Taylor v. Kentucky

• Decision Date: 30 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-5549,77-5549
• Citation: Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978)
• Parties: Michael TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of KENTUCKY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

436 U.S. 478

98 S.Ct. 1930

56 L.Ed.2d 468

Michael TAYLOR, Petitioner,

v Commonwealth of KENTUCKY.

No. 77-5549.

Argued March 27, 1978.

Decided May 30, 1978.

Syllabus

At petitioner's Kentucky state robbery trial, which resulted in his conviction, the trial court instructed the jury as to the prosecutor's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt but refused, inter alia, petitioner's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence.The robbery victim was the prosecution's only witness, and petitioner was the sole defense witness.The prosecutor in his opening statement related the circumstances of petitioner's arrest and indictment.In his closing statement, the prosecutor made observations suggesting that petitioner's status as a defendant tended to establish his guilt.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, rejecting petitioner's argument that he was entitled to the requested instruction as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.Held : On the facts, the trial court's refusal to give petitioner's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 24 S.Ct. 49, 48 L.Ed. 121, distinguished.Pp. 483-490.

(a) While the legal scholar may understand that the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof are logically similar, the ordinary citizen may draw significant additional guidance from an instruction on the presumption of innocence.Pp. 483-485.

(b) An instruction on the presumption is one way of impressing upon the jury the importance of an accused's right to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of evidence introduced at trial and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.Pp. 485-486.

(c)The prosecutor's remarks during his opening and closing statements, together with the skeletal instructions of the trial court, gave rise to a genuine risk that the jury would convict petitioner on the basis of extraneous considerations, rather than on the proof adduced at the trial, a risk heightened by the fact that the trial was essentially a swearing contest between victim and accused.Pp. 486-488.

(d) That the trial court instructed as to the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt did not obviate the necessity for a presumption-of-innocence instruction in view of both the special purpose of such an instruction and the particular need for it in this case.P. 1936.(e) Nor did the fact that defense counsel argued the presumption of innocence in both his opening and closing statements dispense with the need for a presumption-of-innocence instruction, since arguments of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court.Pp. 488-489.

551 S.W.2d 813, reversed and remanded.

J. Vincent Aprile, II, Frankfort, Ky., for petitioner.

Guy C. Shearer, Frankfort, Ky., for respondent.

Mr. Justice POWELLdelivered the opinion of the Court.

Only two Terms ago, this Court observed that the "presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice."Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126(1976).In this felony case, the trial court instructed the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but refused petitioner's timely request for instructions on the presumption of innocence and the indictment's lack of evidentiary value.We are asked to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that either or both instructions be given upon timely defense motions.

I

Petitioner was tried for robbery in 1976, allegedly having forced his way into the home of James Maddox and stolen a house key and a billfold containing $10 to $15.During voir dire of the jury, defense counsel questioned the panel about their understanding of the presumption of innocence,¹ the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,² and the fact that an indictment is not evidence.³The prosecutor then read the indictment to the jury.⁴

The Commonwealth's only witness was Maddox.He testified that he had known petitioner for several years and had entertained petitioner at his home on several occasions.According to Maddox, petitioner and a friend knocked on his door on the evening of February 16, 1976, asking to be admitted.Maddox refused, saying he had to go to bed.The two left, but returned 15 minutes later.They forced their way in, hit Maddox over the head, and fled with his billfold and house key, which were never recovered.

Petitioner then took the stand as the only witness for the defense.He admi ted having been at Maddox's home on other occasions, but denied going there on February 16 or participating in the robbery.He stated that he had spent that night with two friends sitting in a parked car, watching a rainstorm and a power failure.Defense counsel requested the trial court to instruct the jury that "[t]he law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime,"⁵ and that the indict- ment, previously read to the jury, was not evidence to be considered against the defendant.⁶The court declined to give either instruction, and did not convey their substance in its charge to the jury.It did instruct the jury as to the Commonwealth's burden of proving petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.⁷Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to five years of imprisonment.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting.551 S.W.2d 813(1977).Pet tioner argued ⁸—and the Commonwealth denied ⁹—that he was entitled as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to instructions that he was presumed to be innocent ¹⁰ and that his indictment was not evidence of guilt.Both sides briefed federal decisions at some length.Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's presumption-of-innocence contention by citing Kentucky case law for the proposition"that as long as the trial court instructs the jury on reasonable doubt an instruction on the presumption of innocence is not necessary."Id., at 814.Without citing any authority, the court also declared that there was no merit in the position "that failure to give . . . an instruction [on the indictment's lack of evidentiary value] denies the defendant due process of the law."Ibid.Because petitioner had not made a contemporaneous objection, the court refused to consider petitioner's additional contention that the prosecutor's closing argument had been improper.¹¹The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied discretionary review, and we granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 964, 98 S.Ct. 502, 54 L.Ed.2d 449(1977).We now reverse.

II

"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403, 39 L.Ed. 481(1895).The Coffin Court traced the venerable history of the presumption from Deuteronomy through Roman law, English common law, and the common law of the United States.While Coffin held that the presumption of innocence and the equally fundamental principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt were logically separate and distinct, id., at 458-461, 15 S.Ct., at 404-405, sharp scholarly riticism demonstrated the error of that view, see, e. g., J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 551-576 (1898)(hereafter Thayer);9 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 2511 (3d ed. 1940)(hereafter Wigmore); C. McCormick, Evidence 805-806(2d ed. 1972)(hereafter McCormick).¹²

Nevertheless, these same scholars advise against abandoning the instruction on the presumption of innocence, even when a complete explanation of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is provided.Thayer 571-572; Wigmore 407; McCormick 806.See alsoALI, Model Penal Code§ 1.12(1)(ProposedOff.Draft 1962).This admonition derives from a perceived salutary effect upon lay jurors.While the legal scholar may understand that the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof are logically similar, the ordinary citizen well may draw significant additional guidance from an instruction on the presumption of innocence.Wigmore described this effect as follows:

"[I]n a criminal case the term [presumption of inno- cences does convey a special and perhaps useful hint over and above the other form of the rule about the burden of proof, in that it cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced.In other words, the rule about burden of proof requires the prosecution by evidence to convince the jury of the accused's guilt; while the presumption of innocence, too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which is perhaps only an implied corollary to the other) to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the evidence, i. e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused.This caution is indeed particularly needed in criminal cases.Wigmore 407.

This Court has declared that one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or in ocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.See,e. g.Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126(1976).And it long has been recognized that an instruction on the presumption is one way of impressing upon the jury the importance of that right.See, e. g., United States v....