Taylor v. City of New Orleans

• Decision Date: 01 November 1889
• Docket Number: 10,220
• Citation: 6 So. 723,41 La.Ann. 891
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: SEARING TAYLOR, EXECUTOR, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

6 So. 723

41 La.Ann. 891

SEARING TAYLOR, EXECUTOR, v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

No. 10,220

Supreme Court of Louisiana

November 1, 1889

APPEAL from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans Houston, J.

Thos J. Semmes & Legendre, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

W. B Sommerville, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellee.

OPINION

FENNER, J.

The plaintiff, as legal representative of the late Miles Taylor, brings this action for fees due the said Miles Taylor on account of professional services as attorney at law in the famous Gaines litigation.

The claim was met by various defenses amongst which was the plea of prescription of three years, which was sustained in the Court below.

Article 3538 of the Civil Code, provides that the action of attorneys "for their fees and emoluments" is prescribed by three years.

Miles Taylor died on Sept. 23d, 1873. This suit was brought in February, 1883.

The statement of these two facts necessarily throws upon plaintiff the necessity of establishing one of two things, viz: Either (1) that the prescription of three years is not applicable to his claim, or (2) that such prescription has been prevented by some valid cause of interruption or suspension.

It is claimed by the learned counsel of plaintiff that, as to a large portion of plaintiff's claim, the prescription of three years is not applicable.

The basis of this contention is, that the services referred to were rendered outside of the contract between the City and Miles Taylor, that, therefore, the obligation of the City to pay for them arose, not from contract, but from quasi-contract, and that quasi-contracts are prescriptible only by ten years.

We do not find anything in this record to indicate that, in the rendition of these services, Miles Taylor acted as a mere negotiorum gestor, without authority of the city. In absence of contrary proof, the law firmly presumes that attorneys act within the authority delegated by their clients. The City never, at any time, disputed the authority of Mr. Taylor to represent her in the litigation referred to.

The only point ever raised about the matter was that made by Mr. Taylor himself to the effect that these particular services were extra and not covered by the fixed remuneration stipulated in a particular contract, and were entitled to additional remuneration according to their value. He simply claimed on a quantum meruit for these services beyond and outside of the fixed fee stipulated in a particular contract for other services.

In presence of Mr. Taylor's assertion of authority by appearing and acting in the name of his client, and in absence of any denial thereof by the City we are bound to assume that he acted with such authority, and that the City's obligation to pay arose, not from a quasi-contract, but from an ordinary contract express or implied.

Therefore, the predicate, on which the contention rests, is not well-founded. Were it otherwise, however, the stubborn fact remains that the action is for "fees and emoluments" of an attorney, and whether the services for which they are claimed, were rendered under a contract or a quasi-contract, the action equally falls under the prescription pleaded. Authorities are quoted holding that where a negotiorum gestor pays debts due by another, his claim for remuneration does not fall under the prescription applicable to the debts themselves, because his action is not on the debts, but is the action de in rem verso, on the quasi-contract arising from his act in paying them.

In one of the cases, the court said "The plea of prescription of three years cannot prevail, because if Labuzan had no authority to borrow money, then the action is not an action for money...