Taylor v. Brown
| Decision Date | 02 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1710.,12–1710. |
| Citation | 787 F.3d 851 |
| Parties | John E. TAYLOR, Jr., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. James BROWN, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Daniel Thomas Fenske, Barry Levenstam, Attorney, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Evan Siegel, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
John Taylor, an Illinois prisoner, filed suit against several prison officials alleging various civil-rights violations, but his complaint included misjoined claims, one of which was a failure-to-protect claim against Officer James Brown. A magistrate judge issued a show-cause order indicating that he was inclined to sever the claims but that Taylor could avoid a severance order—and a second filing fee—if he dismissed one of the misjoined claims voluntarily. Taylor reluctantly accepted the court's advice and drafted a response voluntarily dismissing his claim against Officer Brown. Two days before the judge's deadline, Taylor gave the document to a prison librarian to be e-filed. The court clerk never received it, however, and the judge severed the claim against Officer Brown, opened a new case, and assessed a second filing fee.
Both Taylor and the officer subsequently argued that Taylor's voluntary dismissal was timely under the prison mailbox rule, but the court never addressed the issue. That was a mistake. Taylor's voluntary dismissal motion was indeed timely under the prison mailbox rule, so the court should not have severed the claim or imposed a second filing fee.
On February 7, 2011, Taylor filed a pro se complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the Menard Correctional Center in southern Illinois where he was incarcerated. Taylor didn't formally differentiate his various allegations against the defendants, but the district judge tasked with screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A discerned five distinct claims. The judge dismissed three of the claims as legally or factually inadequate, but two survived: Count 1 alleged medical indifference on the part of several prison officials (primarily for failing to supply Taylor with needed medication), and Count 3 alleged that Officer Brown failed to protect Taylor from an assault by his cell-mate. The suit was docketed as case number 11–cv–104–JPG (the “104 Case”), and Taylor was approved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), meaning he could pay the $350 filing fee in installments. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915.
A magistrate judge reviewed the complaint and on June 29 issued an order to show cause stating that he was inclined to sever Counts 1 and 3 because they involved different events and defendants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2)(B) (); Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 (). The order informed Taylor that a second filing fee would be assessed if the claims were severed, but also explained that he could avoid the fee if he voluntarily dismissed either count by July 13.
On July 6 the defendants expressed their support for either a severance or the voluntary dismissal of either count and agreed that they “would suffer no plain legal prejudice as a result of an order permitting [a] voluntary dismissal.”
Taylor drafted a response to the show-cause order in early July. In it he accepted the court's suggestion that he voluntarily dismiss one of the counts, saying that he “reluctantly will dismiss Count III, even though the [p]laintiff in his limited knowledge of the [l]aw believes that Count III ... should be included in the complaint.” He added, “[f]or another filing fee to be levied upon the [p]laintiff it would be a miscarriage of justice” and “an overwhelming financial burden,” and “[t]herefore, under duress, the [p]laintiff will dismiss Count III.”
By this time, however, Taylor had been transferred from Menard to the Stateville Correctional Center. Stateville had recently instituted a policy requiring prisoners' court documents to be digitally scanned and e-filed by prison librarians. On July 11 Taylor gave his response to a Stateville law library paralegal named Ms. Winters. Taylor told her that it was due July 13, and she assured him that it would be e-filed before then. It wasn't. Whether Winters forgot or there was a technical glitch (she later claimed another staff member watched her upload it), the document Taylor gave her on July 11 never found its way to the court clerk. It was, however, mailed in hard-copy form to defense counsel, who received it on July 19.
Having received no word from Taylor by the July 13 deadline, the magistrate judge severed Counts 1 and 3 under Rule 21 on July 22.1 The clerk redocketed Count 3 as 3:11–cv–00631–GPM (“the 631 Case”), and Taylor was ordered to pay the $350 filing fee immediately or apply to proceed IFP.
When Taylor was informed of the severance in late July, he became concerned that the court had not received his response to the show-cause order. He asked Winters to refile the document with a note indicating that it was a repeat filing. The court clerk docketed the uploaded response in the 104 Case on August 4.
On August 18 Officer Brown, as the only defendant in the 631 Case (the original Count 3), moved to dismiss. His primary argument was that because Taylor had “attempted to agree to dismiss Count 3 of [p]laintiff's [c]omplaint in [the 104 Case] by the [c]ourt's deadline and before the [c]ourt directed the [c]lerk to open the instant case,” his response to the order to show cause was timely under the prison mailbox rule.2 Officer Brown asked the court to allow Taylor, even now, to voluntarily dismiss the claim as he had tried to do in his July 11 response.3
Taylor responded on August 24 and explained that he had no control over when his motion for a voluntary dismissal was filed after he gave it to the prison paralegal.
He “ask[ed] that the [c]ourt not penalize the [p]laintiff for the [m]otions arriving beyond the deadline date to respond to the Show Cause Motion.” Rather, because he “voluntarily request[ed] the [c]ourt to dismiss Count III that no further charges be [assessed] to the [p]laintiff's account,” he “pray[ed] that the [c]ourt will dismiss the Count III without prejudice.”
On August 29 Taylor again asked the court to “consider[ ] that the [p]laintiff had absolutely no control of the Motion to Dismiss being electronically sent to the [c]ourt”4 and “rule favorably on the Motion to Dismiss.”
The district judge denied Officer Brown's motion to dismiss on September 12. The judge did not acknowledge the officer's argument about the prison mailbox rule or refer to any of Taylor's subsequent motions urging the court to accept his response to the show-cause order as timely filed. The court's order was skeletal, but the judge seems to have been under the misapprehension that Taylor had agreed to the severance and wanted to pursue his claim against Officer Brown. And so despite the wishes of both parties, the second suit continued.
Taylor never paid the filing fee for the 631 Case, nor did he request to proceed IFP. Accordingly, on September 22 the district judge dismissed the 631 Case with prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The judge also sua sponte ordered Taylor to pay Officer Brown's litigation costs. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) ().
On September 30 and October 26, 2011, Taylor filed nearly identical postjudgment motions detailing his attempts to file his response to the order to show cause and asking the court, again, to permit him to voluntarily dismiss his claim against Officer Brown. The first motion did not cite any procedural rule, but the court construed it as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493–94 (7th Cir.2008) (). The second motion specifically requested relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The court denied both motions on February 29, 2012. On March 12 Taylor filed a third postjudgment motion, also under Rule 60(b), which included an affidavit and evidence documenting his attempt to file his response to the order to show cause on July 11. The district court denied that motion on March 18, and Taylor timely appealed the denials of all three postjudgment motions.
Taylor initially proceeded pro se on appeal, but we recruited pro bono counsel to assist him.5 We asked the parties to address two questions: (1) the effect of Taylor's response to the show-cause order and Officer Brown's motion to dismiss; and (2) whether Taylor's response was timely under the prison mailbox rule.
Despite the complex procedural history, the resolution of this case is relatively straightforward. As both Taylor and Officer Brown argued in the district court, Taylor's response to the pre-severance show-cause order was timely under the prison mailbox rule. Since Taylor accepted the court's proposal that he voluntarily dismiss Count 3, the 631 Case should never have come into existence, Taylor should not have been assessed a second filing fee, his claim against Officer Brown should not have been dismissed with prejudice, and he should not have been held liable for Brown's litigation expenses. Taylor is entitled to unwind the clock.
Before analyzing the prison mailbox rule, we must ensure that the...
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