Taylor v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 29 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1039,87-1039
• Citation: 835 F.2d 1037
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,815 TAYLOR, Catherine D., Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 1037

835 F.2d 1037

20 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 139, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,815

TAYLOR, Catherine D., Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services.

No. 87-1039.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued July 14, 1987.

Decided Dec. 23, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1988.

As Amended Feb. 29, 1988.

Alba E. Martinez (argued), David L. Hill, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Dorothea Lundelius (argued), Asst. Regional Counsel, DHHS/OGC/Region III, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BECKER and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns the denial of appellant's motion for fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment ("EAJA"), Pub.L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183, codified at 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504 (Supp. IV 1986) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The district court first rejected the government's position and granted appellant's request for disability benefits. Another trial judge later summarily denied appellant's EAJA fee motion in a one-page order. Taylor v. Bowen, No. 85-5601 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 29, 1986). This second district court found that the "defense of this action" by appellee the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("the Secretary") "was substantially justified." Id. We conclude that the district court's judgment on the EAJA fee motion was legally erroneous. Because the government has failed to demonstrate a solid and well-founded basis in truth for its underlying denial of appellant's request for disability benefits, we will reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this matter for a calculation of appellant's fees and other expenses under EAJA.

I.

In her request for Social Security disability benefits, appellant Catherine D. Taylor alleged that she was disabled by incessant lower back pain. Uncontradicted record evidence demonstrates that Taylor's condition leaves her unable to perform even menial household tasks. The record also shows that Taylor's formal education ceased at age sixteen when she completed the sixth grade, and that her most recent employment was in 1971, when she worked as a waitress.

Two treating physicians and one consulting physician examined Taylor and submitted the medical evidence contained in the administrative record. Dr. William Cassidy treated her as an outpatient and was her treating physician during three hospital visits. On July 14, 1983, Taylor was admitted to Philadelphia's Northeastern Hospital by Dr. Cassidy. She complained of severe lower back pain. An x-ray of the lumbosacral spine revealed bilateral spondylolysis of L5. ¹ It also revealed a slight narrowing of the L4, L5 disc space. Taylor was placed in traction and given physical therapy and medication. After nine days of hospitalization, she was discharged; Dr. Cassidy reported that Taylor's condition at that time was "much improved." Appendix ("App.") at 104. On January 3, 1984, however, Taylor was readmitted to Northeastern Hospital by Dr. Cassidy; she was then diagnosed as suffering from "severe low back pain [that] did not respond to outpatient treatment and rest at home." Id. at 95. Dr. Cassidy's examination revealed "extreme tenderness over the lumbosacral joint." Id. After receiving treatment similar to that she had received during her first hospitalization, Taylor this time was released from the hospital after seven days. On August 15, 1984, she was admitted to Northeastern Hospital for the third time. An examination showed "tenderness ... present over the spine of L5 and S1." Id. at 120. A CAT scan revealed that Taylor had "a herniated disc at the L4-5 level." Id. Following the CAT scan, however, she "progressed very well" and was discharged ten days later. Id. In a September 26, 1984, report submitted to Pennsylvania's Bureau of Disability Determination, ² Dr. Cassidy indicated that any bending caused Taylor to experience pain that was relieved only by bed rest and medication. Id. at 124.

On July 16, 1984, Dr. Richard Paolino, also a treating physician, examined Taylor and diagnosed her condition as a "lumbar strain and sprain, lumbar myofascitis." ³ App. at 115. In his report to the Bureau of Disability Determination, Dr. Paolino noted that, at the time he examined Taylor, she was "unable to walk, stand, [or] sit for long periods of time without experiencing some type of stiffness or pain. [Taylor is] restricted in reaching for objects on shelf." Id. Dr. Paolino also noted that Taylor had a "marked impairment of movement to any degree of lateral bending and forward flexion or extension." Id.

The third physician, Dr. Nicholas Frignito, conducted a consultative examination of Taylor on April 16, 1985. He concluded that, due to lower back pain, "there is no doubt that [Taylor] is limited in the amount of walking she can do, or the amount of lifting and bending she can do." App. at 131. Dr. Frignito's diagnosis was "Herniated Nucleus Pulposus at L4 and 5 ... with chronic lumbar pain." Id.

On July 12, 1984, Taylor applied for Supplementary Security Income based on disability. Her application was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. Taylor requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and a hearing was held on April 9, 1985. App. at 23-26. At this hearing, which lasted a total of eight minutes, Taylor testified that she continuously suffers from lower back pain and that she takes large amounts of medication to alleviate her pain. Id. at 28-30. She stated that she can walk no farther than one block and that she can sit for no more than an hour at a time. Id. at 30.

The ALJ acknowledged at the hearing that Taylor has a problem with her back that "seems to be getting worse." App. at 32. Nonetheless, on June 11, 1985, the ALJ denied Taylor's request for disability benefits. App. at 9-15. Her request for review was subsequently denied by the Appeals Council. App. at 4. The decision of the ALJ thus stood as the final decision of the Secretary. Id.

Taylor appealed to the district court for review of the Secretary's final determination. Both Taylor and the Secretary filed motions for summary judgment. On May 14, 1986, the district court, adopting a magistrate's report, granted Taylor's summary judgment motion. Taylor v. Bowen, No. 85-5601 (E.D.Pa. May 14, 1986). The government did not appeal from this judgment for Taylor. Approximately two months later, the trial judge died. Taylor's case was then reassigned to another member of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Before this second trial judge, Taylor filed a motion for attorney's fees under EAJA. The district court denied this motion without opinion. Taylor, No. 85-5601 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 29, 1986).

Our appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's final order is conferred by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982), and our standard of review is plenary. ⁴ E.g. Russell v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-251, filed Aug. 13, 1987); accord Pullen v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir.1987).

II.

EAJA entitles a prevailing party to receive reasonable fees and costs incurred in any non-tort civil action against the United States "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985). We note that Taylor became a "prevailing party" when the district court held that she was entitled to disability benefits. See Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 747 F.2d 878, 883 (3d Cir.1984) ("it is the receipt of ... benefits that renders a typical Social Security plaintiff a prevailing party"). We also note that the Secretary does not argue that there are "special circumstances" that would render an EAJA fee award in this case unjust. See generally Taylor v. United States, 815 F.2d 249, 252-54 (3d Cir.1987) ("Taylor II ") (applying EAJA's special circumstances exception); Brinker v. Guiffrida, 798 F.2d 661, 667-68 (3d Cir.1986) (rejecting government's claim to fall within this EAJA exception). This appeal thus raises a single question: whether the government's positions in this Social Security disability case, which were rejected by the district court, were nonetheless "substantially justified."

This question is not new to this Court. "[O]n numerous prior occasions," Edge v. Schweiker, 814 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir.1987) ("Edge II "), we have devoted much attention to the task of interpreting the EAJA statutory phrase, "substantially justified." Notwithstanding such attention, however, erroneous district court judgments continue to necessitate the bringing of EAJA appeals, such as this one, to this Court. Accordingly, before we examine the facts before us, we will review the "settled law" detailed in our previous EAJA decisions. Id.

A.

Although EAJA identifies a singular entity--"the position of the United States"--as the focus of a court's inquiry under this statutory exception, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985), it also makes clear that "the required [inquiry is] two-pronged." Lee v. Johnson, 801 F.2d 115, 116 (3d Cir.1986) (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing in banc). EAJA defines " 'position of the United States' [as] ... the position taken by the United States in the civil action [and] the action or failure to act upon which the civil action is based...." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(D) (Supp. III 1985). Accordingly, our decisions "have consistently defined 'position of the United States' as 'not only the litigation position ... but also the agency position [that] made the lawsuit necessary.' " ⁵ Lee, 801 F.2d at 116 (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing in banc ) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States...