Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1908
• Citation: 62 S.E. 1113,81 S.C. 574
• Parties: TAYLOR v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

62 S.E. 1113

81 S.C. 574

TAYLOR v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 24, 1908

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Colleton County; D. E Hydrick, Judge.

Action by Emily Taylor against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.Affirmed.

Jones J., dissenting.

W Huger Fitz Simons, for appellant.

J. G Padgett, for respondent.

WOODS J.

The plaintiff at the trial in the circuit court on her original complaint recovered a verdict of $10,000.On appeal the judgment was set aside, and a new trial ordered.The nature of the act and the circumstances out of which the suit arose are set forth in detail in the former opinion.78 S.C. 552, 59 S.E. 641.It is only necessary to say here that the original complaint was for punitive damages alone, under the allegation that the defendant, as a common carrier, wantonly and recklessly violated its duty to the plaintiff, as a passenger on its railroad, by not protecting her from indignities alleged to have been inflicted upon her at Green Pond, the station at which she left defendant's car, by a crowd of noisy and drunken negroes.The Supreme Court held there was no evidence of wanton or reckless violation of duty, and that the circuit court for that reason should have granted the motion for a new trial.The Supreme Court further held that the circuit court, in charging that a carrier is bound to exercise the highest degree of care to protect a passenger, and that the relation of carrier and passenger continues after the passenger has left the train at his destination, until he has had a reasonable time to get away, should have charged further that, when the injury complained of results from the acts of strangers on the station premises, "knowledge of the existence of the danger or circumstances from which the danger may have been reasonably anticipated is necessary to fix the liability of the carrier for damages sustained in consequence of failure to guard against it."For these errors a new trial was ordered.Thereafter the plaintiff moved in the circuit court to amend her complaint in several particulars.The proposed amendments which were allowed by Judge Hydrick appear in italics in the amended complaints printed in the record.The effect of the amendments was to insert allegations that the wrongs suffered by plaintiff were inflicted while she was leaving the cars and station of defendant, and before she had a reasonable time to leave; that defendant knew the danger to which the plaintiff would be exposed from the crowd of negroes; that its conductor promised her the protection of an escort, but the agent of defendant at Green Pond, who was provided as her escort, made no effort to protect her; and that the defendant's alleged breaches of duty were negligent, as well as wanton and reckless.The defendant insists the amendment should not have been allowed, because the original complaint failed to state facts constituting a cause of action, and therefore there was nothing by which to amend.It requires no discussion to show that, under the case of Ruberg v. Brown,50 S.C. 397, 27 S.E. 873, on which defendant relies, the amendments, except that as to the charge of negligence, were allowed to cure and make complete a faulty and incomplete statement of a cause of action.

The important point in the appeal is made by the objection that amending the complaint so as to charge as negligent the acts and omissions of defendant, described in the original complaint as wanton and reckless, was stating a new cause of action by amendment, and that the Code of Procedure does not allow an amendment which goes to the extent of bringing in a new cause of action.It is well settled that the amendment alleging negligence, where in the original complaint wantonness and recklessness had been charged, sets up a new cause of action.Machen v. Tel. Co.,72 S.C. 256, 51 S.E. 697;Baldwin v. Cable Co.,78 S.C. 419, 59 S.E 67.There is as little doubt that, when the cause was sent back from this court to the circuit court for a new trial, the power of the circuit judge to grant amendments before the new trial was the same as if there had never been a trial.Hall v. Woodward,30 S.C. 575, 9 S.E. 684;Pickett v. Ry. Co.,74 S.C. 236, 54 S.E. 375.The power to allow amendments at this stage of the case is not affected by the fact that it is, as it should be, more difficult to convince a judge that it would be in furtherance of justice to allow an amendment raising new issues, after the parties had been subjected to the expense and delay of a trial in the Circuit Court and on appeal in the Supreme Court.The question then is whether the circuit court had the...