statutes and the ordinance set forth in Jewell's Digest. The ordinance referred to absolutely prohibits the receipt by a public police officer of such a reward.

The various statutes referred to are not indicative of a public policy favoring the right of a public peace officer to demand such rewards and it is evident that the framers thereof intended that only in extraordinary cases and only after the strictest scrutiny by the proper officials should police officers be permitted to retain rewards, if voluntarily tendered.

We find a vast distinction between permitting a police officer to retain a reward tendered after the performance of service and authorizing the same officer to bring suit for a reward claimed to be due him as the result of a contract.

We do not believe that the enactments to which we have referred indicate that in this state there has been established a public policy favorable to permitting public officers to demand rewards for services performed in line of duty, even when such rewards have, prior to the performance of the service, been offered to the general public, without restriction or limitation.

Counsel for plaintiffs argue that, even if we come to such conclusion, nevertheless, plaintiffs here should be permitted to recover because the information was obtained and transmitted outside of the territorial limits of the parish of Orleans, which limits also form the jurisdictional boundaries of the authority of plaintiffs; that, thus, as soon as they crossed the border of Orleans parish and entered the parish of Plaquemines, they lost their character as police officers of the city of New Orleans and became private citizens; and that, therefore, any acts done by them were not done in their respective official capacities, nor within the scope of their official duties, and that, thus, in so acting, they, as other private citizens would have been, are entitled to the reward.

This contention is based on the alleged absence of authority of Orleans police officers to make arrests in the parish of Plaquemines. Whether officers of one parish may in another parish apprehend criminals for acts done in the parish in which the officers have jurisdiction is an interesting question, but one which we find it unnecessary to solve in considering the contention now confronting us because it is not the arrest which was made in the parish of Plaquemines which forms the basis of the claims for the reward, but the furnishing of the information, and it cannot be denied that a peace officer, if sent by his superior into another parish to obtain information, is, while seeking that information, acting within the line and scope of his official duties.

It appears from the testimony of DeRoccha, one of the plaintiffs, that when they left New Orleans to go into the adjoining parish, they did so under orders of their superior officer, Superintendent Ray. How, then, can it be contended that, in obtaining the information, they were acting as private citizens? If they obtained the information while acting as peace officers, how can they claim a reward for divulging it? How can they claim that in divulging it they furnished a consideration sufficient to bring into existence a contract with the various banks who had offered the reward? The information was not theirs to sell or to barter. It belonged to the officers entitled to receive it and in transmitting it they did only what their duties required.

Instead of finding, in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Belek (D. C.) 211 F. 699, 708, anything antagonistic to the views which we have expressed, we see in that opinion language impressively supporting the doctrine which we consider sound. There the court held that a peace officer who, without a warrant, arrested a fugitive from justice from another state, was entitled to a reward because his duties in such case were "limited to the execution of a warrant for such arrest." Thus, the officer was doing something not entirely within the scope of his duties. The court said that if it had been within the scope of his duties to make such arrest, then for doing so he could not have claimed the reward. The court used this language:

"As there does not appear to have been any duty imposed by law upon the two police officers who made the arrest, they are entitled to receive the amount offered for that service."

Here as we have shown, it was the duty to which these officers were assigned to go into the adjoining parish and there obtain information. In obtaining and transmitting it they did...