Taylor v. Brown
| Decision Date | 22 June 1886 |
| Citation | 4 A. 888,65 Md. 366 |
| Parties | TAYLOR AND OTHERS v. BROWN, SR., AND OTHERS. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from court of common pleas, Baltimore city. Issues from orphans' court.
E Otis Hinkley and Benjamin Kurtz, for appellants.
Bernard Carter, for appellees.
The following issues were sent by the orphans' court of Baltimore city to the court of common pleas for trial: (1) Whether the sum of $6,588.07, which, at the time of the death of Sarah Ann Brown, was deposited in the Eutaw Savings Bank or any part thereof, belonged to her estate; (2) whether the sum of $2,063.63, being the proceeds derived from the sale of certain property mortgaged by John Creat and wife to Sarah Ann Brown, was part of her personal estate.
At the trial of these issues, evidence was offered tending to prove that both of these sums belonged to Sarah Ann Brown; that an account was kept in the Eutaw Savings Bank in the joint names of the said Sarah and her husband, William Brown, and the survivor, and subject to the order of either; and that the sum of $8,538.07, thus on deposit in the bank, was paid on the order of the husband after the death of his wife. On the other hand, evidence was offered, on the part of the appellees, tending to prove that the money in question belonged to William Brown, the husband; and, further, that, if the wife had any claim or title to the money, it was paid to the husband, and used by him, with her knowledge and consent.
During the trial the appellants offered to prove, by the witness Taylor, that a few days after the deposit of $5,000 in the savings bank he had a conversation with Mrs. Brown, in the presence and hearing of her husband, in which conversation she explained to witness why her husband's name had been placed upon the pass-book of the bank, and to which explanation no objection whatever was made by the husband. The $5,000 thus deposited was part of the sum of $6,538.07 paid to the husband after the death of the wife; and any explanation by her, made in the presence and hearing of her husband, why it was deposited in their joint names, and payable to the survivor, was clearly admissible. If no objection was made by him to such explanation, his silence might fairly be construed as an acquiescence in the truth of the statement made by the wife; and we do not see on what grounds the evidence was excluded. But the bill of exceptions does not set forth the explanation, to prove which the witness was offered; and, for all that appears to the contrary, the explanation may have been wholly unimportant or immaterial. To justify us in reversing the judgment it must appear that the evidence objected to and excluded worked an injury to the appellants. As was said in Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123:
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