Taylor v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp

• Decision Date: 13 September 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 15-cv-02929-DMR
• Citation: 207 F.Supp.3d 1095
• Parties: Christopher TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

207 F.Supp.3d 1095

Christopher TAYLOR, Plaintiff,

v.FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP, Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02929-DMR

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed September 13, 2016

Erin Amanda Novak, Mark Mailman, Francis and Mailman, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, John G. Albanese, Berger & Montague, P.C., Minneapolis, MN, Matthew C. Helland, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.

Frederick Thomas Smith, Megan Hall Poonolly, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Atlanta, GA, G. Daniel Newland, Eric Michael Lloyd, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Donna M. Ryu, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Christopher Taylor filed suit alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). Plaintiff alleges that IDC Technologies, Inc. ("IDC") rescinded his job offer after reviewing a background check prepared by Defendant First Advantage Background Services Corp ("First Advantage" or "Defendant").¹ The background check mistakenly attributed another person's criminal record to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant willfully and negligently violated the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and failing to conduct the required reinvestigation of two disputed misdemeanor convictions, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).

Plaintiff and Defendant have each filed motions for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on his claim that Defendant negligently violated the FCRA's reinvestigation requirements. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s MSJ") [Docket No. 81]. Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's section 1681e(b) claim, contending that any alleged inaccuracies in its reporting of criminal convictions originated with the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, a state governmental agency, and are not attributable to Defendant's procedures. Defendant also moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims that Defendant acted willfully. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has no evidence demonstrating that it acted in reckless disregard of its FCRA duties. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication ("Def.'s MSJ") [Docket No. 83].

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The facts recounted in this section are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff Christopher Taylor is an IT professional. Plaintiff applied for a position through IDC to work for TCS/Moneygram. On February 6, 2015, IDC offered Plaintiff a six-month contract for the position. IDC's offer to Plaintiff was contingent on successful completion of a background check. IDC obtained a background check on Plaintiff from Defendant First Advantage. On February 10, 2015, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a copy of the criminal background information it was reporting to IDC. The criminal background information included four criminal convictions sustained in Hennepin County, Minnesota: two felonies for robbery and burglary, and two misdemeanors for theft and trespass.

None of these convictions are Plaintiff's.

As set forth in the court records, the four convictions belong to Dwayne Taylor, not Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Dwayne Taylor share the same birth month and day, but were born in different years and have different names. Defendant identified the four criminal convictions by searching its own national criminal file database. Defendant did not obtain the court records corresponding to the convictions, but did send a researcher to Hennepin County courthouse to search for records matching Plaintiff's name and date of birth. The researcher did not find any reportable records for Plaintiff. Defendant did not attempt to reconcile the result of the researcher's efforts with the conviction records it located through a search of its own criminal records database.

On February 11, 2015, Defendant sent IDC the report, which included the four criminal convictions. On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff contested the accuracy of the four convictions on his report by faxing Defendant a completed dispute form. Plaintiff listed the convictions by case number and stated that they did not belong to him. Upon receipt of Plaintiff's dispute, Defendant's employee entered a description of the dispute into Defendant's Consumer Dispute Management System. The employee only entered two of the disputed case numbers—those corresponding with the two reported felony convictions (Case Nos. 09319757 and 07338193)—and failed to enter the two disputed misdemeanors into the system (Case Nos. 06301128 and 07201094). On March 18, 2015, Defendant removed the two felony convictions from Plaintiff's report and sent a revised copy of the report to IDC that still included the two misdemeanor convictions.

IDC rescinded Plaintiff's conditional contract, and he was not hired for a position at TCS/Moneygram.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his complaint against IDC and First Advantage on June 24, 2015. [Docket No. 1.] On May 27, 2016, Plaintiff dismissed all claims against IDC with prejudice. [Docket No. 66.] On July 18, 2016 both Plaintiff and Defendant filed these motions for partial summary judgment. [Docket Nos. 81, 83.]

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A court shall grant summary judgment "if...there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citation omitted). A genuine factual issue exists if, taking into account the burdens of production and proof that would be required at trial, sufficient evidence favors the non-movant such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court may not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve issues of fact. See id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Because summary judgment is a "drastic device," cutting off a party's right to present its case to a jury, the moving party bears a "heavy burden" of demonstrating the absence of any triable issue of material fact. Ambat v. City & Cty. of San Francisco , 757 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir.2014).

To defeat summary judgment once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings, but must produce significant probative evidence, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, supporting the claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n , 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). In other words, there must exist more than "a scintilla of evidence" to support the non-moving party's claims, Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; conclusory assertions will not suffice. See Thornhill Publ'g Co. v.GTE Corp. , 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979). Similarly, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts" when ruling on the motion. Scott , 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769. Where there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to only a single claim or defense or as to part of a claim or defense, the district court may enter partial summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Where, as here, the parties have each filed motions for summary judgment, "[e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits." Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two , 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.2001). "In fulfilling its duty to review each cross-motion separately, the court must review the evidence submitted in support of each cross-motion." Id .

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT CLAIMS

Congress enacted the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 –1681x, to "ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy." Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr , 551 U.S. 47, 52, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007). Because consumer reporting agencies² ("CRAs") "have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit" information, the FCRA imposed a set of duties upon CRAs to insure that "consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy." Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP , 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir.2009) ; 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3)–(4).

The duties imposed on CRAs under the FCRA include the duty to ensure the accuracy of their reporting, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and the duty to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of disputed information, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.

A. Reasonable Procedures to Assure Maximum Possible Accuracy of the Information—15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)

Under section 1681e(b), CRAs have a duty to ensure the accuracy of a consumer report.³ Section 1681e(b) provides:

"Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). "Liability under § 1681e(b) is predicated on the reasonableness of the [CRA]'s procedures in obtaining credit information." Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.1995).

B. Reasonable Reinvestigation of Disputed Information—15 U.S.C. § 1681i

Section 1681i(a)(1)(A) obligates CRAs to reinvestigate disputes when...