Taylor v. Baker
| Decision Date | 10 November 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 6362.,6362. |
| Parties | J. C. TAYLOR, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, Appellant, v. Orie Floyd BAKER, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
David Rubin, Washington, D. C. (Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Wilbur G. Leonard, U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., Harold H. Greene and Gerald P. Choppin, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Robert F. Meersman and Robert F. Moore, Mount Prospect, Ill., for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and BRATTON and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
This proceeding in habeas corpus was instituted in the United States Court for Kansas by Orie Floyd Baker, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, to effectuate his discharge from further confinement in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. And the crucial question upon which the case turns is whether service of three sentences imposed upon petitioner by the United States Court for Eastern Arkansas began at the time he was released from the state penitentiary in Arkansas or at the time he was paroled from the state prison in Wisconsin and delivered to the federal authorities for service of the federal sentences.
The facts constituting the background of the case were stated in detail in United States v. Baker, D.C., 158 F.Supp. 842; United States v. Baker, D.C., 170 F.Supp. 651; and Baker v. United States, 8 Cir., 271 F.2d 190, 191. But for present purposes it is enough to say that the case has its genesis in these facts. Petitioner entered pleas of guilty in three cases pending in the United States Court for Eastern Arkansas and was sentenced to a term of five years in each case, with provision that the sentences should run concurrently with each other. At the time these sentences were imposed, petitioner was serving a term in the penitentiary in Arkansas. The sentences imposed in the United States Court each provided that it should "begin at the expiration of the sentence said defendant is now serving in the Arkansas State Penitentiary * * *." After imposition of these sentences, petitioner was returned to the state penitentiary in Arkansas to complete the service of his sentence there. Upon completion of that sentence, he was released to the custody of authorities of Indiana and was returned to that state for completion of a sentence in the state reformatory there. When petitioner completed his sentence in Indiana, he was turned over to authorities of Wisconsin for service of sentences in the penitentiary of that state. And he was finally delivered to the federal authorities for service of the sentences imposed upon him by the United States Court for Eastern Arkansas. If service of the sentences which the United States Court imposed upon petitioner began at the time he completed his sentence in the penitentiary of Arkansas, and if he were credited with the maximum statutory time for good behavior, he was eligible for conditional release prior to the time of the filing of this action in habeas corpus. On the other hand, if such sentences were computed from the time petitioner was delivered to the federal authorities for their service, he was not eligible for conditional release. Expressing the view that service of the three sentences which petitioner received in the United States Court for Eastern Arkansas began at the expiration of the sentence served in the penitentiary of Arkansas, the court granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered petitioner discharged. The warden appealed.
The time at which a sentence in a criminal case shall begin to run is the subject matter of 18 U.S.C. § 3568. The statute provides:
And the statute has been considered with care in this court and elsewhere. In Rohr v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 105 F.2d 747, 780, petitioner had been in custody for an alleged violation of state law. While in such custody, he was produced in the United States Court; he pleaded guilty; and he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years "from this date" in the penitentiary. Slightly more than a month later, he was tried on the state charge. The jury was unable to agree; at a later date the case was removed from the docket; and petitioner was turned over to the Marshal for delivery to the penitentiary for service of the five-year sentence. It was the contention of the petitioner that since the sentence expressly provided that it was to run from its date, it began to run on that date rather than on the date he was delivered to the Marshal. Predicating its conclusion upon the command of the statute, this court rejected the contention and held that the sentence did not begin to run until the date on which petitioner was delivered to the Marshal. In McIntosh v. Looney, 10 Cir., 249...
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Green v. United States, 6253.
...at the time of imposition of his federal sentence, such as a sentence for escape or for assaulting a prison guard. See Taylor v. Baker, 284 F.2d 43 (C.A.10, 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814, 81 S.Ct. 695, 5 L.Ed.2d 693 (1961), and Lamb v. Heritage, 310 F.2d 71 (C.A.5, 1962), and cases Ekbe......
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Anderson v. United States
...Court began to run from the date Anderson was actually delivered to federal custody for service of his federal sentence. Taylor v. Baker, 284 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1960). ...
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Miller v. Willingham, 10009.
...the issue of concurrent versus consecutive sentences is raised. E. g., Powers v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964); Taylor v. Baker, 284 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1960); Hayward v. Looney, 246 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1957). This determination is, of course, predicated on the conclusion that Miller'......
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Blasenstein v. United States
...denied, 377 U.S. 1002, 84 S.Ct. 1937, 12 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1964); Lavoie v. United States, 310 F. 2d 117 (1st Cir. 1962); Taylor v. Baker, 284 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1960). 3 See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957); Treakle v. United States, 327 F.2d 82 (9th C......