Taylor v. Howes

Decision Date30 August 2013
Docket NumberCASE NO. 11-12668
PartiesDAVID TAYLOR, II, Petitioner, v. CAROL HOWES, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD

OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,

BUT GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner David Taylor, II, has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his state convictions for felon in possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f, assault with a dangerous weapon, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. He alleges that evidence of his prior "bad acts" deprived him of a fair trial, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the "bad acts" evidence, and that the trial court violated his right to due process by requiring a defense witness to appear in shackles at his trial. Respondent Carol Howes urges the Court to deny the habeas petition for lack of merit. The Court agrees that Petitioner's claims do not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Therefore, the petition is denied. A procedural history and analysis follow.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged in St. Joseph County, Michigan with felon in possession ofa firearm, assault with a dangerous weapon, obstruction of justice, and felony firearm. The charges arose from

an altercation that occurred between [Petitioner] and his live-in girlfriend, Trisha, on August 8, 2008. On that date, the two were in the process of moving out of the home they shared when they began arguing. [Petitioner's] cousin, Josh, was also present at the home. The argument escalated to the point where [Petitioner] allegedly hit Trisha. The two were still arguing inside the home when, according to Trisha, [Petitioner] pointed a gun at her and told her he was going to kill her. [Petitioner's] sister arrived after the couple moved their argument outside and testified that she heard [Petitioner], once again, threaten to kill Trisha, though [Petitioner] did not have a weapon in his hands at the time this second threat was allegedly made. Josh testified that he was present during the entire incident and that there was no weapon involved at any time, nor did he hear [Petitioner] threaten to kill Trisha.

People v. Taylor, No. 291949 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2010) (unpublished).

On March 4, 2009, the jury acquitted Petitioner of obstruction of justice, but found him guilty, as charged, of felon in possession of a firearm, assault with a dangerous weapon, and felony firearm. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 366 days to five years in prison for the felon-in-possession conviction and 366 days to four years in prison for the assault conviction. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a consecutive term of two years in prison for the felony firearm conviction.

Petitioner raised his habeas claims in an appeal of right, but the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. The Court of Appeals stated that there was no error in the admission of "other acts" testimony and that Petitioner's right to due process was not violated by the shackling of a defense witness. See id. On March 8, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was not persuaded to review the issues. See People v. Taylor, 488 Mich. 1050; 794 N.W.2d 333 (2011) (table).

On June 20, 2011, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition in this Court. Respondent argues in an answer to the petition filed through counsel that Petitioner's claims fail on the merits. Although the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed both of Petitioner's claims for "plain error" due to Petitioner's failure to preserve the issues for appellate review, Respondent has not argued that Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted. Procedural default, however, is not a jurisdictional matter, and the Court is not required to raise the issue sua sponte. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997); Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court therefore proceeds to the substantive merits of Petitioner's claims, using the following standard of review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)." Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011). Pursuant to § 2254, the Court may not grant a state prisoner's application for the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court's adjudication of the prisoner's claims on the merits

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the "contrary to" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state courtdecides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O'Connor, J., opinion of the Court for Part II).

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on his or her claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

III. DISCUSSION
A. The Evidentiary Claim

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by commenting on Petitioner's status as a prior felon1 and by eliciting evidence that Petitioner committed prior "bad acts." According to Petitioner, the prosecutor contaminated his trial by vilifying him as a dangerous felon and by inducing the jury to convict him on the basis of unproven priorassaults on the complainant, Trisha Cooley. Petitioner contends that the "bad acts" evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial and that the prosecutor failed to give proper notice of his intent to introduce the evidence. Petitioner also asserts that, without a limiting jury instruction, there was nothing to prevent his jury from giving carte blanche treatment to the improper "bad acts" evidence.

The Michigan Court of Appeals thoroughly discussed this issue under state law and concluded that the admission of the challenged evidence was proper. This Court finds no merit in Petitioner's claim because

[t]here is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state violates due process by permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence . . . . While the Supreme Court has addressed whether prior acts testimony is permissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136 L. Ed.2d 574 (1997); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988), it has not explicitly addressed the issue in constitutional terms.

Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2003). Because there is no Supreme Court precedent barring the use of "bad acts" evidence on constitutional grounds, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his evidentiary claim. His disagreement with the state court's ruling on "bad acts" evidence involves no constitutional dimension and, therefore, is not a cognizable claim on federal habeas corpus review. Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir. 2007).

Even if the claim were cognizable on habeas review, it lacks merit for the following reasons. The Court cannot grant relief on the basis of the prosecutor's alleged violations of the Michigan Rules of Evidence and other provisions of state law, because "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,780 (1990). "In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).

While it is true that habeas corpus relief may be warranted if an evidentiary ruling was "so egregious that it result[ed] in a denial of fundamental fairness," Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003), evidence of, and comments on, Petitioner's prior conviction were necessary to establish the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. As for the prior physical abuse, the testimony on this matter did not permeate the trial, as Petitioner contends. Trisha Cooley testified that Petitioner had been hurting her for about a year and a half to two years. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 73, Mar. 3, 2009.) She also claimed that the incident on August 8, 2008, was not the first time that Petitioner had been enraged and abusive, but then apologetic. (Id. at 36.)

Tracy Cooley (Trisha's father) testified that he had seen bruises on Trisha (id. at 103), that there were...

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