Taylor v. General Accident Assur. Corp., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 14 March 1904 |
| Docket Number | 12 |
| Citation | 208 Pa. 439,57 A. 830 |
| Parties | Taylor v. General Accident Assurance Corporation, Limited, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 29, 1904
Appeal, No. 12, Jan. T., 1904, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Berks Co., June T., 1903, No. 24, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Sarah J. Taylor v. General Accident Assurance Corporation, Limited, of Perth, Scotland. Affirmed.
Assumpsit upon a policy of accident insurance.
Verdict for plaintiff for $5,211.80, subject to question of law reserved. On a rule for judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, ENDLICH, J., filed the following opinion:
The policy embodying the contract by whose terms the rights and liabilities of the parties are fixed, provides for the payment of $5,000 to the widow of the insured upon his death "from injuries which are the direct and proximate result of, and caused solely and exclusively by external, violent and accidental means," and not "directly or indirectly . . . from disease in any form either as cause or effect." The plaintiff, asserting a liability upon defendant to pay the indemnity, assumed the burden of proving every element needful to establish it. Necessarily, this involved a showing not only that the deceased fell and died from the effects of the fall, but also that his fall was accidental and not the result of disease in any form. There can be here no doubt as to the fact of the fall or of its fatal consequences; but as to the cause of it (which becomes the material inquiry) there is, as laid down in Keefer v Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 448, at p. 455 "no presumption as between disease and accidental cause, within the terms of the policy." Has then the plaintiff, in her testimony, shown that from which the jury might lawfully find that the fall was accidental?
It must be observed, at the outset, that there is no evidence to show just how the fall occurred -- whether by tripping, by slipping, by a misstep or sudden turn causing decedent to lose his balance, or by any other specific kind of accident. From a distance of about 150 or 250 feet, on a moonlight night, the deceased was seen mounting the four sandstone steps (a rubber mat lying upon the top one) at the entrance to his office and to fall. Immediately afterwards he was found lying at the bottom of the steps on his left side, his feet towards the steps, his head on the ground, his left arm broken and the left side of his face and head cut and bruised. His office keys were subsequently discovered on the office doorstep. He was not then unconscious, but in answer to a question put to him intimated that he did not know how he came to fall. Assisted by the person who saw him fall and helped him up, he walked to his house, a distance of about 375 feet, and expressing a desire to rest sat down on the porch. There he fainted, whereupon he was carried into the house. When medical aid arrived, within about two hours after the fall, he was "suffering from shock almost to the verge of collapse," and shortly taken with a violent hemorrhage. This hemorrhage, and those occurring subsequently, were due to the rupture of blood vessels in the stomach resulting from the fall, and death ensued within four days from these hemorrhages, together with inflammation of the brain consequent upon concussion sustained in the fall. The medical gentlemen who attended the decedent during the last days of his life, and who were acquainted with him and had previously ministered to him professionally for insignificant ailments, unite in testifying that there was nothing in his condition indicating that he was afflicted with any disorder that might have contributed to the fall or to his death.
Whilst in this respect, there is a clear distinction between the present case and Keefer v. Ins. Co., supra, where the "medical testimony was strongly in support of the theory that death resulted from uraemic poison," (p. 455) -- it may be that even this distinguishing feature, standing alone, would not be sufficient to meet the burden of proof imposed upon the plaintiff. It may be that, in order to establish the purely accidental character of the fall, the negative showing that, in his condition some hours later as observed by the physicians acquainted to the extent they were with his previous history, there was nothing apparent to which they could ascribe it, does not answer the requirement of affirmative proof of accident. On the other hand, it surely cannot be successfully contended that nothing will answer that requirement save direct proof of the precise means by which the fall was brought about. If that were the rule, no accident could ever be inferentially established, and no accident resulting in immediate death or loss of consciousness could ever become a ground of recovery under a policy like this, unless it happened in the presence of witnesses and in such manner as to impress upon them its exact details. On the contrary, it must be true that the accidental character of a fall may be proved by circumstances -- just as any other fact may be so proven; the test of the sufficiency of the circumstances adduced always being that, viewed as a whole, they reasonably exclude by their preponderating probative weight any other explanation founded in the evidence. See Phila. Trust, etc., Co. v. Phila., etc., R.R. Co., 160 Pa. 590, 594, and Wills, Circ. Evid. pp. 189-190. Nor can it be indispensable that they establish a...
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