Taylor v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:16cv491-MW/CAS |
| Parties | LEONARD WAYNE TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
After this case was removed from state court, ECF. No. 1, Defendant Corizon, LLC (Corizon), filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. ECF No. 4. Defendant Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) also filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff Leonard Wayne Taylor was advised of his obligation to file a response to the motions. See ECF Nos. 10, 12. Mr. Taylor filed responses, ECF Nos. 18 and 19, and the motions are ready for ruling.
Mr. Taylor initiated this action on September 9, 2014, in the Second Judicial Circuit Court, Leon County, Florida. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. On March 16, 2016, Mr. Taylor filed an Amended Florida Tort Claims Act Complaint, indicating the action was brought pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against various named defendants in their official and personal capacities. ECF No. 13 at 1-2; ECF No. 1-2 at 6-74. Mr. Taylor states the action is brought against the DOC, Corizon, and DOC employees, correctional officers, and contractual employees and agents of the State "for wrongful negligence and intentional acts or omissions . . . committed within the scope of employment functions and operational duties of their agency or divisional offices." ECF No. 13 at 1-2. He also states he is suing the employees in their individual capacities for misconduct committed in the scope of employment. Id. at 2. He asserts "[c]ompliance with tort claims act requirement to serve notice of intent to initiate litigation was mailed on September 9, 2014, to the Defendants" and the Florida Department of Financial Services. Id.
Mr. Taylor's amended complaint presents a multitude of claims:
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to painful, swollen and infected right big toe injury; prevented access to sick call treatment in a reasonable time; impeded access to prescribed Glaucoma Medicine for five (5) months; denied 1st and 14th Amendment right of access to file papers to the courts; retaliatory punishment and harassment for freedom of speech and expression of filing grievance complaints and lawsuits[;] 4th amendment wrongful destruction of personal property[;] 5th and 14th amendment racial and religious discrimination.
Id. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000 from both DOC and Corizon. Id. He also seeks monetary damages in the amount of $10,000 against each employee sued in his or her individual capacity. Id. The amended complaint raises eighteen (18) separate claims against thirty-five Defendants, spanning three different Correctional Institutions over an approximate three year period of time (February 2012 through March 2016). Id. at 3-68.
Corizon argues that Mr. Taylor did not properly plead civil rights claims and that the state law medical negligence claims are insufficient because Mr. Taylor did not comply with presuit requirements for a medical malpractice claim. Id. Additionally, Corizon argues that Mr. Taylor's amended complaint does not comply with the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of the claim. Id. at 3-4. Corizon asserts it is "barely mentioned" in the complaint and "there is no wrongdoing associated with the corporation." Id. at 4.
Moreover, Corizon points out that because it is a corporation, liability attaches only "if an official unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights." Id. Corizon explains that "[w]hile a corporation may be liable for deliberate indifference regarding medical care, claims of negligence are never enough to satisfy pleading requirements, as 'should haves' are not grist for constitutional litigation." Id. at 5. Furthermore, Corizon argues that the amended complaint "does not identify a serious medical need" as an ingrown toenail does not suffice. Id. at 6. Corizon also asserts that "to the extent [Mr.] Taylor seeks to base Corizon's liability on unidentified employees, that claim is clearly barred." Id.
Mr. Taylor opposes Corizon's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 18. He argues his toenail condition was a serious medical need that significantly affected his daily activities and claims Corizon's medical personnel treated him with deliberate indifference. Id. at 8-9. Mr. Taylor points out that DOC contracted with Corizon to provide medical care at its facilities, and asserts that Corizon provided deficient medical care, ultimately leading to sanctions against Corizon by DOC, and Corizon's termination of its contract to provide health care to Florida prisoners." Id. at 10-11.
DOC notes that Mr. Taylor's "main claims stem from an incident which allegedly occurred on July 23, 2013," when Mr. Taylor stubbed his toe. ECF No. 11 at 3. DOC argues that Mr. Taylor's claim against the Department is barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations for prisoner claims that deal with "conditions of confinement." Id. (). DOC notes, however, "the 11th Circuit's current reluctance to apply the one-year statute of limitations based on ambiguity that exists due to no clear-cut decision within the state of Florida." ECF No. 11 at 3-4; see, e.g., Ealy v. GEO Group, Inc., --- F. App'x ---, 2016 WL 3553141 (11th Cir. 2016). DOC further argues it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent it is sued in its official capacity for damages, ECF No. 11 at 4-5, and is also entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 5-6. Finally, DOC argues that the Department cannot be held liable for the actions or omissions of its employees or agents and that the amended complaint otherwise fails to state a claim. Id. at 6-10.
Mr. Taylor generally opposes DOC's motion to dismiss, with the exception of several claims which he concedes are barred by the statute of limitations. ECF No. 19 at 3-4. Mr. Taylor argues that by consenting to removal from state court, the DOC waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 4. He also contends that DOC's policies and practices caused the violation of his rights. Id. at 6-8.
The issue on whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is whether the plaintiff has alleged enough plausible facts to support the claim stated. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (retiring the standard from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).1 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 at 556); see also Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010). "The plausibility standard" is not the same as a "probability requirement," and "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 at 556). A complaint that "pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability," falls "short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 at 557).
The pleading standard is not heightened, but flexible, in line with Rule 8's command to simply give fair notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (). Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by an attorney. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Nevertheless, a complaint must provide sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that a "largely groundless claim" does not proceed through discovery and "take up the time of a number of other people . . . ." Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005) (quoted in Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1966). The requirements of Rule 8 do "not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, but Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation." 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Courts should take a "two-pronged approach" when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. The first consideration is whether the complaint presents "well-pleaded factual allegations" which are entitled to a presumption of truth or, whether, the...
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