Taylor v. Isom
| Decision Date | 02 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:11-CV-1351 CAS,4:11-CV-1351 CAS |
| Parties | CHANEL TAYLOR, by her next friend, Morline Patton Taylor, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL ISOM, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on defendant Latroy Taylor's motion to dismiss the claims against him in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint"). Plaintiff Chanel Taylor opposes the motion and it is fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's state law claims of assault and battery in Count IV on the basis of official immunity, and deny it in all other respects.
This action arises out of an incident that occurred on September 28, 2010. The Complaint alleges that plaintiff Chanel Taylor, a minor, observed defendant St. Louis police officers Dresch, Christ and Taylor arresting an individual named Kwame H., and saw the officers force his face and body to the ground, with one officer placing his forearm in the man's neck and another placing his knee in the man's back. Plaintiff thought these actions were police brutality and she "verbally expressed her displeasure to officers." Complaint at 4, ¶¶ 10-14. Plaintiff was 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighed 125 pounds at the time. Officer Taylor called for emergency backup, and defendant Stockley and another officer arrived. Taylor ordered Stockley to arrest plaintiff. Although plaintiff did not resist, Stockley grabbed her right arm, placed it in a position known as an "arm bar" andtwisted plaintiff's right arm until her wrist broke. Plaintiff's body went limp and she was taken into custody. Complaint at 4, ¶¶ 14-20.
Plaintiff asked Stockley, Taylor, Dresch and Christ for immediate medical care but all declined. Plaintiff was transported to the St. Louis Metropolitan police station where she was booked and processed, and asked for medical attention throughout the process. Plaintiff was denied medical attention for approximately five hours, and then was taken to the Children's Hospital emergency room where it was confirmed that her right wrist was fractured. After receiving treatment, plaintiff was returned to the St. Louis City Justice Center and charged with Interference with a Police Officer and Resisting Arrest in violation of St. Louis City Ordinances, and those charges remain pending. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 22-27.
The Complaint alleges that the charges filed against plaintiff have no legal or factual merit and were issued for pretextual reasons to cover up the defendants' misconduct against plaintiff, as plaintiff did not at any time accost, assault, resist or otherwise provoke the defendant police officers' assault and use of force against her. The Complaint also alleges that each of the defendant police officers had the ability to intercede and prevent physical harm from occurring to plaintiff, but they failed to so intercede. Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.
The Complaint asserts three civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Stockley, Taylor, Dresch and Christ: use of excessive force (Count I); "unlawful seizure by arrest and detention" (Count II); and conspiracy to violate plaintiff's civil rights (Count III). The Complaint also asserts supplemental state law claims: assault and battery against defendants Stockley and Taylor (Count IV); and false arrest and false imprisonment against defendantsStockley, Taylor, Dresch and Christ (Count V).1 Defendants Stockley, Taylor, Dresch and Christ are sued in their individual and official capacities. Complaint at 4, ¶ 8.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of its allegations, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), but "must include sufficient factual information to provide the 'grounds' on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted). This standard "simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element]." Id. at 556.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, even if it appears that "actual proof of those facts is improbable," id. at 556, andreviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (). Although legal conclusions can provide the framework for a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id. at 1950. Plausibility is assessed by considering only the materials that are "necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint[.]" Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoted case omitted). The plausibility of the plaintiff's claim is reviewed "as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation." Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010).
Defendant Taylor first argues that plaintiff's claims against him in his official capacity must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which bars suits against a state or one of its agencies in federal court unless the state has given consent to be sued. In support of his motion, defendant cites several Supreme Court cases discussing Eleventh Amendment principles, specifically Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1994); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), and Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Defendant makes the conclusory assertion that plaintiff "is suing Taylor in his official capacity; thus her suit is against the state." Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 4. Implicit in defendant's argument is the necessary propositionthat his employer, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, is an arm of the state. Plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's Eleventh Amendment argument in her opposition memorandum.
The "sovereign immunity enjoyed by states and recognized in the Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from bringing actions for damages against unconsenting states in federal courts." Thomas v. Saint Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 447 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). Eleventh Amendment immunity "extends to states and 'arms' of the state," but it does not extend to local governments. Id. "[T]he question whether a particular state agency . . . is . . . an arm of the State, and therefore 'one of the United States' within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of federal law." Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997)).
The United States Supreme Court has squarely held that the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners is not an "arm of the state" for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 n.1 (1997) (); see also Thomas, 447 F.3d 1082 (). In Thomas, the Eighth Circuit observed that while "[r]ecent developments in Missouri law appear to have eroded the Eleventh Amendment" analysis in Auer, only the Supreme Court can overrule Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1086. Defendant Taylor does not cite to any decision overruling Auer and, in fact, his motion does not acknowledge the existence of Auer, Thomas, or any of this Court's multiple decisions following Auer and Thomas and holdingthat the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners and its employee police officers are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.2
Based on the controlling precedent of Auer and Thomas, the Court will deny defendant Taylor's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against him on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Defendant Taylor moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims against him in his individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity. Taylor's motion makes the conclusory assertion that he is entitled to qualified immunity, but does not specify the claims in the Complaint to which this defense is raised. "Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability in a section 1983 action unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known." Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Taylor's...
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