Taylor v. King

• Decision Date: 07 April 1819
• Citation: 20 Va. 358
• Parties: Taylor v. King
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

20 Va. 358

Taylor v. King

Supreme Court of Virginia

April 7, 1819

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In Ejectment in the Superior Court of Montgomery County, by John M. Taylor against Joseph King, the Jury found a special verdict; that Andrew Lewis was seised of the land in the declaration mentioned, with the appurtenances, in fee; that, before the 1st of February 1809, he had by proper deed conveyed the whole to his son Charles G. Lewis, who was thereof seised, and, while in actual seisin, being indebted to Reuben and Randolph Ross in the sum of $ 1,515 32 Cents, on the 3d day of February 1809, executed, jointly with his father, a Deed of Trust to Henry Edmundson, to secure the payment of the said sum of money to the said Reuben and Randolph Ross; which Deed, being duly recorded, was found in haec verba: --that, on the 4th of June 1811, the said Reuben and Randolph Ross, for a valuable consideration, fairly and bona fide transferred their interest, in the said deed of trust and the money secured thereby, to John M. Taylor the lessor of the plaintiff, by a writing under seal, found also in haec verba: --that, on the 14th day of December 1811, the sum of $ 1273 14 1/2 Cents, secured by the said Deed of Trust, being due on account of principal and interest, the said Trustee, having fixed on Montgomery Court House, as the place of sale, distant from the premises about ten miles, and, at the request of the said Taylor, having duly advertised the time and place of sale according to the provisions of the Deed, proceeded to expose the Land and appurtenances according to the tenor and in the terms therein stipulated; and, after due outcry at the place designated, the same was struck off to the said John M. Taylor, (who was the only bidder,) for the said sum of $ 1273 14 1/2 Cents: that, before this sale, and before the date of the advertisement, the suit mentioned in the said deed, depending in the Court of Appeals, between Andrew Lewis appellant and the heirs of William S. Madison, had been finally determined in favour of Andrew Lewis, so as to secure the title, as in the said Deed is mentioned, to Charles G. Lewis: that Henry Edmundson the trustee, by a deed of bargain and sale, (found also in haec verba,) conveyed the premises to the lessor of the plaintiff: --that Charles G. Lewis, after he had made the said deed of trust, did regularly sell the land and premises for a valuable consideration, to wit, $ 15,000, to Joseph King the defendant, and put him in possession thereof: --that, on the day of sale of the premises under the deed of Trust, and before the land had been knocked off by the auctioneer, a certain Garnett Peyton attended, and had made a positive and satisfactory arrangement to purchase the land in partnership with him the Trustee; and, in consequence of that arrangement, the said Peyton had come to the resolution to bid as far as $ 8000, if the land could not be got for less; that, afterwards, on the same day, and before the sale had taken place, the said John M. Taylor, understanding that arrangement and determination, then and there agreed with Peyton, that, if he bought the land, the said Peyton should have it at the price of $ 8000: that, in consequence of this agreement, and the conduct of Taylor, Peyton did not bid at the sale: that, on the morning of the day of sale, one James Craig asked Taylor, if it would not be right for him to bid to the amount of the Deed of Trust; that Taylor then approved the said Craig's intention of bidding, but, in the evening, and before the land was struck off, came to him, and requested him not to bid; in consequence of which he did not bid; but, if Taylor had not made the request, he would have bid to the amount at which it was cried off to the said Taylor, and more rather than have lost the land: that Craig had not, at that time, by him, more than about $ 1100, but believed himself able to procure more money: that, in consequence of this conduct of the said Taylor, he was without a competitor in the market, and did obtain the land as the only bidder, at a very inferior and inadequate price; the land in the general estimation being worth from $ 8,000 to 10,000: that the said John M. Taylor, the creditor and lessor of the plaintiff, was guilty of a fraud at the sale of the land aforesaid, by which he obtained it, as purchaser, at less than one seventh part of it's real value, to the injury of the said Joseph King. The verdict concluded in the usual form.

The Superior Court, upon this special Verdict, entered judgment for the defendant; from which the lessor of the plaintiff appealed.

Reversed judgment.

Wickham for the appellant.

By virtue of a deed of trust, the legal estate is in the Trustee, who therefore may bring Ejectment, even after the debtor has paid the money without taking a release; for the estate, without a release, does not revert. So a mortgagee may bring Ejectment, before forfeiture; and the only remedy of the mortgagor is in equity. --At law, the person giving the deed, retains no estate, either in fee, or freehold, or for years.

The Deed therefore from the Trustee to the purchaser passed the estate; being good between them. --The Trustee can not recover from the purchaser, or defend himself from a suit for the land, founded on his own act. --Admit it not binding as to the debtor: --this can be in relation to his right only which is merely equitable. --Can a fraud committed by others, turn it into a legal right?

Suppose the fraud had been between the Trustee and a purchaser, without the creditor; --would the deed be void absolutely, or only pro tanto? --Suppose the creditor a party to the fraud; what becomes of the estate? --Does it remain in the Trustee, notwithstanding his own deed? Can the debtor bring Ejectment, where the land has been sold, and possession delivered, by the Trustee to the purchaser? why should he? for the purchaser with notice of the trust, and of it's not being duly executed, is himself a trustee. ^[a] The proper remedy of King is by Bill in Equity to redeem or to set aside the sale; making the purchaser a party, who, then, must prove the sale regular, or the decree will be against him. --So, if A. sells to B., but makes no conveyance to him, and afterwards conveys to C.; (a purchaser with notice of B.'s right; ) the conveyance is good at law: --the fraud of A. & C. does not give B. a legal estate: --his only remedy is in Equity.

It may be contended that a Court of common law has jurisdiction in cases of fraud. --I answer, that the Deed of Trust, which passed the legal estate, was not founded in fraud: but, if it were, the Court of law can not take cognizance of it, for the estoppel operates. --The case of Chew ex'or. of Wormley v. Moffett, lately decided, (ante) turned on the circumstance that, by joining issue, the objection to the legality of the plea was waived; --otherwise, the decision would have been different.

The rule laid down in the Books, is, that all contracts of a nature generally repugnant to the policy, or contrary to the provisions, of the common law, are void. --But the rule relates to contracts whose general nature and object is illegal; such as bonds for compounding prosecutions for perjury; ^[a] for the wages of prostitution, & c. ^[b] A similar rule applies to contracts prohibited by Statute. For example, a conveyance of all the goods of a trader, is an act of bankruptcy and void: ^[c] so also, bonds tainted with Usury, & c., are void.

In like manner, a Bond may be avoided on the ground of fraud committed in it's execution; as, if an illiterate person be induced to sign it, by reading it to him in words different from those in which it is written; ^[d] for, in such case, the mind of the obligor does not assent to the act.

The consequences of extending the rule farther, would be very inconvenient. Suppose the creditor, on a settlement, brings in a false charge of 51. 0. 0 in 10001., and takes a bond, for too much, to that amount: --if the debtor could plead the fraud at law, the bond would be avoided altogether; whereas the rule in Equity is, that the fraudulent instrument is void only so far as it ought to be so.

Again, if a person defrauded, executed a Deed, would it be proper to permit him to avoid it in the hands of a purchaser without notice? If so, what becomes of titles?

There is not a case like this, in which the conveyance has been decided to be void at common law: --but there are thousands in equity. Questions relating to purchasers without notice, breaches of trust, & c., form a main pillar of equitable jurisdiction, which would be thrown down, if the judgment now in question should stand.

Call for the appellee.

1. The deed from the trustee was void between the parties, for every fraudulent act is void in law; and a Court of law is competent to declare it so. ^[e] Neither is there any difference between a deed and simple contract; for what is base in it's origin can not be made good by forms. ^[f] If you put the question upon the foundation of the mind's not assenting; that reason is as much applicable to one species of fraud as another. If a man, intending to give a bond for twenty shillings, is imposed upon, and made to give one for twenty pounds, the bond is void, (says Mr. Wickham,) because his mind never assented: but the truth is, the ground of avoidance is the fraud committed by his adversary.

A defendant is not estopped from pleading a collateral matter which makes a deed void, or voidable: --not by the old law; as in the cases of the deed obtained by fraud from an illiterate man, ^[g] and where a man persuaded a woman to execute writings to another, as her trustee upon an intended marriage, which in truth contained...