Taylor v. Carter, 91-3052

Decision Date06 April 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-3052,91-3052
Citation960 F.2d 763
PartiesJohn TAYLOR, Appellee, v. Mary Louise CARTER; Pauline Catmet; Ronald McGee; Lola Tate; Louise Hall; Solomon Thurman; John Wolff; Clayborne King; Darlene Crawley; Jerry Simpson, all in individual and official capacity, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Frank Susman, St. Louis, Mo., argued (Randall B. Kahn, on brief), for appellants.

Gregory C. Fenlon, St. Louis, Mo., argued (Gerald M. Dunne, on brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and WOODS, * District Judge.

HENRY WOODS, District Judge.

Officials of the City of Pagedale, Missouri, appeal the district court's 1 denial of their motion to dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity. The appellee contends that the appeal was not timely filed because the appellants failed to appeal the district court's earlier denial of two virtually identical motions. We find that the appeal was not timely taken and, therefore, do not reach the merits of the appellants' qualified immunity defense.

In June, 1989, the defendant city officials filed their first motion to dismiss claims against them in their individual capacities on the ground of qualified good-faith immunity. The motion was denied by the district court in January 1990; no appeal was taken. On June 19, 1990, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified good-faith immunity. That motion was denied January 11, 1991; no appeal was taken.

April 22, 1991, the individual defendants again moved the district court to dismiss the claims against them on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court, for the third time, rejected the good-faith immunity defense on July, 25, 1991. The individual defendants filed a notice of appeal on July 30, 1991, within thirty days of the third denial.

A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss a claim on the basis of qualified good-faith immunity is a final appealable decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). As such, the denial is subject to the thirty-day time limit for appeal. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). The question before the Court is whether a defendant can repeatedly file the same motion with a district court thereby starting a new clock running for purposes of appeal. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit when faced with this question:

[T]he appealability of orders denying absolute and qualified immunity is governed by the same temporal limitations and subject to the same rules as other appeals, whether interlocutory or final. If [defendants' earlier] motion did in fact raise the question of absolute or qualified immunity, the parties had thirty days after the order denying it in which to file a notice of appeal. Having failed in this we conclude that they lost that right, and any later effort to appeal would not be timely.

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  • White v. Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • October 19, 2011
    ...within” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). See also Taylor v. Carter, 960 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir.1992) (“A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss a claim on the basis of qualified good-faith immunity is a final appealabl......
  • Robbins v. Wilkie
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • January 10, 2006
    ...substantially the same as the first. Armstrong v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 30 F.3d 643, 644 (5th Cir.1994); Taylor v. Carter, 960 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir.1992). But see Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir.1996) (distinguishing Armstrong and Taylor in a case where d......
  • Grant v. City of Pittsburgh
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • October 18, 1996
    ...would be an inappropriate vehicle for such a holding because the two rulings addressed different legal theories. In Taylor v. Carter, 960 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir.1992), also cited by the plaintiffs, the defendants had attempted to appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment that ......
  • Vega v. Miller
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 3, 2001
    ...(appeal from denial of second qualified immunity motion dismissed where "the two motions are substantially the same"); Taylor v. Carter, 960 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1992) However, the Supreme Court has ruled that an appeal will lie from a rejection of qualified immunity on a motion for summ......
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