Taylor v. Csx Transp.
| Citation | 418 F.Supp.2d 1284 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civ.A. 204CV960IDM. |
| Parties | Shonita L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Charles Neville Reese, Reese & Reese, Daleville, AL, for Plaintiff.
William Glassell Somerville, III, Adams & Reese/Lange Simpson LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.
DE MENT, Senior District Judge.
Before the court is Defendant CSX Transportation's ("CSXT") motion for summary judgment, filed October 10, 2005. A brief and an evidentiary submission accompany the motion. Plaintiff Shonita L. Taylor ("Ms.Taylor") submitted a memorandum in response and an evidentiary submission on November 7. Thereafter, on November 14, CSXT filed a reply.1
CSXT moves for summary judgment on Ms. Taylor's claims for sexual harassment and retaliation brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title VII"), and her state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her federal civil rights claims are premised on allegations that, during her employment with CSXT, Ms. Taylor's supervisor, Cedric Killebrew ("Mr.Killebrew"), sexually harassed her and that, thereafter, CSXT subjected her to adverse employment actions, including termination, in retaliation for complaining to management about the sexual harassment. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be entered in CSXT's favor on Ms. Taylor's federal claims under § 1981 and Title VII and that Ms. Taylor's state law claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations of both.
A court considering a motion for summary judgment must construe the evidence and make factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment is entered only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). At this juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). This determination involves applying substantive law to the substantive facts that have been developed. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, based on the applicable law in relation to the evidence developed. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, which "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment will not be entered unless the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
CSXT, based in Jacksonville, Florida, is a railroad transportation company which serves the eastern United States and Canada. It employs approximately 37,000 individuals, the majority of whom are union employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. (Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 155.) On or about April 8, 2003, Ms. Taylor began working at CSXT as an "extra board clerk" at its terminal in Montgomery, Alabama. (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 35) (Ex. C to Doc. No. 150); (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 1 (Ex. 1 to Doc. No. 155)); (Compl.¶ 8.) The extra-board clerk job is a union position governed by a collective bargaining agreement. (Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 155.) In this position, Ms. Taylor fills in when the regular clerks are on vacation, sick leave, or leave of absence. (Id.) While she does not have a set work schedule, Ms. Taylor receives a weekly "guaranteed rate of pay," even if she is not called in to work, so long as she agrees to be available at any hour during a specified seven-day period. (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 36.) Ms. Taylor's duties include performing general clerical activities and transporting train crews to and from their trains. (Id. at 44.) Ms. Taylor indicates that "normally" she works on the "night shift." (Id. at 103.)
Ms. Taylor admits that, in June and July of 2003, she began having attendance problems. (Id. at 40.) After several months, on October 16, 2003, A.B. Montgomery ("Mr.Montgomery"), the terminal manager, spoke with Ms. Taylor about her absenteeism. (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 183); (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 6.) During that meeting which occurred on a Thursday, Ms. Taylor reported for the first time that Mr. Killebrew, a manager and one of Ms. Taylor's supervisors, had been sexually harassing her since the onset of her employment with CSXT. (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 61); (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 1-2); (Ex. D to Doc. No. 150.) The same day, after receiving information from Mr. Montgomery about the harassment (Ex. D at 14 (Doc. No. 150)), Linda Hill ("Ms.Hill"), a human resource official in CSXT's headquarters in Jacksonville, Florida, called Ms. Taylor and interviewed her over the telephone. (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 61-63); (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 6); (Ex. D at 14 (Doc. No. 150).) Ms. Taylor described the acts of harassment and explained to Ms. Hill that "a lot of [her] absenteeism issues were related to the fact that [she] didn't want to come to work . . . [and] deal with the harassment." (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 62-65); (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 6); (Ex. D at 14 (Doc. No. 150).) Ms. Taylor relayed, among other incidents, that Mr. Killebrew told her that he wanted to watch her "lick" an ice cream cone, that he pointed out an isolated work site and described sexual relations he had had with other employees there, and that he suggested that he would "go easy on her or help her out on the job" in return for sexual favors. (Ex. D at 14 (Doc. No. 155)); (see also Ms. Taylor Dep. at 65-66, 102-16.)
On Monday, October 20, 2003, Kathy Arthur ("Ms.Arthur"), whose job title was "manager EEO and affirmative action," traveled to Montgomery, Alabama, to conduct interviews in relation to Ms. Taylor's complaint against Mr. Killebrew.3 (Ms. Taylor Dep. at 181); (Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 155.) She interviewed 16 individuals, including Mr. Killebrew and a female contract employee who conveyed for the first time that Mr. Killebrew had made an inappropriate sexual comment to her. (Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 155.) Ms. Arthur also reviewed time sheets which confirmed an overlap between Ms. Taylor's and Mr. Killebrew's schedules on the night shift. (Id.) After completing her investigation, Ms. Arthur determined that the harassment had taken place, as alleged by Ms. Taylor. (Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 155); (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 9.)
As a consequence of CSXT's investigative findings, Mr. Killebrew was demoted from the position of trainmaster to that of assistant trainmaster, a non-managerial position, but with no reduction in salary. (Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 155.) Concomitantly, Mr. Killebrew was stripped of all supervisory authority over Ms. Taylor. (Id.) Additionally, management prohibited Mr. Killebrew from being alone with Ms. Taylor and directed him not to ask Ms. Taylor to drive him anywhere. (Id.) Mr. Killebrew also was forbidden from using the unisex restroom when Ms. Taylor was on duty and was told to remove a sexually-suggestive screensaver from his work computer. (Id.); (see also Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 3.)
Ms. Taylor complains that she was treated adversely after she reported the harassment to Mr. Montgomery on October 16, 2003. She says that, "[w]ithin 11 days of [her] initial complaint[,] two actions were taken that prevented [her] from being able to work." (Ms. Taylor Br. at 10 (Doc. No. 155).) First, Ms. Taylor says that she was directed to furnish a medical form (an "MD-5" form) to excuse a recent absence, but that she had not been required to submit this form for a previous medical absence. (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 8); (see also clerk's journal book (Ex. 6 to Doc. No. 155).)
Second, Ms. Taylor says that she "was effectively taken out of service and prevented from working." (Ms. Taylor Aff. ¶ 8.) Angie Averitte ("Ms.Averitte"), assistant superintendent of operations of CSXT's Atlanta Division, orally directed that Ms. Taylor not be scheduled to work on Mr. Killebrew's shift. (Id. ¶ 10.) A CSXT log book, which Ms. Taylor describes as the "clerk's journal book" indicates that Mr. Montgomery complied with Ms. Averitte's directive. (Ms. Taylor Br. at 9 (Doc. No. 155).) The clerk's journal book contains a notation on "10/27" which reads as follows: "Do not call S.L. Taylor for 1st or 2nd shifts, Monday thru Fri this wk per Mr. Montgomery." (Ex. 7 to Doc. No. 155.) Following this notation is an "additional note," stating, "Do not call S.L. Taylor to work when Mr. Killebrew is working per Montgomery." (Id.)
Ms. Taylor also was not scheduled to work on the third shift with another supervisor, Doug Yow ("Mr.Yow"). Given that...
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