Taylor v. Lytle

• Decision Date: 25 October 1916
• Citation: 160 P. 942,29 Idaho 546
• Parties: H. C. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. CLARENCE L. LYTLE, Respondent, and CLARENCE L. LYTLE, Respondent, v. SPRINGSTON LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, and H. C. TAYLOR, Intervenor, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

160 P. 942

29 Idaho 546

H. C. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. CLARENCE L. LYTLE, Respondent, and CLARENCE L. LYTLE, Respondent, v. SPRINGSTON LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, and H. C. TAYLOR, Intervenor, Appellants

Supreme Court of Idaho

October 25, 1916

REAL PROPERTY - VENDOR AND PURCHASER - REPRESENTATIONS AS TO BOUNDARY-EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS.

1. While the purchaser of real property has a right to rely upon the representations made by the vendor as to the boundary lines thereof, where, as in this case, purchase of timber situated upon certain land has been made, and the purchaser testifies that a blazed line was pointed out to him by the vendor as the true boundary, and that he believed the representation so made and acted upon it to his injury and the vendor denies that he made such representation, and where it appears that the purchaser and others, prior to the transaction being completed, made an estimate of the timber in question, it is not error to admit evidence showing that it is customary for timber cruisers to definitely locate the boundaries of land upon which timber is situated, before making an estimate thereof, and that it would have been easy to do so, as tending to establish the probability, or improbability, of the testimony of the parties.

2. Although certain instructions, and portions of others, may not accurately state the law applicable to the facts in a case, when read and considered alone, if read in the light of the entire charge given to the jury they are not misleading the giving of such instructions will not constitute reversible error. All instructions given in a case must be read and considered together, and where they are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due consideration to the instructions as a whole rather than to an isolated portion thereof.

[As to liability of vendor for false representations innocently made, see note in Ann.Cas. 1913C, 63]

APPEALS from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District for Kootenai County. Hon. R. N. Dunn, Judge.

Action for damages. Judgment for defendant. Affirmed.

Judgments of the trial court affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

Action on promissory note. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Ezra R. Whitla, for Appellants.

The jury did not have to be satisfied, as instructed by the court, and any such instruction used under such circumstances as this is grossly erroneous, calling for a higher degree of proof than is contemplated by law. (Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 P. 627; Rosenbaum Bros. v. Levitt, 109 Iowa 292, 80 N.W. 393; Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146, 60 Am. St. 680, 45 N.E. 6, 39 L. R. A. 737; Willis v. Chowning, 90 Tex. 617, 59 Am. St. 842, 40 S.W. 395; O'Donohue v. Simmons, 12 N.Y.S. 843; Ball v. Marquis (Iowa), 92 N.W. 691; Torey v. McBuney, 113 Ala. 496, 21 So. 348.)

The purchaser has an absolute right to take the statement of the vendor and rely thereon without making further inquiry, and if the vendor misrepresents the facts, he is liable. (Davis v. Nuzum, 72 Wis. 439, 40 N.W. 497, 1 L. R. A. 774; Carlyle v. Sloan, 44 Ore. 357, 75 P. 217; Lynch v. Mercantile Trust Co., 18 F. 486, 5 McCrary, 623; Olson v. Orton, 28 Minn. 36, 8 N.W. 878; Ledbetter v. Davis, 121 Ind. 119, 22 N.E. 744; McGibbons v. Wilder, 78 Iowa 531, 43 N.W. 520; Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis. 220, 52 N.W. 88; Montreal River Lumber Co. v. Mihills, 80 Wis. 540, 50 N.W. 507; Holcomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396, 37 N.W. 497; Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26, 10 L.Ed. 42; Culbertson v. Blanchard, 79 Tex. 486, 15 S.W. 700; 20 Cyc. 55; Lawson v. Vernon, 38 Wash. 422, 107 Am. St. 880, 80 P. 559.)

C. H. Potts, for Respondent.

All instructions given in a case should be read and considered together and as a whole, and if when so considered they fairly present to the jury the law of the case, the judgment will not be reversed on account of some specific portion of the instruction, which, when taken alone, is incomplete and obscure. (State v. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 90 P. 860, 91 P. 318; People v. Bernard, 2 Idaho 193, 10 P. 30.)

We cannot determine the correctness of an instruction by segregating it from the entire charge and considering it alone. (Houser v. Austin, 2 Idaho 204, 10 P. 37; Just v. Idaho Canal etc. Co., 16 Idaho 639, 133 Am. St. 140, 102 P. 381; Rowley v. Stack-Gibbs Lbr. Co., 19 Idaho 107, 112 P. 1041; Knauf v. Dover Lbr. Co., 20 Idaho 773, 120 P. 157; Breshears v. Callendar, 23 Idaho 348, 131 P. 15; Osborn v. Cary, 28 Idaho 89, 152 P. 473; Quirk v. Sunderlin, 23 Idaho 368, 130 P. 374.) A purchaser of real estate cannot be voluntarily blind as to facts which are equally within the knowledge of both parties, and complain because of his own lack of diligence in ascertaining the truth when he was in a position to do so. (Stewart v. Larkin, 74 Wash. 681, 134 P. 186, L. R. A. 1916B, 1069; Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379, 20 L.Ed. 627.)

MORGAN, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Budge, J., concur.

OPINION

MORGAN, J.

During the fall of 1911 negotiations were entered into between appellant, Taylor, and the respondent looking to the purchase by the former from the latter of the timber situated upon the S. 1/2 of the NW. 1/4 and the NW. 1/4 of the SW. 1/4 of sec. 34, and the SE. 1/4 of the NE. 1/4 of sec. 33, Twp. 49 N., R. 2 W., B. M.

The result of these negotiations was that the parties agreed upon $ 12,000 as the purchase price of the timber, and, Taylor being unable to finance the deal, procured appellant, Springston Lumber Company, to do so for him. On December 12, 1911, the parties met in Spokane, Washington, where Lytle and his wife made, executed and delivered to the lumber company a deed transferring to it title to the timber, and received from it, in consideration therefor, the sum of $ 6,000 and its three promissory notes for $ 2,000 each.

It appears that the deed was so drawn as to convey title to the lumber company instead of to Taylor in order to secure the repayment to it by him of the purchase price, and that at the time, and as a part of the transaction, it entered into a contract with him whereby it purchased all the white pine saw timber on the land. It further appears that two of the promissory notes have been paid and that the other remains unpaid.

It is contended by Taylor that in this transaction Lytle, with the intent and purpose of deceiving and defrauding him and of inducing him to buy the timber, pointed out a certain blazed line which he represented to be the true north boundary of his land; that it was not the true line but was located about 265 feet north of and parallel with the actual boundary; that by reason of this fraud, misrepresentation and deception he was led to believe, and did believe, he was purchasing and would receive a body of valuable timber situated upon a strip of land about 265 feet wide and three-quarters of a mile long, which was no part of the land of respondent, but, in truth and in...