Taylor v. El Centro Coll.

• Decision Date: 10 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:21-CV-0999-D
• Parties: REGINALD DARRELL TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. EL CENTRO COLLEGE, et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

REGINALD DARRELL TAYLOR, Plaintiff,
v.
EL CENTRO COLLEGE, et. al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-0999-D

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

January 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, SENIOR JUDGE.

Pro se plaintiff Reginald Darrell Taylor (“Taylor”), ^[1] an African-American male who had already graduated from the El Centro campus of Dallas College, was twice denied access to the school's library. Taylor principally maintains that he was refused entry based on his race and gender rather than his status as a former student who lacked a current student Id. Taylor now sues for monetary and equitable relief based on myriad federal- and state-law claims alleged against the following defendants: El Centro College, Dallas County Community College District, Dallas College, and Dallas Campus Police^[2] (collectively, the “Institutional Defendants”), ^[3] and Lieutenant Byron Stewart (“Lt. Stewart”), Captain Smith,

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Officer Guerro, Officer Valdez, Chancellor Joe May (“Chancellor May”), and President Jose Adames (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”).^[4] The following five motions are pending for decision: the Institutional Defendants' September 13, 2021 motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); the Individual Defendants' September 13, 2021 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); defendants' October 21, 2021 motion to stay discovery pending resolution of their motions to dismiss; Taylor's October 30, 2021 motion for leave to extend time; and defendants' November 19, 2021 opposed motion for entry of protective order.^[5]

For the reasons explained, the court grants the Institutional Defendants' and the Individual Defendants' motions to dismiss, grants Taylor leave to replead, and denies the other motions.

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I

Taylor, an African-American male, is a 2016 graduate of what is now the El Centro campus of Dallas College.^[6] According to Taylor, when he returned to the El Centro campus on June 26, 2019^[7] to use the library to make photocopies, he was “discriminated against” and denied access “based on race, color, gender, . . . [and] retaliation.” Compl. ¶¶ 2, 43; Quest. Ans. at p. 2.1. Taylor alleges that Officer Valdez threatened to press criminal charges if Taylor did not leave the library, despite the fact that “Graduates, non-degree holders, alum,

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alumni, and classmates of Mr. Taylor and of El Centro College, Dallas Community College District that [were] of a different gender and/or ethnicity [were] not restricted from accessing any of the [library] resources.” Compl. ¶ 45.

While Taylor alleges that the officers denied him access for discriminatory reasons, he also asserts that the officers' stated reason was that he was not a current student. One officer stated that Taylor was being denied access because “the institution was a private college and only allowed faculty and current students access to resources.” Quest. Ans. at p. 6 (emphasis omitted). Another officer stated that access was being denied because Taylor needed to be a “current student” with a “valid school id.” Id. at p. 7. Shortly thereafter, the library faculty posted a sign stating that only current students were permitted to enter the library.

In November and December 2019, Taylor attempted to communicate with Dallas College faculty to gain access to the library. On November 19, 2019 he emailed Karen Stills (“VP Stills”), the Vice President of Student Services & Enrollment Management, outlining his concerns about the alleged discriminatory behavior and the denial of library access. On December 2, 2019 he met with VP Stills to discuss his concerns. On December 11, 2019 he sent his concerns to the Campus Police chief.

On December 13, 2019 Taylor again attempted to enter the El Centro library, but was refused access. He recorded his interaction with faculty and police during this encounter despite the officers' attempts to restrict him from recording.

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II

“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the sufficiency of [plaintiff's] complaint by ‘accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). To survive defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, Taylor must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted).

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III

The court turns first to Taylor's state common law claims.

A

Taylor asserts that the Individual Defendants^[8] and the Institutional Defendants committed various torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, defamation, negligence, and premises liability.^[9] The Institutional Defendants maintain that they are immune from tort claims and other state-law claims. Similarly, the Individual Defendants contend that they are also entitled to governmental immunity for suits against them in their official capacities. And to the extent Taylor asserts claims against them in their individual capacities, they posit that they are protected under the Texas Tort Claims Act

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(“TTCA”). Taylor responds that defendants are not immune because “Texas Local Government Section 271.152 fully waives” governmental immunity for breach of contract and other acts of discrimination.^[9] ECF No. 39 at 15-16. Defendants reply that Taylor has not adequately responded to their arguments.

B

Because defendants assert governmental immunity, the court will construe their motions to dismiss as being made not only under Rule 12(b)(6) but also under Rule 12(b)(1). Under Texas law, governmental immunity removes a court's subject matter jurisdiction from suit. See Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003); see also Powell v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 3359620, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010) (Ramirez, J.), rec. adopted, 2010 WL 3359618 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2010) (Lindsay, J.). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the appropriate vehicle to challenge subject matter jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Accordingly, the court construes the Institutional Defendants' and the Individual Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions as Rule 12(b)(1) motions to the extent the motions assert governmental immunity. See, e.g., Nixon v. Hegar, 2021 WL 4197207, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.) (construing Rule 12(b)(6) motion as Rule 12(b)(1) motion).

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A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction can mount either a facial or factual challenge. See, e.g., Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 2013 WL 607151, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb.19, 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981)). When a party makes a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without including evidence, the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial. Id. The court assesses a facial challenge as it does a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that it “looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citations omitted).

C

Applying the Rule 12(b)(1) standard, the court now assesses whether Taylor has met his burden to establish jurisdiction. The court first considers Taylor's claims against the Institutional Defendants, which, as explained above, see supra note 3, means only Dallas College since it is the only proper party in this group of defendants.

As a junior college district, Dallas College enjoys governmental immunity from suit

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unless immunity is waived.^[10] See Tercero v. Tex. Southmost Coll. Dist., 989 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Texas governmental immunity, unlike constitutional sovereign immunity, applies to the state's political subdivisions, including junior college districts”); Williams v. Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2015 WL 13742548, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015) (Godbey, J.).^[11] The Texas legislature has partially abrogated governmental immunity via the TTCA, which provides limited waivers of immunity. See Austin v. Hood Cnty., 2007 WL 1544379, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.).^[12] But the TTCA does not abrogate immunity in any way...