Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 23 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1413,CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1414 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | AARON TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. HARRISBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. JUNE TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. HARRISBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
(Judge Rambo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
Albert Einstein once said that doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is the highest form of human folly. These two pro se, informa pauperis lawsuits, which were filed on July 21, 2015, call to mind the wisdom of Einstein's observation.
These lawsuits are virtually identical to a prior lawsuit filed by Aaron Taylor on March 18, 2015. Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Department, et al., 1:15-CV-543. Like the instant lawsuits, Taylor's initial complaint was a spare, two-page pleading. In it, Taylor alleged that a Harrisburg Police Officer conducted an illegal search of Mr. Taylor in February of 2015. Moreover, like the current lawsuits, Taylor's initial civil complaint named a police officer and Harrisburg Police Department as defendants, but contained no well-pleaded factual averments regarding the defendants beyond the talismanic assertion that a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment in some undefined way by conducting a search in some unexplained manner.
Upon a screening review of Taylor's initial complaint in Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Department, et al., 1:15-CV-543, we recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to the institutional defendant. The complaint was then served upon the police officer named therein, Officer Carriere, who moved to dismiss the complaint. In this motion to dismiss the defendant referred us to undisputed court dockets which, on their face, seemed to wholly undermine Taylor's claims. These dockets reflected that the February 13, 2015, search of Taylor was conducted incident to Taylor's arrest on another warrant, and resulted in the seizure of marijuana from Taylor. These courtrecords further revealed that the drug charge brought against Taylor as a result of this search incident to his arrest on other charges also remained pending in the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County. Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Department, et al., 1:15-CV-543.
Taylor never responded to this motion to dismiss filed in Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Department, et al., 1:15-CV-543. Accordingly, concerned about whether Taylor intended to pursue this lawsuit given his complete inaction, we directed Taylor to respond to the motion stating, "With respect to this outstanding motion, the plaintiff shall file a response to the motions in accordance with Local Rule 7.6 on or before June 25, 2015." We also warned Taylor in clear and precise terms of the consequences which could flow from a failure to respond telling him that:
Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions, and provides that: Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief. Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added). It is now well-settled that Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug.26, 2010). Therefore, a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motion being deemed unopposed and granted.
(Doc. 15.)
This deadline then passed without any action by the plaintiff to litigate this matter, respond to this motion, or comply with the Court's order directing a response. In the face of this continuing refusal to litigate this matter, respond to this motion, or obey this Court order, we concluded that Taylor had abandoned this lawsuit and recommended that Taylor's case be dismissed. That recommendation in Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Department, et al., 1:15-CV-543 remains pending before the district judge assigned to that case, Judge Jones.
Rather than litigate this claim where it was first filed, Taylor has now apparently opted to engage in something equivalent to a legal mulligan,1 by filing two nearly identical complaints, one in his name and a second in the name of June Taylor, a person who is otherwise unidentified. Both of these complaints allege the same nucleus of operative facts which Taylor presented in his initial, but apparentlyabandoned, lawsuit that is pending before Judge Jones. Both cases name a legally inappropriate defendant, the Harrisburg Police Department. Moreover these two latest lawsuits involve identical and largely unarticulated legal claims of an unlawful search of Taylor in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, both lawsuits run afoul of the same legal obstacles which we previously outlined to Taylor in his initial lawsuit in Taylor v. Harrisburg Police Department, et al., 1:15-CV-543, and none of these legal flaws have been addressed in any meaningful way by the plaintiffs in this latest set of complaints.
Along with these two complaints, Aaron and June Taylor have filed motions seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis in these two cases, but as part of our legally-mandated screening review we find that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, we recommend that the Court dismiss these cases.
This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis in cases which seek redress against government officials. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, when reviewing in forma pauperis complaints, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) specifically enjoins us to "dismiss the complaint at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal —U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the...
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