Taylor v. Gilmore
| Decision Date | 21 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1148,91-1148 |
| Citation | 954 F.2d 441 |
| Parties | Kevin TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jerry D. GILMORE, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Robert Agostinelli, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, Ill., Timothy P. O'Neill, argued, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.
Douglas K. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Atty. Gen., Criminal Appeals Div., Springfield, Ill., argued, for respondent-appellee.
Before POSNER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
Kevin Taylor admitted that he stabbed his ex-wife's live-in lover to death, but maintained that his crime was manslaughter. An Illinois jury disagreed--maybe--and declared him a murderer. In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Taylor argues that his conviction was invalid because the instructions given the jury were defective, precluding it from returning a voluntary manslaughter verdict when one may have been appropriate.
Taylor's appraisal of the jury instructions in his case is well taken. The Illinois Supreme Court held in People v. Reddick, 123 Ill.2d 184, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141 (1988), that nearly identical instructions offended Illinois statutory law, and this Court found in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.1990), that they ran afoul of the federal due process clause. Illinois prudently concedes that the instructions given Taylor's jury were defective, and challenges the vitality of neither Reddick nor Falconer. It contends, however, that the retroactivity principles of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), deprive Taylor of the benefit of Falconer and Reddick because both cases announced "new rules" after his conviction became final and neither case falls within either of the two exceptions carved in Teague. The district court agreed and denied his petition for habeas corpus. 770 F.Supp. 445 (C.D.Ill.1990). Because we find that Falconer is not a "new rule," and therefore that Taylor is entitled to its retroactive application, we reverse and grant the writ.
Prior to the killing a tense relationship had developed between Taylor and Scott Siniscalchi, the new romantic interest and housemate of his ex-wife Joyce. Katie Taylor, the young daughter of Joyce and Kevin, lived with Joyce and Siniscalchi, and the two men argued on occasion when Siniscalchi would bring Katie to Taylor's trailer home for parental visits. Taylor also claimed that Siniscalchi ridiculed and antagonized him when both men were working at a fair.
The bad blood reached a boiling point on September 14, 1985. At approximately 1 a.m., Taylor called Joyce--not an uncommon occurrence, as she often worked late hours--to arrange for visitation plans with Katie the following morning. The two spoke for a few moments, agreed that Taylor would pick Katie up at Joyce's home, and hung up. Taylor then realized that he had other plans that morning, and called Joyce back to make alternate arrangements. Siniscalchi answered the phone and refused to let Taylor speak with Joyce; he claimed that she was tired and needed sleep. Taylor then asked Siniscalchi if he would bring Katie to meet Taylor at the municipal pool that morning. Siniscalchi refused, and (according to Taylor) said that he wasn't going to bring Katie anywhere to see Taylor. Finally, Taylor offered to pick Katie up at that moment, to which Siniscalchi replied (again, according to Taylor), "Well, suit yourself, but you're not going to get her." XIII Tr. at 70.
Agitated that Siniscalchi was trying to keep him from his daughter, Taylor quickly drove to Joyce's apartment building. Before leaving his car, Taylor grabbed a sheathed hunting knife and stuck it in the side of his sweatpants. Taylor testified that he heard Katie crying when he approached the door of Joyce's apartment. He beat on the door, and when nobody answered he kicked it open. Taylor then searched for Katie and found her sitting on the floor in the master bedroom, where Joyce and Siniscalchi were sitting up in bed. Taylor testified that, when he reached to pick up Katie, Siniscalchi "started to roll out of bed and looked like he was reaching for something." Id. at 76. A fracas ensued between the three adults, and Taylor was thrown into a wall. While Siniscalchi was pulling his hair and shirt, Taylor grabbed the knife and stabbed Siniscalchi, who screamed, "[t]he knife is in me Joyce, the knife is in me." XII Tr. at 42. Siniscalchi died from his wounds, and Taylor was subsequently arrested.
At the time of Taylor's trial, Illinois homicide law provided that murder had two elements. First, the defendant must have performed the acts that caused the death of the victim; second, in performing those acts, the defendant must have intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim, must have known that the acts would cause great bodily harm or death, must have known that the acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, or must have been committing a forcible felony (in Taylor's case, home invasion). Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, p 9-1 (1985). Voluntary manslaughter had three elements. The first two were, for all relevant purposes, the same as both elements of murder. The third was a mitigating mental state; the defendant must have acted either under a sudden and intense passion arising from a serious provocation, or under an unreasonable (but honest) belief that deadly force was justified to prevent his imminent death or great bodily harm. Id. p 9-2. In essence, the third element worked as a partial affirmative defense to a charge of murder--partial in that a successful defense effected a murder acquittal but a manslaughter conviction. 1
At trial Taylor did not deny that he committed the homicide (although he was less forthright with the police following his arrest). He instead maintained that he acted under a sudden and intense passion provoked by Siniscalchi and hence was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. At the close of the evidence, the judge tendered to the jury the Illinois pattern murder instructions followed by the pattern voluntary manslaughter instructions. The manslaughter instructions placed upon Taylor the burden of proving that he possessed a mitigating mental state. In addition, the instructions did not direct the jury to consider Taylor's manslaughter defenses in the event it found both elements of murder. The jury returned a murder verdict, and the judge sentenced him to 35 years of imprisonment. (Taylor's conviction and concurrent 6-year sentence for home invasion is not at issue here.)
On direct appeal, Taylor challenged his conviction on the ground, among others, that the jury instructions improperly assigned him the burden of proof on the mitigation issue. The trial judge, he argued, should have required the prosecution to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his "sudden and intense passion" defense. The Illinois appellate court did not reach the merits of this claim, holding that Taylor had waived it by not raising it at trial. People v. Taylor, 151 Ill.App.3d 1167, 113 Ill.Dec. 681, 515 N.E.2d 490 (4th Dist.1987) (unpublished order). The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal on June 4, 1987. Since Taylor did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, his conviction became final on that date. 2
Taylor then sought post-conviction relief in the Illinois courts. The trial court dismissed his petition. Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court in Reddick, 122 Ill.Dec. at 5-6, 526 N.E.2d at 145-46, invalidated jury instructions similar for all relevant purposes to those given at Taylor's trial; the Court held (endorsing the argument Taylor made on direct appeal) that, under Illinois law, the state bears the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt issues that would mitigate a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter. With Reddick in hand, Taylor appealed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The Illinois appellate court nonetheless affirmed, explaining that Reddick did not correct "constitutional error," the only grounds available to support state post-conviction relief when a defendant had waived a claim at trial. People v. Taylor, 181 Ill.App.3d 538, 130 Ill.Dec. 101, 536 N.E.2d 1312 (4th Dist.1989) (unpublished order). The Illinois Supreme Court again denied his petition for leave to appeal.
His state remedies exhausted, Taylor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Eleven days later, we held in Falconer v. Lane, supra, that the jury instructions invalidated on state law grounds in Reddick also transgressed the federal due process clause. The district court in this case agreed that Taylor's jury instructions were invalid under both Reddick and Falconer. 770 F.Supp. at 446. However, it held that both cases, decided after Taylor's conviction became final, announced new rules that did not fall within either of the two exceptions carved by Teague and its progeny. Id. at 448. Since Teague deprives habeas petitioners of the retroactive benefit of new rules not falling within either exception, see Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487-88, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1259-60, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the court denied Taylor's petition. This appeal followed.
The district court rested its decision upon an interpretation of law, not a determination of fact. Our review is therefore de novo. Because the process of distinguishing new rules from old under Teague is complicated and of somewhat novel application in this circuit, 3 we survey the terrain to structure our inquiry into whether Reddick and Falconer indeed announced new rules, or whether both simply applied established rules in a different factual context.
In Teague, the Supreme Court defined a "new rule" as one that "breaks new ground," "imposes a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stone v. City and County of San Francisco
...federalism will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring" further state proceedings); see also Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.1992) (applying sua sponte rule that federal courts will not correct errors of state criminal law in collateral proceedings), pe......
-
Cuevas v. Washington
...vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2954, 125 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993), on remand, 5 F.3d 1021 (1993); Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 450 (7th Cir.1992), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993), on remand, 4 F.3d 997 (1993) (Table); United Stat......
-
Daugherty v. Welborn
...on September 17, 1992. The Court now RESERVES RULING on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, pending resolution of Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.1992), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 52, 121 L.Ed.2d 22 (1992) in the United States Supreme PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January......
-
Thomas v. Peters
...a jury to convict for murder "without considering evidence that would warrant mitigation to voluntary manslaughter." Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 452-53 (7th Cir.1992). In sum, these decisions essentially characterized the error as possibly depriving defendants of the benefit of the aff......