Taylor v. Chater, 3:94 cv 662 AS.
| Decision Date | 09 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | 3:94 cv 662 AS. |
| Citation | 907 F. Supp. 306 |
| Parties | Karen TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Karen Taylor, Michigan City, IN, pro se.
Clifford D. Johnson, Office of the United States Attorney, South Bend, IN, for defendant.
Claimant Karen Taylor ("Ms. Taylor") appeals from a final judgment of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("the Secretary")1 awarding Child's Insurance Benefits ("CIB") to the stepchildren of a Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") recipient. Ms. Taylor challenges the Secretary's findings that the recipient's four stepchildren meet the relationship and dependency requirements of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(e), and thus are entitled to receive CIB — resulting in a reduction of the benefits paid to the recipient's natural children. The defendant, Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), moves the court to dismiss this cause for failure to join an indispensable party. This court has jurisdiction over Ms. Taylor's petition for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The claimant, the ex-wife of the wage earner/DIB recipient, became entitled to CIB on behalf of her two children (the wage earner's natural children) effective July 1990. Following the wage earner's marriage to Almarie Taylor ("Almarie") in June of 1990, Almarie filed a claim for CIB on behalf of her four children on July 30, 1991, and the Social Security Administration ("SSA") determined that the children became entitled to CIB as the wage earner's stepchildren effective June 1991. Due to the "family maximum" mandated by the Act for CIB payments, 42 U.S.C. § 403(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.403 (1995), their entitlement resulted in a reduction in the amount of CIB payable to the claimant on behalf of her two children. 20 C.F.R. § 404.404 (1995). In a letter dated October 7, 1991, the SSA notified the claimant that her children's benefit amounts would be adjusted accordingly. The claimant contested the entitlement of Almarie Taylor's children, and, on reconsideration, the SSA affirmed the entitlement of the stepchildren.
The claimant subsequently requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and a hearing was held in South Bend, Indiana, on October 5, 1992. In a decision dated November 16, 1992, ALJ Peter J. Caras, Jr., affirmed the SSA's decision, but found that the stepchildren's entitlement should have commenced in July (rather than June) of 1991. The Appeals Council denied Ms. Taylor's request to appear and present oral argument in support of her claim. In an opinion dated June 22, 1994, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision, but reinstated the original eligibility date after determining that the one-year duration-of-marriage requirement under 20 C.F.R. § 404.357 had been met effective June of 1991.
The claimant filed her pro se complaint in this court on September 6, 1994. Following an extension of time, the Secretary filed her response on December 6, 1994. In an order dated December 14, 1994, the court deemed the matter to be before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to its Local Rule 7.3 and ordered the claimant to file her brief in support thereof by January 21, 1995. On February 3, 1995, the court ordered the claimant to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The claimant responded to the show cause order by asking for a continuance, which request the court granted. On March 16, 1995, the court granted the Commissioner's motion to compel joinder of Almarie Taylor as a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After the claimant belatedly filed her brief in support of summary judgment on July 24, 1995, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party on August 11, 1995. The court is now prepared to rule on the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The claimant was married to the wage earner, Sam Taylor ("Mr. Taylor"), in May of 1974. Their marriage bore two children, Lucinda and Delisha, before it was judicially dissolved in April of 1990. On June 2, 1990, Mr. Taylor married Almarie Taylor. At the time of their marriage, Almarie had four children — Dujuan Mitchell, Deandre Mitchell, Lasheia Mitchell, and Latoya Evans — none of whom were the natural children of the wage earner. Mr. Taylor lived with Almarie Taylor and her four children from June 1990 until December 1990, and again in May of 1991. During his marriage to Almarie, Mr. Taylor did not provide his stepchildren with direct financial support, nor did he adopt them — apparently, his only financial contribution to the family was paying household bills. On December 20, 1993, after a lengthy period of separation, Mr. Taylor petitioned the Superior Court of LaPorte County to dissolve his marriage to Almarie Taylor.2
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). At all times relevant to the present action, Almarie Taylor was subject to service of process,3 and, because subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is predicated upon a federal statute, her inclusion would not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Moreover, Almarie Taylor evidenced her interest in the subject of this claim in a written statement to the ALJ, submitted in lieu of personally appearing at the administrative hearing. Thus, the defendant maintains that because the stepchildren's interests are not necessarily adequately represented by the Commissioner, and because a decision rendered in the absence of Almarie Taylor could ultimately result in the SSA being required to exceed the "family maximum" provided for by the Social Security Act, the claim must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensable party.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has concisely described the analytical process by which a court must dispose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7):
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss, we must apply Rule 19(b) if we first determine that the party to be joined satisfies the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a). Moore v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 901 F.2d 1445, 1447 (7th Cir.1990). Thus, Rule 19(a) requires joinder when the presence of the party to be joined is essential to the litigants' complete relief, or when the party to be joined must be present to protect its own or another party's interests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). If the court finds that the requirements of Rule 19(a) are satisfied, it may dismiss the action if, in weighing four additional factors specified in Rule 19(b), those factors so indicate.
Boulevard Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Philips Medical Sys. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1419, 1422-23 (7th Cir.1994) (footnote omitted); see also Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 1237, 1243 (E.D.Wis.1995).
The proponent of a Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss has the burden of producing evidence which shows the nature of the absent party's interest and that the protection of that interest will be impaired or impeded by the absence. Martin v. Local 147, Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades, AFL-CIO-CFL, 775 F.Supp. 235, 236 (N.D.Ill. 1991); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Area Pension Fund v. Safeco Ins. Co. Of America, 717 F.Supp. 572, 573 (N.D.Ill. 1989); see Sladek v. Bell Sys. Management Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 980 (7th Cir. 1989). The defendant has met her burden in the present action: the Commissioner contends that without Almarie Taylor as a party in the action, a decision adverse to the Commissioner could impair or impede the stepchildren's ability to protect their current level of CIB, since the stepchildren's interests are not necessarily adequately represented by the Commissioner.
Additionally, as previously noted, Rule 19(a) states that joinder is required if persons already parties to the action will, in the absence of the person claiming an interest, be "subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). Here, the defendant argues that a decision adverse to the Commissioner, rendered without Almarie Taylor as a party, might effectively...
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