Taylor v. Giant Food, Inc., Civil Action No. DKC 2006-0156.

Citation438 F.Supp.2d 576
Decision Date12 July 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. DKC 2006-0156.
PartiesJulia M. TAYLOR v. GIANT FOOD INC., et al.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)

Joann P. Myles, Law Office of Joann P. Myles, Largo, MD, for Plaintiff.

Connie N. Bertram, Winston and Strawn LLP, Marilyn L. Baker, Money Green Baker and Saindon PC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending in this case are the motions of (1) Plaintiff Julia M. Taylor to remand to state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (paper 20); (2) Defendants Teamsters Local Union No. 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters' ("Union"), and Michael David to dismiss (paper 8); (3) Defendant Giant Food, Inc. ("Giant") for partial dismissal (paper 9); and (4) Giant for leave to file an exhibit under seal (paper 11).1 The issues are briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the court finds that removal was proper, but will grant the motions of the Union and Mr. David to dismiss. The remaining claims will be remanded.2

I. Background

This is the second time this case is before the court. On February 27, 2004, Plaintiff filed an action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, alleging wrongful and abusive discharge by her employer, Giant, a large grocery chain. Giant removed the action to this court, asserting federal pre-emption based on § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).3 Plaintiff moved to remand, contending that no claim was subject to § 301 pre-emption. Plaintiff then amended her complaint, this time alleging employment discrimination based on race and sex, retaliatory discharge, and misrepresentation and deceit. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On September 13, 2004, this court issued an Order holding in abeyance Plaintiff's motion to remand and Giant's motion to dismiss. The court found that Plaintiff's claims of discrimination and retaliation were not pre-empted, but that Plaintiffs claim of misrepresentation was too vague. Accordingly, the court directed Plaintiff to file a more definite statement within fifteen days.

In response to the court's September 13, 2004, Order, Plaintiff filed a document labeled "Plaintiff's More Definite Statement," but which was actually a full-length second amended complaint, despite Plaintiff not having moved for leave to amend. The court found Plaintiff's pleading to be nonresponsive to the Order, and that the misrepresentation claim remained "unworkably ambiguous."4 Thus, on October 22, 2004, the court issued an Order dismissing the misrepresentation claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). The court directed Plaintiff that if she wished to amend her complaint for a second time, she must move for leave to amend within ten days. The court stated that if Plaintiff did not move to amend within ten days, then, because the court earlier had found that the remaining claims should be remanded, the case would be remanded at that time. Plaintiff did not seek leave to amend and the court remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on November 8, 2004.

The case proceeded in state court and was scheduled to go to trial in February 2006. On December 30, 2005, Plaintiff amended her complaint in state court to assert claims against the Union and Mr. David, the union steward, and to assert a breach of contract claim against Giant. On January 19, 2006, the Union and Mr. David filed a notice of removal in this court.5 (Paper 1). The Union and Mr. David assert that Plaintiffs claims "implicate the Union's duty of fair representation and therefore raise a federal question." Thus, the parties contend that the case may be properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).6 On January 26, 2006, the Union and Mr. David filed a motion to dismiss, (paper 8), and Giant filed a partial motion to dismiss (paper 9) and a motion to file an exhibit under seal (paper 11). Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case on February 21, 2006. (Paper 20). Moreover, on February 28, 2006; Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the court's decision on the dismissal motions and Giant's motion to file an exhibit under seal until the court rules on Plaintiff's remand motion. (Paper 22).

II. Motion to Remand
A. Standard of Review

It is well-settled that the removing party bears the burden of proving proper removal. Greer v. Crown Title Corp., 216 F.Supp.2d 519 (D.Md.2002) (citing Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994)). On a motion to remand, the court must "strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court," indicative of the reluctance of federal courts "to interfere with matters properly before a state court." Richardson v. Phillip Morris Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700, 701-02 (D.Md.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151.

Remand is required in some instances and optional in others. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Additionally, even if the court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, the court nevertheless has discretion to remand a case to state court if, among other things, "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Remand is favored in cases turning primarily on questions of state law, because "[n]eedless decisions of state law [by federal courts] should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Thus, in a case where federal claims are eliminated before trial, "the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).

B. Analysis

In her motion to remand, Plaintiff asserts that removal was improper because she did not plead a federal claim and none of her claims are pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA.7 If, as Plaintiff contends, none of the claims in the second amended complaint are pre-empted, then removal was improper and the court will remand the case to state court. On the other hand, to the extent that any of Plaintiff's claims in the second amended complaint are preempted, the court will possess federal question subject matter jurisdiction over that claim, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the others. In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff added breach of contract claims against Giant, the Union, and Mr. David. All parties acknowledge that if federal subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case, it is rooted solely in federal pre-emption with regard to the "breach of contract claim" against the Union and Mr. David.8

1. Pre-emption Doctrines

Defendants maintain that removal is proper because, although Plaintiff labels her claim against the Union and Mr. David as "breach of contract" and "breach of contract (breach of fiduciary duty)," the claim is in actuality a claim of fair representation which is governed by federal labor law. To determine whether removal is proper based on federal pre-emption, it is necessary to distinguish between the doctrines of ordinary conflict pre-emption and complete pre-emption. Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 370-71 (4th Cir.2003). Under the doctrine of conflict pre-emption, state laws that conflict with federal laws are pre-empted, and pre-emption is asserted as a federal defense to the plaintiff's state court law suit. Id. Because conflict preemption is a "defense," it does not generally appear on the face of a plaintiff's complaint, and thus is not the proper basis for removal to federal court. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542," 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987); Sonoco, 338 F.3d at 371.

Conversely, with complete pre-emption, there is a proper basis for removal:

In the case of complete preemption, however, Congress "so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55. That is to say, the doctrine of complete preemption "converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim." Id. at 65, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55. Thus, the doctrine of complete preemption serves as a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule: because the state claims in the complaint are converted into federal claims, the federal claims appear on the face of the complaint. Id. at 63-65, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55.

Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir.2002).

2. Pre-emption and the LMRA

Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides, in pertinent part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

It is settled law that any claims that require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") are completely pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA. Thus, regardless of how a plaintiff may label her claim, it is construed as a claim brought pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA and is properly removed. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 559-60, 88 S.Ct....

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