Taylor v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 12 November 1946
• Citation: 198 S.W.2d 297,303 Ky. 562
• Parties: TAYLOR et al. v. BARNES et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

198 S.W.2d 297

303 Ky. 562

TAYLOR et al. v. BARNES et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

November 12, 1946

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ohio County; Clarence Bartlett, Judge.

Action by Oscar Taylor and others against Frank Barnes and others for a mandatory injunction to compel defendants to remove obstructions upon and reopen a public road through defendants' property.From a judgment dismissing their petition, plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Otto C. Martin, of Hartford, and A. J. Bratcher, of Morgantown, for appellants.

Woodward Dawson, Hobson & Fulton, of Louisville, and A. D. Kirk, of Owensboro, for appellees.

VAN SANT, Commissioner.

Appellants four in number, jointly instituted this action, seeking a mandatory injunction to compel appellees to remove certain obstructions upon, and to reopen, a public road running through the property of appellees.The Chancellor refused to grant the relief, and dismissed the petition.The road in question runs in a southerly, then easterly, direction commencing at a new county road which runs east and west, and ending at, and connecting with, the Riverside Robinson Mill Road, which pursues a north-south course.The new county road and the Riverside Robinson Mill Road intersect at right angles approximately two miles east of the obstructed road's intersection with the new highway.The road in question formerly led to a boat landing on Green River, but the boat landing long since has been abandoned.No church school, store, mill, or other public place is located on the obstructed road, nor does it offer to the traveling public or appellants a more convenient route to such an institution or place of business; in fact, each of the appellants admits the new county road affords a much better and more convenient means of travel than does the road which has been closed.No witness testified to any fact from which the Court may conclude that either of the appellants has sustained special damage different either in degree or kind from that suffered by the public at large; indeed, no witness testified to any fact from which the Court may infer that the public at large has suffered any inconvenience, much less damage.Finally, it was shown that appellants own no property fronting on, or adjacent to, the closed road, and that the road itself afforded no necessary means of ingress or egress to or from any of their properties.

Appellants admit the above facts,...