Taylor v. Lansing Bd W & L

• Citation: 725 N.W.2d 84,272 Mich. App. 200
• Decision Date: 27 June 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 265533.
• Parties: Joni TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. LANSING BOARD OF WATER AND LIGHT, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

725 N.W.2d 84

272 Mich. App. 200

Joni TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. LANSING BOARD OF WATER AND LIGHT, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Docket No. 265533.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 14, 2006, at Detroit.

Decided June 27, 2006.

Approved for Publication August 29, 2006, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication December 7, 2006.

Schram, Behan & Behan (by Michael R. Behan and Raymond R. Behan), Okemos, for the plaintiff.

Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by Stephen O. Schultz and Sarah J. Gabis), and Amy M. Cavanaugh, Lansing, Lansing, for the defendant.

Edward M. Thomas, Corporation Counsel, and Colleen S. Pacler, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for amici curiae Wayne County.

William C. Mathewson, Ann Arbor, for amici curiae the Michigan Municipal League.

Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right an order granting, in part, summary disposition in plaintiff's favor and ordering defendant to disclose certain documents pursuant to the Michigan Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq. Plaintiff cross-appeals that portion of the order determining that the requested personnel records were exempt from disclosure and denying their release. Because we conclude that none of the documents requested by plaintiff was exempt from disclosure, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Plaintiff filed this action seeking an order compelling defendant, a public body, to produce documents she requested under FOIA. In the request, plaintiff sought disclosure of, among other things, Virginia Cluley's (and others') personnel files, e-mails between identified individuals on specific dates, correspondence between named individuals on specific dates, and approval and expense reimbursement information for named individuals on specific dates. Defendant denied the request in a September 29, 2004, letter stating, "It is apparent that the intended use of the requested documents is for the civil lawsuit of Cluley v. Lansing Board of Water and Light and that you are acting as the Plaintiffs' agent and on their behalf in requesting the documents. Therefore, the requested items are exempt from disclosure under FOIA." Plaintiff thereafter filed an action against defendant, alleging that defendant improperly denied the request in violation of FOIA.

Defendant moved for summary disposition in the trial court, arguing that at the time of plaintiff's FOIA request, defendant was involved in litigation with plaintiff's best friend, Virginia Cluley, who had told plaintiff about the lawsuit she had filed against defendant. Defendant also pointed out that Ms. Cluley's counsel in that lawsuit was the same counsel who prepared plaintiff's FOIA request and who currently represents plaintiff, and argued that plaintiff's FOIA request was an attempt to circumvent the discovery rules governing the Cluley action. Defendant claimed that it thus properly denied the request as seeking information exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(v). The trial court disagreed and, on September 26, 2005, entered an order denying defendant's motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff,¹ with the exception of requested personnel records, which the trial court deemed not subject to disclosure. Both parties now appeal the order.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 470 Mich. 274, 277, 681 N.W.2d 342 (2004). In considering a motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 278, 681 N.W.2d 342. If the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). Issues concerning the interpretation of a statute are questions of law that we also review de novo. Dressel v. Ameribank, 468 Mich. 557, 561, 664 N.W.2d 151 (2003).

Defendant argues on appeal that the requested documents are in fact exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(v). Defendant contends that in denying its motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, the trial court construed MCL 15.243(1)(v) too narrowly and in a manner contrary to the legislative intent. Plaintiff, in her cross-appeal, contends that while the trial court appropriately ruled in her favor, it also erred in excluding the requested employee personnel files, given that defendant did not argue that those files were exempt and that there is no specific FOIA exemption for personnel records.

The purpose of FOIA is to provide all persons, except those persons incarcerated in state or local correctional facilities, with "full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees. . . . The people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic process." MCL 15.231(2). FOIA mandates a policy of full disclosure, Stone Street Capital, Inc. v. Bureau of State Lottery, 263 Mich.App. 683, 687, 689 N.W.2d 541 (2004), and a public body must disclose all public records that are not specifically exempt under the act upon written request, MCL 15.233(1); Scharret v. City of Berkley, 249 Mich.App. 405, 411, 642 N.W.2d 685 (2002).

Pursuant to MCL 15.243(1), a public body may exempt the following from disclosure:

(a) Information of a personal nature if public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy.

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(d) Records or information specifically described and exempted from disclosure by statute.

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(v) Records or information relating to a civil action in which the requesting party and the public body are parties.

The exemptions must be narrowly construed, and the party seeking to invoke an exemption must prove that nondisclosure is in accord with the intent of the Legislature. City of Warren v. Detroit, 261 Mich. App. 165, 169-170, 680 N.W.2d 57 (2004). If a request for information held by a public body falls within an exemption, the decision to release the information becomes discretionary. Bradley v. Saranac Community Schools Bd. of Ed, 455 Mich. 285, 293, 565 N.W.2d 650 (1997). Whether requested information fits within an exemption from disclosure under FOIA is a mixed question of fact and law, and, on appeal, the trial court's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, but its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Stone Street Capital, Inc, supra at 686, 689 N.W.2d 541.

Case law is clear that initial as well as future uses of information requested under FOIA are irrelevant in determining whether the information falls within exemption, as is the identity of the person seeking the information. See, e.g., Clerical-Technical Union of Michigan State Univ. v. Michigan State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 190 Mich.App. 300, 475 N.W.2d 373 (1991); State Employees Ass'n v. Dep't of Mgt. & Budget, 428 Mich. 104, 404 N.W.2d 606 (1987). Thus, the public body asserting the exemption in MCL 15.243(1)(v) must prove that it is a party to a civil action involving the requesting party. Otherwise, this Court's ruling in Central Michigan Univ. Supervisory-Technical Ass'n v. Central Michigan Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 223 Mich.App. 727, 730, 567 N.W.2d 696 (1997) (holding that FOIA does not conflict with the court rules governing discovery, nor does it supplement or displace them), is applicable, and the public body is afforded no exemption from disclosure based solely on the status of one of the parties as litigants.

A plain reading of MCL 15.243(1)(v) would require a conclusion that the trial court correctly ruled the requested documents were not exempt. The plain language of the exemption cited by defendant applies only to information relating to a civil action in which both the requesting party and the public body are parties. "Party" is not defined in the statute itself, but is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) as "those by or against whom a legal suit is brought. . . ."² Plaintiff in this matter is the admitted best friend of Ms. Cluley, a party involved in a lawsuit against defendant. However, there is no dispute that plaintiff was not and is not a party to the Cluley action. MCL 15.243(1)(v) thus serves as no basis for exempting the records requested by plaintiff.

This Court is well aware that a literal interpretation of statutory language is disfavored when that interpretation would lead to an absurd result. See Houghton Lake Area Tourism & Convention Bureau v. Wood, 255 Mich.App. 127, 142-143, 662 N.W.2d 758 (2003). This Court is also well aware that a literal application of the statutory language leads to an absurd result in this matter. Plaintiff testified that when requesting the documents at issue, she was acting as Ms. Cluley's friend, and...